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BIASED DECISION MAKING IN A NATURALISTIC ENVIRONMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FORECASTS OF COMPETITIVE EVENTS 
by David C. J. McDonald 
This thesis, which is divided into five papers, explores biased decision making 
in naturalistic environments and its implications for the efficiency of financial 
markets and forecasts of competitive event outcomes. Betting markets offer a 
valuable  real  world  decision  making  context,  allowing  analysis  that  is  not 
possible using regular financial market data. The first paper surveys studies 
that have employed betting markets to investigate biased decision making and 
discusses  why  the  extent  of  these  biases  is  significantly  less  than  in  the 
laboratory. 
The second paper addresses unresolved issues relating to noise trading and 
herding in financial markets, by showing that noise trading is associated with 
increased market efficiency, that the extent of herding differs depending on the 
direction and timing of changes in market prices, and that this results in an 
economically significant inefficiency. The findings of this paper have important 
policy implications for wider financial markets: regulatory measures to protect 
investors from the destabilizing effects of noise appear to be self-defeating and 
herding  is  particularly  prevalent  when  uninformed  traders  perceive  that 
informed traders are participating in the market. 
The third and fourth papers address the favourite-longshot bias (FLB), where 
market  prices  under-/over-estimate  high/low  probability  outcomes.  These 
papers demonstrate that previous explanations of the bias are inconsistent with 
evidence  of  trading  in  UK  betting  markets  by  developing  and  testing  the 
predictions of models that explain the bias in terms of competition between 
market  makers  and  the  demand  preferences  of  bettors.  Moreover,  it  is 
definitively shown that, when no market maker is involved, the bias is due to 
cognitive errors of traders rather than their preference for risk, because only 
prospect theory, and not risk-love, can explain a reduced FLB in events with 
strong favourites. 
 
The  final  chapter  explores  methodological  concerns  relating  to  estimates  of 
forecast  accuracy  in  models  of  discrete  choice,  and  arrives  at  a  much  more 
rigorous understanding of the value of these estimates.   3 
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Introduction 
 
  In  contrast  to  normative  economic  theory,  decision  makers  have  been 
shown to be susceptible to judgemental biases when making choices (Simon, 
1955).  However,  the  vast  majority  of  evidence  for  this  conclusion  has  been 
obtained from laboratory-based studies. The generalizability of these results to 
the population as a whole has been questioned because it is well understood 
that  controlled  laboratory  conditions  cannot  replicate  the  richness  and 
complexity  of  real  life  settings,  with  subjects  often  lacking  the  relevant 
experience and meaningful incentives (Bruce and Johnson, 2003; Levitt and List, 
2007). Hence, an attractive alternative for researchers is to seek out evidence of 
biased  judgements  in  the  natural  environment  of  the  decision  maker.  The 
decisions of traders operating in financial markets, for instance, can be analyzed 
by seeing that the market price of a speculative asset results from the combined 
decisions of all traders, and so the average subjective probability estimates of 
the  asset’s  payoffs  can  be  determined;  this  can  be  compared  with  objective 
outcomes in order to determine whether participants in the market are biased 
in their decision making (Griffith, 1949). However, it is difficult to assess the 
extent of biases in regular financial market prices because uncertainty is always 
present,  with  prices  reflecting  the  current  subjective  expectation  of  future 
prices rather than objective fundamental information (Shleifer and Summers, 
1990). Hence, one can never be certain whether anomalies in financial market 
prices truly represent biased decision making or simply reflect the expectation 
of possible future events that may or may not occur in practice. 
  Betting markets are an ideal real world decision making environment in 
which  to  explore  biased  decision  making,  sharing  many  features  with  other 
financial markets and offering many advantages over laboratory experiments. 
In particular, they involve a large number of regular traders who have access to 
widely available information, a smaller number of traders who are particularly 
adept at combining information in such a way as to make excess returns, and a 
minority  of  traders  who  have  access  to  privileged  information  (Vaughan 
Williams and Paton, 1997). In contrast to laboratory conditions, betting markets 
are associated with rich, dynamic information sets, offer strong incentives for   12 
success, require the commitment of the individual’s own resources, and involve 
repeated trials. Most importantly, they have a defined end point at which all 
uncertainty  in  the  relation  between  prices  and  fundamental  information  is 
resolved,  thus  overcoming  the  problem  of  expectation  in  regular  financial 
markets. In addition, “in its simplest formulation, the market for bets in an n-
horse race corresponds to a market for contingent claims with n states in which 
the ith state corresponds to the outcome in which the ith horse wins the race” 
(Shin, 1993, p.1142). Betting markets also offer the opportunity of quantifying 
the  proportion  of  market  activity  attributable  to  informed  trading  (using  a 
model developed by Shin, 1993). Consequently, betting markets appear to offer 
considerable  advantages  for  the  study  of  biased  decision  making  in  a 
naturalistic environment. 
  This thesis is divided up into five separate but inter-related papers. The 
theme running through all the papers is that they examine to what extent and 
why decision makers make biased choices in a naturalistic environment and the 
implications of such biased behaviour for the efficiency of financial markets and 
forecasts  of  competitive  event  outcomes.  Throughout,  these  papers  develop 
new  insights  relating  to  behavioural  and  economic  biases  in  general  by 
developing innovative models and carrying out empirical tests on recent data 
drawn  from  UK  betting  markets.  Overall,  this  thesis  makes  a  significant 
contribution towards understanding the extent and nature of biased decision 
making in naturalistic environments. 
  Chapter  1,  entitled  “Evidence  of  biased  decision  making  in  a 
naturalistic  environment”,  a  version  of  which  is  to  be  published  in  the 
forthcoming title The Economics of Gambling (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
is a discussion of previous studies that have employed betting markets to study 
biased  decision  making,  with  particular  reference  to  systematic  biases  that 
were first discovered in the laboratory. Hence, it serves as an overall literature 
review  for  the  remainder  of  the  thesis,  although,  as  each  chapter  can  be 
considered a stand-alone paper, relevant literature is covered at the beginning 
of each subsequent chapter. This paper begins by noting (as have a number of 
other researchers, e.g., Ebbeson and Konecni, 1980; Funder, 1987) that, while 
there is a substantial literature consisting of evidence of biased decision making,   13 
such as the work of Simon (1955) on bounded rationality and Kahneman and 
Tversky on heuristics and biases (Kahneman et al., 1982), most of this research 
has been carried out in controlled laboratory conditions with subjects who are 
often students lacking the relevant experience for the task at hand. It outlines a 
number of reasons why there is a problem with generalizing the results of these 
studies  to  the  wider  population  and  shows  how  studies  of  betting  markets 
overcome this problem. Then it summarizes and discuss the results of betting 
market studies of a number of important decision making biases: the favourite-
longshot bias, anchoring and adjustment, herding, the gambler’s fallacy, and the 
hot hand. 
  Chapter  2  consists  of  a  paper  that  will  be  submitted  to  The Journal of 
Financial  Markets:  “Noise,  herding,  and  the  efficiency  of  market  prices: 
insights from markets for state contingent claims”. This paper shows how 
data  from  betting  markets  can  be  employed  to  provide  new  insights  into  a 
number of unresolved issues relating to two types of biased decision making 
that are prominent in the financial markets literature. First, it explores the role 
played in the efficiency of financial markets by noise trading, which is trading 
that is based on anything except information, and so appears to be a universally 
loss-making strategy (Black, 1986). An unanswered question has been whether 
noise trading results in excessively volatile, inefficient markets, in which added 
risks limit the possibility of arbitrage by informed investors (De Long et al., 
1990), or if noise is essential in providing liquidity to informed investors in 
order that markets are efficient (Bloomfield et al., 2009). It has been predicted 
and,  to  an  extent,  verified  empirically  (Campbell  and  Kyle,  1993)  that  a 
consequence of noise trading is increased volatility in market prices. So, on the 
one hand, it has been argued that noise results in volatility in excess of the 
variations justified by underlying fundamental information (Shiller, 1990), in 
which case, noise is detrimental to market efficiency because of its destabilizing 
effect  on  long-run  equilibrium  values,  with  risk-averse  informed  investors 
limiting their arbitrage to avoid liquidity risks (Shleifer and Summers, 1990). 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  suggested  that  noise  may  be  essential  for 
generating  liquid,  and  thus  efficient,  markets  (Black,  1986;  Grossman  and 
Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985). Noise trading might harm market efficiency, but only   14 
when prices are extreme; when prices are not extreme, noise traders help to 
make  prices  more  efficient  by  providing  liquidity  to  informed  traders 
(Bloomfield et al., 2009). The first aim of this paper is to answer these questions: 
are markets associated with a greater degree of noise trading also more volatile, 
and are these markets more or less efficient?  
  Second, this paper investigates the related decision making bias of herding, 
which occurs when market participants neglect their own private information 
and adjust their actions to be more representative of those of other traders. 
They  do  this  in  the  belief  (perhaps  mistaken)  that  other  traders  are  more 
informed than themselves. The combined activity of many herding traders can 
result in extraordinary changes in asset values over a short period, possibly 
leading  to  bubbles,  crashes  and  bank  runs  (Devenow  and  Welch,  1996). 
However,  empirical  evidence  for  the  phenomenon  is  inconclusive  in  both 
financial  markets  (Lakonishok  et  al.,  1992;  Wermers,  1999;  Sias,  2004)  and 
laboratory  investigations  (Cipriani  and  Guarino,  2005;  Spiwoks  et al.,  2008). 
One reason for this mixed evidence could be that previous studies failed to take 
account of differing levels of actual and perceived trading by investors with 
priviliged information at different times of the market as well as depending on 
the direction of price movements. The second aim of this paper, therefore, is to 
explore the extent and reasons for herd behaviour while accounting for these 
concerns. 
  The  third  and  fourth  papers  address  the  favourite-longshot  bias  (FLB), 
which is the widely-reported phenomenon wherby prices in markets for state 
contingent  claims  systematically  under-/over-estimate  high/low  probability 
outcomes (e.g., Dowie, 1976; Ali, 1977; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). It has 
been  attributed  to  a  wide  range  of  causes,  such  as  the  risk-loving  nature  of 
traders  (Weitzman,  1965),  errors  in  the  estimation of  probabilities  (Henery, 
1985), the pricing policies of bookmakers (Shin, 1993), and limited information 
of traders (Sobel and Raines, 2003). Each of these papers demonstrates that 
previous  explanations  of  the  bias  are  inconsistent  with  theoretical  and 
empirical considerations relating to recent trading in UK betting markets. The 
first  of  these  papers  addresses  bookmaker  and  exchange  markets  and  how 
competition  between  these  markets,  along  with  the  demand  preferences  of   15 
bettors,  can  provide  a  more  satisfactory  explanation  for  the  presence  (or 
absence) of the bias in these markets. The second of these papers addresses 
pari-mutuel  markets  and  investigates  using  a  novel  methodology  whether, 
when no market maker is involved, the bias is due to cognitive errors of traders 
rather than their preference for risk. 
  Chapter 3 is titled “The favourite-longshot bias in competing betting 
markets” and consists of a paper that is under review by The Economic Journal. 
Many studies have sought to explain the enduring presence of the FLB and its 
absence in some markets, but little consensus has been reached (Jullien and 
Salanié, 2008), particularly with respect to the presence (and absence) of the 
FLB in the two major competing types of horserace betting market in the UK 
and  Ireland  (and  in  other  jurisdictions,  such  as  Australia):  bookmakers  and 
betting exchanges. In order to explain observed patterns of the extent of the 
FLB at various times in these markets, this paper explores two aspects of these 
parallel markets: competition and informed trading. The markets for horserace 
betting in the UK are increasingly competitive, with the rapid rise of exchange 
betting,  along  with  many  existing  operators  and  a  wealth  of  information 
regarding  prices  available  to  bettors  via  internet  price  comparison  services. 
This  paper  develops  a  theoretical  model  to  investigate  the  optimal  pricing 
decisions of bookmakers when the betting public are able to rapidly compare 
prices, and also it is argued that informed trading has a significant effect on 
reducing  the  degree  of  the  FLB  in  either  type  of  market,  but  only  when 
transaction costs are low. These considerations lead to hypotheses, which are 
tested  empirically  using  a  novel  and  unique  dataset,  consisting  of  over  5.5 
million market prices: specifically, this paper analyzes how the bias develops 
over the course of the markets for 6058 races run between August 2009 and 
August 2010. 
  Chapter  4  (“New  evidence  for  a  prospect  theory  explanation  of 
systematic decision making bias in a market for state contingent claims”) 
will be submitted to Economics Letters, and hence is a concise but definitive 
account  of  whether  cognitive  errors  of  traders  or  risk  preferences  better 
explain the FLB in pari-mutuel markets (i.e., markets that are independent of a 
market maker). While there have been a range of explanations proposed for the   16 
FLB  in  pari-mutuel  markets,  a  simplified  but  useful  categorization  is  that 
bettors either have unbiased expectations, but are risk-loving, or have biased 
expectations, but are risk-neutral or risk-averse (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). 
However,  it  is  difficult  to  empirically  discriminate  between  these  competing 
explanations  because  each  is  observationally  equivalent.  Those  that  have 
attempted  this  task  have  relied  on  parametric  assumptions  or  assumptions 
relating to the choice  set of the  decision maker. This paper develops a new 
methodology for choosing between the hypotheses that does not rely on these 
assumptions, consisting of a representative agent model that predicts a ‘strong 
favourite’ effect on the level of FLB. Specifically, it is demonstrated that the level 
of bias in an individual event varies in a predictable manner depending on the 
traders’ risk preferences. If the representative agent is risk-seeking, the model 
predicts  an  increased  FLB  in  events  where  the  variance  of  the  odds  on 
competitors other than the favourite is relatively low, ceteris paribus. Convesely, 
if the representative agent is risk-averse, the level of FLB is reduced or a reverse 
bias is predicted when the same variable is relatively low. This prediction is 
independent of whether probabilities enter the decision process linearly (as in 
expected utility theory) or nonlinearly (as in prospect theory). Hence, empirical 
tests can be conducted that distinguish between hypotheses that do and do not 
require the representative agent to be risk-loving. The purpose of this paper 
therefore, is to test empirically the predictions of the model and definitively 
show whether expected utility theory or prospect theory better explains the 
FLB. 
  Chapter 5 consists of a paper with the title, “Properties of pseudo-R2 as 
an  estimate  of  forecast  accuracy  for  discrete  choice  models”,  and  is 
primarily concerned with methodological issues relating to statistical methods 
employed  in  studies  that  employ  models  of  discrete  choice,  of  which  the 
conditional logit model, employed throughout this thesis, is an example. Hence, 
this paper will be submitted to The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series 
B (Methodological). The motivation for this paper is that in many studies that 
have used discrete choice models, particularly many of the studies cited in this 
thesis, pseudo-R2s are reported as a measure of forecast accuracy. However, it is 
shown in this paper that there are significant concerns related to the evaluation   17 
of discrete choice models using pseudo-R2s. A key property of any means of 
evaluation of a forecast is its comparability across empirical models, both in the 
sense  that  its  interpretation  should  be  the  same,  and  that  standard  errors 
should  be  reported,  in  order  to  carry  out  significance  tests.  However,  little 
attention has previously been given to whether pseudo-R2s have this desirable 
property,  and  the  consequences  of  this  for  the  evaluation  of  discrete  choice 
models  using  pseudo-R2s.  Consequently,  there  are  three  broad  research 
questions that are asked in this paper. First, are pseudo-R2s directly comparable 
across models estimated on datasets with different characteristics? Second, if 
they  are,  what  is  the  most  appropriate  method  for  statistical  comparisons? 
Finally, how useful are pseudo-R2s in explaining the predictive power of model 
probabilities? 
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1. Evidence of biased decision making in a naturalistic 
environment 
 
Abstract 
 
The generalizability of laboratory-based research into behavioural biases has 
been  questioned  because  it  is  well  understood  that  laboratory  experiments 
cannot replicate the richness and complexity of real life settings. Naturalistic 
environments and betting markets in particular therefore offer an  attractive 
alternative for examining decision making behaviour. This paper discusses the 
results  of  studies  that  have  employed  betting  markets  of  various  kinds  to 
investigate decision making, with particular reference to systematic biases that 
were first identified in the laboratory. The primary conclusion of this paper is 
that,  while  systematic  biases  reported  in  the  laboratory  have  been  found  in 
naturalistic betting markets, the extent and generality of these biases in these 
real  world  environments  is  often  significantly  less.  We  attribute  this  to  the 
context of the decision task, the incentives offered, the lack of scrutiny involved, 
the experience of the decision makers, and the effect of aggregation.  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
  Psychologists  have  long  been  aware  of  the  limitations  of  normative 
models of judgement and decision making. Herbert Simon’s (1955) work on 
bounded  rationality  criticized  rational  models  of  decision  making  for 
disregarding factors such as the limited cognitive capacity of individuals. Later, 
psychologists  confirmed  experimentally  that  decisions  are  systematically 
biased  in  many  ways,  with  decision  makers  adopting  rules  of  thumb  or 
‘heuristics’ in order to more rapidly solve complex problems (Kahneman et al., 
1982). However, over the decades, it has become apparent that many of these 
conclusions have relied on experiments carried out under controlled laboratory 
conditions.  This  has  led  researchers  to  question  the  generalizability  of  the 
results (e.g., Bruce and Johnson, 2003; Levitt and List, 2007). In particular, it is 
well understood that laboratory experiments cannot replicate the richness and   20 
complexity of real life settings. As Festinger (1953, p.141) notes: “In the most 
excellently  done  laboratory  experiment,  the  strength  to  which  the  various 
variables can be produced is extremely weak compared to the strength with 
which  these  variables  exist  and  operate  in  real  life  situations”.  Naturalistic 
environments  offer  an  attractive  alternative  for  examining  decision  making 
behaviour, featuring subjects who, unlike in many laboratory experiments, are 
experienced in the task at hand and are not directly aware that their actions are 
under scrutiny. 
  Betting markets are naturalistic decision making environments that offer 
considerable potential for understanding decision making behaviour, sharing 
many features with other real world decision environments. In particular, they 
are associated with rich, dynamic information sets, offer strong incentives for 
success, require the commitment of the individual’s own resources, and involve 
repeated  trials.  This  paper  provides  a  survey  of  previous  studies  that  have 
employed betting markets of various kinds to investigate decision making, with 
particular  reference  to  systematic  biases  that  were  first  identified  in  the 
laboratory. 
  The remainder of this paper is structured in three main parts. First, we 
summarise  the  debate  over  the  generalizability  of  laboratory  findings  and 
identify  ways  in  which  naturalistic  environments  offer  an  alternative  for 
studying  biased  decision  making.  In  particular,  we  outline  the  usefulness  of 
betting  markets  and  review  a  range  of  studies  that  have  demonstrated  that 
bettors are, in many ways, rational and well calibrated decision makers. Second, 
we discuss the psychology behind the widely documented favourite-longshot 
bias.  Third,  we  address  two  decision  biases, anchoring  and  herding,  each  of 
which involve judgements of some unknown quantity being unduly influenced 
by external stimuli. Finally, we survey studies that have investigated biases that 
result  from  a  failure  of  individuals  to  recognise  randomness:  the  gambler’s 
fallacy and the hot hand fallacy. 
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1.2. Betting markets: decision making in a naturalistic environment 
 
1.2.1. The generalizability of laboratory findings 
 
  At  the  heart  of  this  discussion  is  the  distinction  between  experiments 
carried  out  under  controlled  conditions  in  artificial  laboratory  settings  and 
analysis  of  data  obtained  from  naturalistic  environments,  such  as  casinos, 
lotteries, and markets for betting on horseraces or other sports. While some 
experiments can claim to have been carried in ‘real world’ environments, we 
define  a  naturalistic  environment  as  one  that  “has  not  been  artificially 
manipulated (i.e., a nonexperimental setting)” (Johnson and Bruce, 2001, p.266). 
This distinction is crucial, and there is a long running debate concerning the 
relative  merits  of  the  two  alternative  methodologies  when  employed  in 
experimental  psychology  (e.g.,  Ebbeson  and  Konecni,  1980;  Hogarth,  1981; 
Funder,  1987;  Bruce  and  Johnson,  2003)  and  economics  (Harrison  and  List, 
2004; Levitt and List, 2007). A critical assumption in experimentation is that 
results  generalize  to  the  broader  population,  but  this  generalizability,  or 
‘external  validity’,  has  been  questioned  because  of  significant  variations  in 
observed  behaviour  between  laboratory  and  naturalistic  environments  (e.g., 
Ebbeson  and  Konecni,  1980;  Koehler,  1996).  The  factors  that  have  been 
identified as limiting the generalizability of laboratory experiments include the 
following: 
 
1. Context: Laboratory environments often present simplified versions of tasks 
that are more complex in real world environments, and so may unintentionally 
omit variables that are influential in the natural setting. Significant differences 
in behaviour may depend only on small changes to the experimental conditions 
(Ayton and Wright, 1994), and Harrison and List (2004, p.1010) note that 
 
although it is tempting to view field experiments as simply less controlled 
variants of laboratory experiments, we argue that to do so would be to 
seriously mischaracterize them. What passes for “control” in laboratory   22 
experiments might in fact be precisely the opposite if it is artificial to the 
subject or context of the task. 
 
In addition, there are variables that the experimenter cannot control, such as 
past experiences or social norms, that can affect the results (Levitt and List, 
2007). Finally, biases recorded in the laboratory may simply be a response to 
the specific laboratory stimulus, with those same biases not occurring under 
ordinary  circumstances  (even  while  resulting  from  the  same  cognitive 
processes). For example, when mistakes are made in visual perception tasks in 
the  laboratory,  it  is  usually  assumed  that  the  mechanisms  that  result  in  the 
error generally produce correct judgements in real life (Funder, 1987).1 
 
2. Experience: Laboratory studies typically use university students, who may be 
inexperienced in the task at hand. Hogarth (1981) highlights the importance of 
feedback  in  making  correct  decisions  over  the  continuous  time  period  often 
associated with real world decision making. Feedback is simply not available in 
‘one-shot game’ laboratory studies, so there is limited potential for participants 
to  learn  from  their  mistakes.  Even  worse,  they  frequently  carry  ‘baggage’: 
behaviour learned in the outside world entirely unsuited to the problem at hand 
(e.g.,  Burns,  1985).  Furthermore,  a  number  of  studies  demonstrate  large 
differences between the decision strategies of experts and novices in terms of 
the way they think, the nature of the decision models they employ, and the 
speed and accuracy of their problem solving (e.g., Larkin et al., 1980). 
 
3.  Scrutiny:  Laboratory  subjects,  who  are  usually  aware  that  they  are  being 
investigated, may be keen to project a particular image (even if they have no 
                                                 
1 As a further example of the importance of context in decision making, consider the following 
problem. There are four cards on the table, each with a letter on one side and a number on the 
other. The rule is, “If there is a vowel on one side of a card, then there is an even number on the 
other side.”  The cards show A, D, 4, and 7.  Which cards  must  be  turned  over  in  order to 
determine whether the rule is true or false? This is known as Wason’s four-card selection task 
(Wason, 1968), and usually less than 10% of people respond with the correct answer of A and 
7  (most  neglect  to  choose  7,  or  unnecessarily  include  4).  However,  when  this  problem  is 
reframed in terms of certain social contexts, such as asking subjects to test the  rule, “If a 
person is over 18, they can drink alcohol”, and replacing the cards with ‘16 years old’,  ‘22 
years old’, ‘Coke’, and ‘Beer’, the correct answer (‘16 years old’ and ‘Beer’) is given by most 
respondents, even though the problem is logically identical to the first, more abstract, task (e.g., 
Cox and Griggs, 1982).   23 
idea of the purpose of the experiment). The student volunteers studied in most 
investigations are more likely to be ‘scientific do-gooders’ (e.g., interested in the 
research,  or  seeking  approval  from  the  experimenter)  with  unusually  high 
awareness of the moral implications of their decisions. Scrutiny may therefore 
exaggerate  the  importance  of  pro-social  behaviours  such  as  altruism  and 
fairness (Levitt and List, 2007). Conversely, the anonymity that is often present 
in real settings may allow decision makers to feel that they are able to avoid 
being judged morally. 
 
4.  Incentives:  Laboratory  experiments  are  usually  conducted  with  relatively 
trivial rewards for success. However, in the real world, decision makers are 
often involved in high-stakes environments, where they must commit their own 
or  others’  resources  and  where  the  results  of  their  decisions  can  have 
significant  personal  consequences.  These  high-stakes  environments  can, 
therefore,  involve  a  meaningful  degree  of  risk.  This  can  lead  to  a  marked 
difference  in  risk  taking  behaviour  between  laboratory  and  real  world 
environments  (Yates,  1992).  For  example,  the  lack  of  excitement  and  low 
arousal levels in laboratory studies may lead to behaviours that would not be 
present in real settings (Anderson and Brown, 1984). 
 
The  issues  discussed  above  all  limit  the  generalizability  of  biased 
behaviour often found amongst laboratory participants to the wider population. 
However,  to  discard  laboratory  findings  outright  would  be  naive  (Hogarth, 
1981). Rather, data gathered in the laboratory and under naturalistic conditions 
have  their  own  strengths  and  weaknesses,  so  should  be  considered 
complementary (Keren and Wagenaar, 1985). For instance, naturalistic work 
suffers from the inability to use control groups and difficulties associated with 
the  replication  of  results.  In  addition,  laboratory-based  investigations  are 
usually  more  cost-effective  and  afford  the  possibility  of  isolating  specific 
variables. 
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1.2.2. Betting markets as valuable naturalistic environments 
 
  Betting  markets  offer  an  ideal  naturalistic  environment  in  which  to 
explore biased decision making. A key practical advantage is the availability of 
extensive  and  detailed  quantitative  data  relating  to  bettors’  decisions.  Since 
markets are finite in nature, there is a continually expanding set of ‘completed’ 
markets, i.e., self-contained time periods of betting with pre-defined endpoints, 
when all bets are settled in an unambiguous manner2. Furthermore, there is 
potential  for  comparative  analysis  across  different  types  of  event  or  bet, 
according to criteria such as quality (e.g., Smith et al., 2006), time of day (e.g., 
McGlothlin,  1956),  or  complexity  (e.g.,  Johnson  and  Bruce,  1998).  Thus,  it  is 
possible to control for some aspects of the decision setting. Most importantly, 
betting  markets  include  many  of  the  factors  regarded  as  distinctive  to 
naturalistic decision making (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993): uncertain dynamic 
environments,  poorly-structured  problems,  high  stakes,  time  stress, 
action/feedback  loops,  and  multiple  players.  Each  element  of  the  decision 
making event (i.e., the bet) is unique: no two horseraces or football matches are 
the same. Thus, the outcome is uncertain, and the information relating to that 
outcome is often (as it is in many real world decision environments) ambiguous, 
vague, or redundant. For example, it is not obvious how to combine the various 
factors that might enable one to predict participants’ performance. The dynamic 
nature  of  betting  markets  is  evidenced  by  the  constantly-updating  prices  as 
bettors with diverging opinions participate in the market. 
  Bettors, like many decision makers in real world environments, often risk 
meaningful  amounts  of  money  while  under  stress  from  time  pressures  (the 
window  of  opportunity  in  a  betting  market  may  only  last  minutes,  or  even 
seconds). A further important feature of these markets is the repetitive nature 
of betting. Since events take place regularly  and often, there is potential for 
gaining  familiarity  with  and  expertise  in  the  task.  Betting  markets  involve 
action-feedback loops; once bets have been placed and a market is closed and 
                                                 
2 This  is  a  particular  advantage  of  betting  markets  over  other  types  of  financial  market  for 
naturalistic research. The payoffs in betting markets are entirely unambiguous, so there is a 
time when all uncertainty is resolved. This is not the case in regular financial markets, where 
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decided,  bettors  receive  relatively  unambiguous  feedback  on  the  success  of 
their decisions, and this can be incorporated into future decisions (Goodman, 
1998). Also, betting markets involve multiple players, and it has been shown 
that  the  interaction  between  individuals  in  markets  can  significantly  reduce 
errors (Wallsten et al., 1997). This results from a variety of causes, not least the 
fact  that  different  individuals  use  different  decision  making  procedures  and 
have diverse information gathering skills. As a result, their reaction to the same 
information  may  vary.  Consequently,  the  final  prices  that  emerge  in  these 
markets  take  into  account  a  wide  range  of  information  and  the  forecasts  of 
many individuals, and studies show that combining diverse forecasts generally 
leads to significantly more accurate predictions (e.g. Vlastakis et al., 2009; Grant 
and  Johnstone,  2010).  In  addition,  betting  markets  are  not  subject  to  the 
limitations of laboratory investigations listed above. For example, bettors are 
unaware  that  their  decisions  may  be  scrutinized,  as  they  are  not  directly 
volunteering  to  take  part  in  an  experiment;  instead,  betting  patterns  are 
analysed in such a way as to observe their decisions unobtrusively. 
 
1.2.3. Betting market data and decision making 
 
  In any betting market, individuals are able to place bets on one or more of 
a set of outcomes of some future event. For instance, in the simplest of markets 
for betting on a horserace with n runners, n different bets are available, one for 
each horse to win the race. After the market has closed and the race has taken 
place, each bet pays, for each £1 staked, a return £Ri if horse i wins and nothing 
otherwise.  While  the  returns  Ri  (usually  referred  to  as  the  ‘odds’  against 
outcome i) are determined differently according to the type of market and event, 
they depend on the relative amounts bet on each outcome by all the market 
participants.  Consequently,  bettors  have  an  incentive  to  continue  to  place 
money on each outcome until the returns reflect the market’s best estimate of 
that outcome’s probability of occurring (Figlewski, 1979). Therefore, a typical 
approach  to  assessing  decisions  in  betting  markets  is  summarized  (with 
reference to horserace betting) by Griffith (1949, p.290): 
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the  odds  on  the  various  horses  in  any  race  are  a  functioning  of  the 
proportion of the total money that is bet on each and hence are socially 
determined. On the other hand, the objective probability for winners from 
any group of horses is given a posteriori by the percentage of winners. 
Thus the odds express (reciprocally) a psychological probability while the 
percentage of winners at any odds group measures the true probability; 
any consistent discrepancy between the two may cast light not only on the 
specific topics of horse-race betting and gambling but on the more general 
field of the psychology of probabilities. 
 
Hence, the ‘socially determined’ prices in betting markets reflect the ‘subjective 
probabilities’ assigned to each possible outcome by the bettors, in aggregate. 
The  results  of  the  event  then  determine  the  ‘objective  probabilities’.  Thus, 
biases can be detected by researchers by comparing subjective and objective 
probabilities. 
  A drawback of most betting market research is that, for ethical and/or 
practical reasons, it is usually not possible to obtain information relating to the 
decisions  of  individual  bettors.  Instead,  subjective  probabilities  are  an 
aggregation of opinions of all bettors. Hence, it is possible that ‘‘certain biases 
present  in  an  individual  bettor’s  decisions  are  being  counterbalanced  by 
opposite biases in other bettors’ decisions’’ (Johnson and Bruce, 2001; p. 280). 
Camerer (1987, p.982) notes that a common argument for the rationality of 
market participants is that “random mistakes of individuals will cancel out”, but 
also offers the counter-argument: “biases found by psychologists are generally 
systematic - most people err in the same direction”. Thus, the best we can hope 
for in betting market research is evidence of systematic bias. 
  A further weakness of employing betting market data to examine decision 
making  behaviour  is  that  psychologically  significant  biases  also  hold  an 
economic  significance.  Consequently,  if  some  bettors  (even  a  small  group) 
become  aware  of  an  overall  disparity  between  subjective  and  objective 
probabilities, they can potentially profit by betting against the bias. This could 
reduce the extent to which any systematic bias that exists amongst bettors is 
detectable  from  aggregate  betting  market  data.  Fortunately  for  researchers,   27 
transaction  costs  ensure  that  it  is  rarely  possible  to  entirely  arbitrage  away 
biases. 
 
1.2.4. Calibration of bettors’ judgements 
 
  Given  the  above  discussion,  it  might  be  expected  that  bettors  display 
significantly  less  biased  judgements  in  their  natural  domain  than  is 
demonstrated amongst naive participants in laboratory experiments. Indeed, 
Rosett  (1965)  found  that  horserace  bettors  are  generally  sophisticated  and 
rational  agents,  who  will  not  forego  combinations  or  sequences  of  bets  that 
offer higher probability of winning for the same return or higher return for the 
same  probability  of  winning.  Furthermore,  results  reveal  a  high  correlation 
between  subjective  and  objective  probabilities,  suggesting  that  bettors  are 
familiar  with  their  decision  making  environment  and  are  able  to  accurately 
forecast risky outcomes3. Rosett (p.596) notes that 
 
if  these  gamblers  behave  as  though  they  know  statistical  prediction 
methods and the probability calculus, it seems reasonable to suppose that, 
in  a  variety  of  other  circumstances,  human  beings  can  be  expected  to 
respond  appropriately  to  risky  situations  merely  after  having  had 
sufficient experience with them. 
 
Johnson and Bruce (2001) also investigated the calibration of horserace bettors’ 
subjective  probability  judgements.  They  found  that  bettors’  subjective 
probabilities  are  not  significantly  different  from  the  observed  objective 
probabilities.  They  noted  that,  while  there  is  substantial  evidence  of  poor 
calibration  in  decision  makers,  this  may  reflect  on  the  specific  laboratory 
experiments  involved.  For  example,  Shanteau  (1992)  suggests  that  task 
characteristics may account for differences observed in the quality of experts’ 
judgments; specifically, more competent performance is likely if the decisions 
involve stimuli that are relatively constant, the tasks undertaken are repetitive, 
                                                 
3 An exception holds for objective probabilities of less than 0.05, which is the favourite-longshot 
bias detailed in the second part of this chapter.   28 
and  where  decision  aids  are  widely  available.  Furthermore,  it  has  been 
empirically  observed  that  violations  of  rationality  are  reduced  under  the 
multiple play conditions that exist at the racetrack (e.g., Keren and Wagenaar, 
1987). Johnson and Bruce’s (2001) study therefore suggests that bettors are 
skilled in a similar way to weather forecasters, who are also required to make 
frequent risky forecasts (Murphy and Brown, 1984). Hoerl and Fallin (1974) 
also  found  no  significant  difference  between  subjective  and  objective 
probabilities in horseraces, and suggested that this is due to the high incentives 
available for successful gambling. 
  Not  only  are  bettors  well  calibrated  in  general,  they  are  able  to  adapt 
remarkably well to uncertain and dynamic information. Johnson, O’Brien, and 
Sung (2010) set out to test Gigerenzer’s (2000) assertion that evolution has 
equipped  humans  to  process  probabilistic  information  from  frequencies 
observed  in  a  natural  environment.  They  investigated  the  extent  to  which 
horserace bettors accounted for post position bias (an advantage/disadvantage 
afforded to the horses depending on their position in the starting stalls), a factor 
shown  to  be  a  particularly  important  determinate  of  race  outcomes  at  the 
racetrack examined. Despite the fact that track managers employed a variety of 
procedures to alter the bias (even between two consecutive races, and often 
unannounced) bettors were able to account for most of the changes through 
regular outcome feedback over 6 years. This finding may be accounted for by 
the fact that (i) bettors have a strong motivation to make accurate probability 
judgements as their own financial resources and often their peer group esteem 
depend on the outcome of their decisions (Saunders and Turner 1987), and (ii) 
those who frequently make probability judgments are often better calibrated 
(Ferrell  1994).  It  has  also  been  shown  that  bettors’  calibration  is  generally 
improving  over  time  (Smith  and  Vaughan  Williams,  2010)  and  that  expert 
bettors employ complex mental models encompassing a wide range of variables 
and interactions between these variables (Ceci and Liker, 1986). 
  In summary, naturalistic environments such as betting markets offer rich, 
complex settings in which to examine decision making biases that have been 
observed in the laboratory. Due to a number of factors, bettors appear to be 
more rational, well calibrated, and able to adapt to dynamic information than   29 
participants  in  laboratory  studies.  However,  there  are  a  number  of  ways  in 
which bettors are biased, and the first, and most widely documented, of these is 
the favourite-longshot bias, which is the focus of the next section. 
 
1.3. The favourite-longshot bias 
 
  By far the most reported departure from rationality in the betting market 
literature  is  that  of  the  favourite-longshot  bias  (FLB).  Prevalent  over  many 
decades  and  in  many  jurisdictions  around  the  world,  the  bias  is  the 
phenomenon  whereby  returns  to  bets  are  such  that  the  chances  of  high 
probability  outcomes  (favourites)  are  underestimated,  while  low  probability 
outcomes (longshots) are overestimated. 
 
1.3.1. Evidence from the laboratory 
 
  Preston and Baratta (1948) provided early laboratory evidence of the bias. 
They were concerned that ‘rational’ theories of behaviour could not universally 
explain peculiarities in the way people approached ‘wagering games’ (in which 
participants are required to bet on an uncertain outcome). They hypothesized 
that  players  apply  to  outcomes  a  scale  of  ‘psychological’  probabilities  not 
necessarily identical to their mathematically correct probabilities. In order to 
investigate this possibility, they carried out games with undergraduate students 
and  faculty  members  (the  latter  were  more  experienced  in  mathematics, 
statistics,  and  psychology).  The  game  required  the  participants  to  compete 
against each other, bidding for the chance to win a given prize with a given 
probability.  They  found  that  the  players  tended  to  pay  too  generously  for 
outcomes with low probabilities and not bid high enough for outcomes with 
high  probabilities.  The  indifference  point,  where  the  psychological  and 
mathematical probabilities coincided, was found to be about 0.20. Moreover, 
even the faculty members displayed the bias (although to a lesser extent than 
the  undergraduates),  despite  in  many  cases  appearing  to  actively  employ 
mathematics  when  forming  their  decisions.  The  experimental  findings  of 
Preston  and  Baratta  have  since  been  confirmed  in  numerous  laboratory   30 
experiments (e.g., Yaari, 1965; Rosett, 1971; Lichtenstein et al., 1974; Piron and 
Smith, 1994). 
 
1.3.2. Evidence from betting markets and explanations 
 
  The first evidence of the FLB in betting markets was from Griffith (1949). 
He was inspired by the laboratory evidence of Preston and Baratta (1948), but 
keen to test the results outside of the laboratory. Employing racetrack data, 
Griffith  found  that  horses  with  low  and  high  probabilities  of  winning  were 
systematically  over-  and  under-valued,  respectively,  a  result  consistent  with 
that  of  Preston  and  Baratta,  with  a  similar  indifference  point  of  about  0.20. 
McGlothlin (1956) replicated (and expanded upon) Griffith’s study with a larger 
data set, and found similar results. 
  In the decades that followed, a significant body of evidence for the bias 
emerged in betting markets around the world (e.g., in the USA: Ali, 1977; Asch 
et  al.,  1982;  in  the  UK:  Dowie,  1976;  Vaughan  Williams  and Paton,  1997;  in 
Australia and New Zealand: Tuckwell, 1983; Gandar et al., 2001)4. The emphasis 
in the research then shifted towards attempting to explain the origins of the 
bias. As a result, a broad range of explanations have been offered, including the 
‘bragging rights’ associated with holding a winning longshot ticket (Thaler and 
Ziemba,  1988)  or  the  additional  excitement  derived  from  longshot  betting 
(Bruce and Johnson, 1992). Henery (1985) suggests that bettors may discount a 
fixed proportion of their losing bets, leading them to believe that longshot bets 
are  more  attractive.  Alternatively,  the  bias  may  arise  from  particular 
characteristics of the market itself, such as the cost of obtaining information and 
transaction  costs  (Hurley  and  McDonough,  1995)  or  the  defensive  pricing 
policies adopted by bookmakers (Shin, 1991). In this paper we simply provide 
an overview of the significant debates concerning the origins of the FLB from 
the  perspective  of  bettors’  decision  behaviour;  for  more  comprehensive 
explorations, see surveys by Thaler and Ziemba (1988), Sauer (1998), Vaughan 
Williams (1999), Jullien and Salanié (2008), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2008). 
                                                 
4 Exceptions have been reported in the horserace betting markets in Hong Kong (Busche and 
Hall, 1988; Busche, 1994), the market at one racetrack in the US (Swidler and Shaw, 1995), 
and exchange betting markets in the UK (Smith et al., 2006).   31 
1.3.3. Do bettors love risk or do they misestimate probabilities? Expected utility 
theory vs. prospect theory 
 
  One strand of the FLB literature in particular merits attention because it 
has led to an important intellectual debate concerning the relative merits of two 
prominent competing theories for explaining decision making in wider fields: 
expected utility theory and prospect theory. The building block for this debate is 
the ‘representative bettor’. Weitzman (1965) introduced Mr. Avmart, a fictitious 
person  who  represents  the  ‘social  average’  of  all  bettors.  Weitzman’s  (p.26) 
innovation was to infer the preferences of the ‘most typical’ bettor from the 
population of bettors: 
 
instead  of  concentrating  on  individuals  and  trying  to  derive  utility 
generalizations  from  their  experimental  behavior,  more  nearly  the 
converse  approach  was  attempted.  A  plethora  of  data  concerning  the 
collective risk actions of parimutuel bettors was employed in investigating 
utility aspects of the behavior of a hypothetical member of the group. 
 
Weitzman was concerned primarily with constructing Mr. Avmart’s utility of 
wealth  curve  (the  mathematical  representation  of  preferences  over  various 
monetary outcomes and the basis of expected utility theory). He found that the 
FLB  in  the  data  was  best  explained  by  a  convex  utility  of  wealth  curve, 
indicating  that  the  average  bettor  is  locally  risk-loving  (i.e.,  preferring  the 
riskier,  low  probability  outcomes).  Quandt  (1986)  extended  the  analysis  by 
showing that the bias is the natural result of equilibrium in a market where the 
average bettor is risk-loving. The findings of Ali (1977) and Hamid et al. (1996) 
also supported this hypothesis. 
  However,  there  are  alternative  scenarios  that  can  explain  the  biased 
decisions  of  the  representative  bettor.  So,  for  instance,  Golec  and  Tamarkin 
(1998) showed that the FLB can arise if bettors are risk-averse in general but 
with a preference for skewness of returns. An alternative explanation stems 
from Preston and Baratta’s (1948) supposition that ‘psychological’ probabilities 
assigned to uncertain outcomes are systematically biased. If this is the case, the   32 
FLB can be explained solely with reference to bettors’ systematic misestimation 
of probabilities, and bettors need not be locally risk-loving. This is formalized in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory (later extended and renamed 
cumulative prospect theory; see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The important 
feature of prospect theory for this discussion is that objective probabilities are 
transformed  into  subjective  decision  weights  that  allow  for  biases  in  the 
estimation of probabilities. 
  Hence, there are now two broadly competing sets of theories regarding 
the explanations for the bias in terms of the representative bettor: are bettors 
unbiased in their estimation of probabilities, but risk-loving, or are bettors risk-
neutral, but biased in their estimation of probabilities? Unfortunately, there is 
no straightforward answer. As Yaari (1965, p.278) comments: 
 
at first blush it seems as though one cannot, by looking at empirical data, 
choose between the two hypotheses (distortion of utility versus distortion 
of probability) because utility and probability are two purely theoretical 
components of an integral decision process. Thus, the two hypotheses are 
empirically indistinguishable, and choosing between them is a matter of 
taste. 
 
However,  some  researchers  have  made  progress  in  this  regard.  Golec  and 
Tamarkin  (1995)  noted  that  risk-love  cannot  explain  the  relatively  unfair 
returns  for  the  low  risk,  low  return  side  bets  offered  by  some  bookmakers. 
Instead,  they  suggested  that  overconfidence  better  explains  the  FLB  (a 
conclusion consistent with bettors overestimating small probabilities). Jullien 
and  Salanié  (2000)  found  that  prospect  theory  better  explains  the  bias  for 
standard bets, although computational limitations of this approach restricted 
their analysis. Bradley (2003) adapted the approach of Jullien and Salanié by 
accounting for bet size and found an even better fit to the data. 
  More recently, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) set out to test the competing 
theories using a novel approach and a large dataset of all the horseraces run in 
North America from 1992 to 2001 (over 865,000 races). They first estimated 
the parameters of the two models by fitting them to standard ‘win’ bets. They   33 
then examined compound exotic bets, such as the ‘exacta’, a bet that two horses 
will finish a race in first and second place in a specific order. Snowberg and 
Wolfers reasoned that bettors would bet in the same manner in the exotic and 
win  betting  pools,  so  the  same  models  should  apply  for  each  bet  type. 
Accordingly, they used the fitted models to predict expected market prices in 
the exotic betting pools and compared their predictions with the actual prices 
on offer. They found that the misestimation of probabilities model predicted 
exotic bet prices more accurately than the risk-love model, and concluded that, 
with respect to the representative bettor, prospect theory explained the FLB 
more effectively than expected utility theory. 
  An important issue in this debate is the validity of the assumption that 
bettors’ decisions can be averaged by the representative bettor. In the third 
section of this paper, we show that the distinction between different types of 
bettor, on the basis of the quality of the information they hold or how they 
handle this information, is crucial to fully understanding another bias in betting 
behaviour.  Sobel  and  Raines  (2003)  demonstrated  this  by  differentiating 
between ‘serious’ and ‘casual’ bettors. They identify serious bettors as those 
that attend the racetrack on week nights, bet larger sums, and bet to a greater 
extent  on  more  complicated  types  of  bet.  On  the  other  hand,  casual  bettors 
attend primarily on weekends and bet smaller sums on simpler types of bet. 
Sobel  and  Raines  found  evidence  of  the  FLB,  but  the  bias  was  significantly 
reduced in those races that involved a higher proportion of serious bettors. 
 
1.3.4. The late-race effect 
 
  A curious element of the nature of the FLB is its apparent tendency to vary 
in a systematic manner over the course of a day’s betting activity. In horserace 
betting  markets,  in  particular,  it  has  been  found  that  the  extent  of  the  bias 
appears to increase significantly in the last race or last few races of the day, a 
phenomenon that has become known as the ‘late-race effect’. Early evidence of 
this pattern was uncovered by McGlothlin (1956), who found that, in the last 
race of the day, bettors underbet favourites to a greater extent than in any other 
race. He suggested that bettors might avoid bets on favourites in the last race   34 
because  winning  such  bets  would  not  recoup  earlier  losses  (the  track  take 
ensured  that  most  bettors  would  finish  the  day  out  of  pocket).  Rather,  they 
preferred to bet on longshots, hoping for a lucky win in order to end the day in 
profit. 
  Over  time,  as  more  evidence  of  the  late-race  effect  emerged,  it  was 
explained in terms of the risk-loving attitudes of the representative bettor. For 
example, Ali (1977), who found a greater degree of the FLB in the last race than 
the  first  two  races  of  the  day,  posited  that  this  demonstrated  that  bettors 
became more risk-loving as the day progressed. Similarly, Asch, Malkiel, and 
Quandt (1982) replicated McGlothlin’s (1956) results, although, in their study, 
the extent of the bias was greater in the last two races of the day. Metzger (1985) 
also  found  evidence  of  the  effect,  but  only  if  the  first  race  of  the  day  was 
excluded from the analysis. The late-race effect soon passed into betting lore, 
with Kopelman and Minkin (1991) describing how an avid racing enthusiast 
known as ‘Gluck’ espoused the rule: ‘The best time to bet the favourite is in the 
last race’. Kopelman and Minkin’s analysis confirmed that there was a sound 
economic basis for Gluck’s rule. 
  More recent evidence has thrown the existence of the late-race effect into 
question. Johnson and Bruce (1993) found that in UK betting shops, bettors 
tended to place more bets on favourites in the last race, and suggested that this 
might be due to a ‘break even’ effect, whereby bettors seek to recover their 
losses by betting on outcomes that have at least a moderate chance of occurring. 
This hypothesis is supported by evidence that decision makers tend to exhibit 
loss aversion after a series of prior losses (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). Similarly, 
Brown, D’Amato, and Gertner (1994) observed a greater prevalence of the FLB 
in  the  last  race  of  the  day  than  in  earlier  races,  but  the  difference  was  not 
statistically  significant.  Sobel  and  Raines  (2003)  found  a  slight  increase  on 
betting on longshots in the last two races of day. However, they also found that 
the general trend over the latter half of the evening was for bettors to begin to 
prefer  favourites  and  shun  longshots.  Finally,  Snowberg  and  Wolfers  (2010) 
found no significant difference in the extent of the FLB in the last race of the day 
(in a dataset of over 850,000 races), suggesting that the late-race effect has now 
been eliminated.   35 
  From the contrasting evidence discussed above, it appears that bettors’ 
increasing risk-love over a day’s betting cannot fully explain the late-race effect. 
Johnson and Bruce (1993) consider that their converse result (a decreasing FLB 
in the last race) could be explained by a ‘break-even’ effect. However, a similarly 
plausible explanation is used by other authors to explain the opposite effect (an 
increasing FLB in the last race). Furthermore, it is not clear that expected utility 
theory is an adequate explanation. As Thaler and Ziemba (1988, p.171) ask, 
“why  should  a  reduction  in  wealth  increase  the  tendency  for  risk  seeking?” 
Camerer (2001) points out that expected utility theory cannot explain why the 
same bettor leaves the racetrack one day, arrives again the next, and adopts a 
completely different risk attitude. Thaler and Ziemba propose that the effect can 
be explained by ‘mental accounting’, whereby bettors partition their wealth into 
separate accounts, and do not attempt to recoup losses in one account with 
funds in another. So, the late-race effect could be explained by bettors opening a 
mental account at the beginning of the day and closing it at the end, with an 
increasing desperation to break even as the day progresses (Camerer, 2001). 
Finally, the relative paucity of evidence for the effect in recent years could be 
attributed to a learning effect among bettors, as those who are aware of the 
effect are able to arbitrage it away should it reappear. 
  In  summary,  the  FLB,  while  proving  to  be  an  interesting  riddle  for 
researchers,  admirably  demonstrates  the  value  of  naturalistic  environments, 
betting  markets  in  particular,  in  the  study  of  decision  making.  While  some 
potentially unrealistic simplifications (such as the representative bettor) must 
sometimes be made, the quality and quantity of betting market data has enabled 
the development of a large body of research on the nature of preferences and 
perceptions of risk under uncertainty. 
 
1.4. Anchoring and herding 
 
  Betting market research has largely focused on the FLB, but some studies 
have  investigated  whether  bettors  make  biased  decisions  in  other  ways.  In 
particular,  anchoring  and  herding  represent  biased  behaviour  whereby  the 
decision maker alters their decision to account for external stimuli. Thus, when   36 
employing  the  anchoring  and  adjustment  heuristic,  decision  makers 
unnecessarily alter their judgements to reflect an initially-provided estimate. 
Herding arises when decision makers neglect their own information and alter 
their judgements to reflect those of others. This section details the findings of 
these studies. 
 
1.4.1. Anchoring and adjustment 
 
  Laboratory  research  suggests  that,  when  making  a  numerical  estimate, 
individuals, in an attempt to simplify the decision making process, tend to start 
from an initial value and make ‘adjustments’ upwards or downwards from it 
(e.g.,  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974).  However,  this  often  results  in  a  bias 
whereby the decision is ‘anchored’ on the initial estimate, and adjustments are 
not sufficient. This is known as the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman asked participants pairs of questions such as: 
 
(a) Is the percentage of African countries in the United Nations higher or 
lower than 25? 
(b) What do you think the exact percentage is? 
 
They  found  that  the  figure  given  in  (a)  (i.e.,  25  in  the  above  example) 
significantly influenced the participants’ responses to (b), even when the figure 
was randomly generated by spinning a  wheel of  fortune in the participants’ 
presence. Higher/lower random numbers were associated with higher/lower 
estimates. 
  Anchoring has mainly been studied in controlled laboratory conditions. 
The few studies that have been conducted in naturalistic environments (e.g., 
amongst  auditors:  Bhattacharjee  and  Moreno,  2002,  and  real  estate  agents: 
Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987)  have  generally  concluded  that  anchoring  does 
seem to occur in information-rich real-world settings. However, these studies 
have used questionnaires or artificial problems. Consequently, the advantages 
of  studying  anchoring  in  betting  markets  are  that  participants  are  making 
estimates that matter to them, in a familiar real-world environment, without the   37 
use of questionnaires or artificial problems, and that they do not alter their 
normal behaviour (because they do not know they are being observed). 
  In the first study to investigate whether bettors anchor their judgements 
excessively, Liu and Johnson (2007) were primarily concerned with whether or 
not  participants  in  horserace  betting  markets  employed  factors  relating  to 
previous performance of horses, jockeys, and trainers as anchors. For example, 
if a jockey had won his or her previous race, do bettors overestimate the chance 
that he or she will also win the current race? Previous finishing positions are 
not anchors in the traditional sense, since bettors are not specifically required 
to make direct comparisons between initial values and final judgements. Rather, 
this study attempted to find evidence of basic anchoring, where decision makers 
can  be  influenced  by  anchor  values  even  when  not  asked  to  consider  them 
directly  (Wilson  et  al.,  1996).  Liu  and  Johnson  investigated,  using  betting 
market  data  from  Hong  Kong,  various  explanatory  variables  that  represent 
possible anchors (such as whether the horse won its previous race). However, 
the only significant explanatory variable was one that summarised a horse’s 
finishing  position  over  its  career;  this  variable  showed  that  bettors  tend  to 
underestimate  horses  that  have  a  strong  finishing  record.  Consequently,  it 
appears  that  bettors  tend  to  ignore  some  useful  information  relating  to  the 
horses’  potential  (or  are  unable  to  effectively  employ  such  a  complicated 
variable).  However,  the  key  finding  was  that  no  other  explanatory  variables 
were  significant,  indicating  that  bettors  do  not  anchor  their  judgements  on 
previous performances. 
  It  is  possible  that  Liu  and  Johnson’s  (2007)  results  fail  to  identify  the 
anchoring  that  does  occur  in  betting  markets  since  any  bias  created  by  the 
anchoring of most bettors could be arbitraged away by the remainder of bettors. 
For instance, it is well known (e.g., Benter, 1994) that large betting syndicates, 
attracted by the unusually large betting volumes and strict regulation in Hong 
Kong  (which  helps  to  eliminate  malpractice  and  insider  trading)  use 
sophisticated computer models to make considerable profits in this market. 
  Johnson,  Schnytzer,  and  Liu  (2009)  extended  the  analysis  of  Liu  and 
Johnson (2007) in two ways. First, noting that bettors in Hong Kong often spend 
considerable time reviewing race results, they expected that barrier position   38 
(the stall position from which the horse starts the race) would be a significant 
anchor for bettors. Second, decision makers with a higher level of expertise tend 
to be less susceptible to anchoring effects (e.g., Northcraft and Neale, 1987), so 
they expected that more experienced bettors would be less prone to anchoring. 
They  found  that  bettors  as  a  whole  did  not  anchor  excessively  on  barrier 
position over all their data but bettors overestimated the advantage offered by a 
good barrier position in one of the two racetracks under investigation. However, 
they  found  that  expertise  significantly  reduced  the  extent  of  anchoring 
displayed by bettors (they used early and late betting as a proxy for inexpert 
and  expert  bettors,  respectively).  In  summary,  the  two  anchoring  studies 
conducted  in  betting  markets  indicate  that  anchoring  in  real  world 
environments may be a more complex phenomenon than has been found in 
laboratory studies, suggesting that further research may be required to fully 
understand its influence on decisions in real world environments. 
 
1.4.2. Herding 
 
  Herding occurs when decision makers neglect their own information and 
adjust their actions to be more representative of the actions of others. Early 
theoretical  models  rationalized  herding  behaviour  as  information  cascades, 
where decisions are made sequentially by different agents who each hold their 
own private information (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Avery 
and Zemsky, 1998). The validity of the information is inherently uncertain and, 
as a result, individuals may be rational in disregarding some of their private 
information when the information held by other agents appears to conflict with 
their  own.  Hence,  strictly  speaking,  herding  behaviour  in  itself  may  not  be 
‘biased’ decision making. However, a biased outcome results from the combined 
effect of herding by multiple participants. In particular, this behaviour can lead 
to expected returns differing significantly from their ‘rational’ value. 
Laboratory  studies  have  generally  found  that  participants  display  herd 
behaviour, but to a lesser extent than theoretical models predict, although the 
evidence  has  been  inconclusive  (Spiwoks  et  al.,  2008).  In  betting  markets, 
herding might be expected because there is a belief that certain bettors have   39 
access to privileged information. It has been found that betting on a horse or 
team  that  subsequently  attracts  a  high  degree  of  betting  interest during  the 
course of the market (known as a ‘market mover’ or ‘plunger’) is, on average, 
profitable (e.g., Crafts, 1985). The problem, of course, is that it is difficult to 
identify such opportunities before the fact, and this is where bettors with access 
to  privileged  information  can  gain  an  advantage.  Bettors  with  superior 
information are often referred to as ‘insiders’ in the literature because of the 
presumption that their information is not in the public domain (e.g., a racehorse 
owner may have knowledge of secret training programs). However, there are 
also  some  bettors  who  use  only  publicly  available  information,  but  expertly 
combine all the information in such as a way as to form highly accurate opinions 
of the competitors’ chances; these bettors are often referred to as ‘informed’ 
bettors. The presence of insiders and informed bettors in betting markets is 
widely reported (e.g., Crafts, 1985) and, consequently, herding behaviour may 
ensue when ‘uninformed’ bettors interpret a significant price movement as a 
signal that a competitor is being backed by insiders or informed bettors, and 
alter their bets accordingly. 
  The first study that investigated whether bettors herd is that of Camerer 
(1998).  He  tested  whether  bettors  might  respond  to  privileged  information 
signals by placing large early bets in pari-mutuel pools at US racetracks and 
recording subsequent betting patterns. The purpose of this field test was to 
investigate whether markets could be manipulated. However, by observing the 
reactions of bettors to the temporary bets (Camerer subsequently cancelled the 
early bets), Camerer was also able to observe whether or not bettors displayed 
herding behaviour. He began by placing temporary bets of $500. He found that, 
while his bets temporarily distorted the odds, prices returned to their expected 
levels after cancelling his bets, indicating that bettors were not responding to 
the fake signals. Following this, Camerer increased his bet size to $1000 and 
targeted smaller racetracks and ‘maiden’ races (for horses that have never won 
a race). He detected a weakly significant herding effect whereby bettors were 
more likely to respond in the maiden races. However, overall the results still 
resolutely  showed  that  bettors  did  not  display  herding  behaviour.  There 
remains an important caveat: although Camerer’s bets made up of about 7% of   40 
the  pool  in  the  second  study,  they  still  may  not  have  been  large  enough  to 
induce herding.  In a later study, Law and Peel (2002) argued that the apparent 
lack of herding in Camerer’s (1998) study probably arose because, while the 
bets were sufficiently large to temporarily distort the markets, there was little 
incentive for bettors to herd on the initial price movement, since pari-mutuel 
bettors cannot lock in profits. To counter this, they conducted an empirical test 
for herding in UK bookmaker markets for horseracing. They argued that since 
the returns to a bet with a bookmaker are known at the time of bet placement, 
bettors might be more likely to herd in these markets. They noted that while an 
initial  price  movement  could  be  due  to  informed  trading,  a  further  price 
movement may result from further informed trading or herding. Using the Shin 
(1993) measure of the degree of insider (or informed) trading, they were able 
to identify those large price movements that resulted from the trading of those 
with  access  to  privileged  information  (the  Shin  measure  increased  over  the 
duration of the market) or from herding (the Shin measure decreased). Law and 
Peel were particularly interested in those horses that opened at shorter odds 
than  forecasted  that  then  attracted  significant  betting  interest.  Significant 
positive  returns  of  10.2%  could  be  made  by  betting  on  horses  with  these 
characteristics  whose  odds  plunged  as  a  result  of  informed  trading;  returns 
were significantly negative otherwise, at -10.9%. Consequently, Law and Peel 
were  able  to  demonstrate  that  herding  led  to  biased  prices,  with  negative 
(positive) returns being reported when price movements were due to herding 
(informed betting). 
  Schnytzer and Snir (2008) noted that a horse that is not attracting bets 
that  suddenly  attracts  a  high  degree  of  betting  interest  is  likely  to  be 
overestimated due to herding. However, early plunges in odds suggest trading 
by bettors with privileged information, so they hypothesised that, due to the 
limited budgets of insiders, “a short time later, when the odds on those runners 
are lengthened again, those insiders are either unable or unwilling to place bets 
of sufficient significance to affect prices, even when the odds on those runners 
have drifted back to initial levels or even further” (p.3). This may arise because 
informed traders place most of their bets early in the market to secure profits. 
Schnytzer  and  Snir  considered  two  possible  situations:  either  odds  increase   41 
early in the market and then decrease, or odds decrease early in the market and 
then increase. In the former, the late betting interest on the horse is considered 
to be evidence of herding, since the horse attracted little interest in the early 
market, and the final odds are expected to overestimate the horse’s winning 
chances. In the latter, the early plunge followed by a lack of betting interest in 
the late market is considered evidence of cash-constrained informed betting, 
and  the  final  odds  are  expected  to  underestimate  the  horse’s  chances. 
Investigating their hypothesis in bookmaker markets in the UK and Australia, 
their results demonstrated that, for horses attracting early but not late betting 
interest, positive returns of 15.3% were possible. On the other hand, only highly 
negative  returns  (as  low  as  -27.2%)  were  possible  for  horses  that  lacked 
interest in the early market but were the subject of herding in the late market. 
These results confirmed that bettors herd and that this can lead to highly biased 
outcomes. 
  In summary, studies of anchoring and herding in betting markets have 
offered  mixed  conclusions.  Camerer  (1998)  was  unable  to  induce  herding 
behaviour  with  his  ‘fake’  signals  but  other  studies  have  found  evidence  of 
significant herding by bettors when insider trading is prevalent. However, it 
appears that bettors do not anchor their judgements to the extent that has been 
reported in the laboratory. This may result from the fact that bettors are making 
decisions in an environment with which they are familiar (cf. naive subjects in 
unfamiliar laboratory settings) and in which they have learned (e.g., through 
repeated  trial  and  improvement)  to  handle  appropriately  the  redundant 
information and decision-relevant cues. Equally, while many bettors may herd 
to a significant extent, the actions of informed bettors, who arbitrage on the 
herding behaviour of others, may serve to suppress the observable effects of 
herding. 
 
1.5. The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy 
 
  The  gambler’s  fallacy  and  the  hot  hand  fallacy  both  involve  a 
misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  randomness.  The  application  of  these 
fallacies often results in systematically biased behaviour. The gambler’s fallacy   42 
is defined as the belief that an event’s probability of occurring is reduced after 
that event has occurred, even if the event is independent from one trial to the 
next  (Rabin,  2002).  Laplace  (1825,  p.92)  gave  the  following  examples  from 
lotteries and coin tossing: 
 
when one number has not been drawn in the French lottery, the mob is 
eager  to  bet  on  it.  They  fancy  that,  because  the  number  has  not  been 
drawn for a long time, it, rather than the others, ought to be drawn on the 
next draw. . . . It is, for example, very unlikely that in a game of heads or 
tails  one  will  get  heads  ten  times  running.  This  unlikeliness,  which 
surprises us even when the event has happened nine times, leads us to 
believe that tails will occur on the tenth toss. 
 
The gambler’s fallacy is the conviction that the coin, which is known, objectively, 
to be fair, is more likely to land heads than tails after the ‘streak’ of nine tails. 
This belief is demonstrated in laboratory experiments where participants are 
asked  to  invent  a  random  sequence,  such  as  repeated  tosses  of  a  coin.  The 
results  show  that  people  tend  to  produce  sequences  containing  too  many 
alternations in the outcome relative to genuine randomness (Falk and Konold, 
1997). The representativeness heuristic has been proposed as an explanation: 
the  gambler  believes  that  small  samples  must  be  representative  of  the 
population, so if unexpected sequences occur, a correction is expected (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1971). As Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p.1125) note: “chance 
is commonly viewed as a self-correcting process in which a deviation in one 
direction induces a deviation in the opposite direction". Since nine tails in a row 
is an extremely unlikely event, the observer committing the gambler’s fallacy 
expects that the next toss should be heads, in order to make the sequence of ten 
tosses seem less unusual. A commonly-cited example of this phenomenon is 
that of the Monte Carlo casino where, in a roulette game in 1913, black occurred 
26 times in a row. During this streak, customers bet increasing amounts on red, 
and the casino profited as a result (Lehrer, 2009). 
  The hot hand fallacy involves mistaken convictions that run contrary to 
the gambler’s fallacy. In particular, this fallacy involves a belief that if a player   43 
or team is on a winning (or losing) streak, this streak will continue longer than 
should be expected in a random sequence. So, in a game where the objective is 
to obtain tails on the toss of a coin, a gambler who has achieved the unlikely feat 
of landing tails nine times in a row believes that they are on a ‘hot streak’, and 
therefore expects that the coin has a greater probability of showing tails than 
heads on the next toss. 
  Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) found that many basketball players 
and fans believed that a player would be more likely to score on a shot if they 
had scored (cf. missed) on their previous shot. However, they found no evidence 
to support this claim in either real games or controlled shooting experiments. 
The  hot  hand  has  been  attributed  to  the  illusion  of  control,  which  is  the 
misplaced perception that gamblers have an element of control over random 
events (Langer, 1975). In fact, it has been shown that some gamblers believe 
that luck is separate from chance, and that their good fortune allows them to 
operate  outside  the  laws  of  probability  while  they  are  on  winning  streaks 
(Wagenaar and Keren, 1988). Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) suggested 
that,  as  with  the  gambler’s  fallacy,  bettors  may  be  employing  the 
representativeness heuristic. In this case, long runs are deemed too unusual for 
the  representative  sequence,  so  bettors  infer  that  the  sequence  generating 
process is no longer random (e.g., a basketball player who shoots an usually 
high run of on-target shots is said to be ‘in the zone’, or a roulette table or die is 
assumed to be biased). It is possible that, while a general belief in the hot hand 
may  be  misplaced,  an  accurate  belief  in  the  hot  hand  in  specific  instances 
motivates people to believe in its universality (see Bar-Eli et al., 2006, for many 
examples of genuine hot hand effects). The remainder of this section details the 
findings  of  studies  that  have  investigated  the  two  fallacies  in  naturalistic 
environments. 
 
1.5.1. Evidence of the gambler’s fallacy in betting markets 
 
  Clotfelter and Cook (1993) undertook one of the early studies using real 
betting data to investigate the gambler’s fallacy. The US state of Maryland runs a 
‘daily numbers’ draw lottery, where a 3-digit number between 000 and 999 is   44 
picked at random, and the bettor wins if they select this number. Clotfelter and 
Cook found that betting volumes on a number decreased in the days after the 
number was drawn, before returning to original levels after 84 days. It was 
postulated that bettors could be reducing their bets on numbers that had been 
drawn  previously  because  they  thought  that  that  number  was  less  likely  to 
appear again. However, Clotfelter and Cook were unable to eliminate a ‘wealth 
effect’ from their data: bettors who regularly bet a particular number might 
stop betting altogether because they had achieved their financial  goals. This 
could lead to a natural reduction in betting volumes on a winning number in the 
days and weeks after its appearance. A more significant caveat with Clotfelter 
and Cook’s study was noted by Terrell (1994): the Maryland lottery has fixed 
payouts  (winners  are  always  paid  $500  on  a  one-dollar  bet),  so  choosing 
numbers based on the gambler’s fallacy does not reduce the expected return to 
the bettor. 
  Croson  and  Sundali  (2005)  studied  18  hours  of  roulette  play  in  a  real 
casino, during which over a hundred players placed thousands of bets. They 
found evidence of the gambler’s fallacy after streaks of around 5 or more similar 
outcomes (e.g., 5 red numbers in a row). However, Croson and Sundali (p.200) 
pointed out a similar concern to that existing in the Clotfelter and Cook (1993) 
study: “since the house advantage on (almost) all bets at the wheel is the same, 
there is no economic reason to bet one way or another (or for that matter, at 
all).”5 
  These studies highlight an important issue: while the gambler’s fallacy is 
anecdotally known to be a common belief among gamblers, it does not always 
result in biased behaviour. For example, in roulette, the returns to bets on each 
outcome are independent of the bets placed by the customers. Therefore, the 
decision of which outcome to bet on is irrelevant. The gamblers in the Monte 
Carlo  casino  were  not  necessarily  wrong  to  bet  on  red  rather  than  black 
(although they might have bet more than they could afford). In such cases, it is 
plausible that belief in the fallacy only adds to the excitement of the game. 
                                                 
5 Croson and Sundali also found evidence of the hot hand fallacy: 80% of bettors quit playing 
after losing a bet while only 20% quit after winning. Moreover, bettors tended to place more 
bets after winning than after losing.   45 
In circumstances where acting on the fallacy results in a systematic bias 
that leads to a lower expected return for the bettor, it might be expected that 
the fallacy would be eliminated (e.g., by a learning process). However, there are 
a number of examples of the gambler’s fallacy resulting in a systematic bias. 
These  studies  have  necessarily  needed  to  be  creative  in  order  to  identify 
situations  where  one  might  expect  evidence  of  the  gambler’s  fallacy.  For 
example, Metzger (1985) found evidence that horserace bettors tend to believe 
that streaks of favourites and longshots winning should cancel out. So, if a series 
of  longshots  wins,  they  bet  more  on  favourites,  and  vice  versa.  Terrell  and 
Farmer (1996) thought that bettors at greyhound racing events might believe 
that the starting positions of the winning dogs should be more random than it 
appears. Thus they might underestimate the winning chances of a dog starting 
in a given position from winning if the winner of the previous race also started 
from that position. Their calculations revealed that this was the case, with a 
positive return of $1.09 per dollar bet for a strategy of betting on dogs starting 
from  the  same  position  as  the  winner  of  the  previous  race.  Terrell  (1998) 
extended the study of Terrell and Farmer (1996) with a larger dataset, but only 
found significant evidence of the fallacy in one of the two years in their data. 
  Terrell  (1994)  conducted  a  similar  investigation  to  Clotfelter  and  Cook 
(1993)  but  in  a  pari-mutuel  New  Jersey  lottery,  where  payouts  are  shared 
between  all  the  bettors  who  choose  the  winning  number.  Hence,  if  many 
gamblers avoid numbers that have recently appeared, the expected return to 
these gamblers is reduced. As expected, the extent of the gambler’s fallacy was 
lower in this case. However, there was still a tendency to avoid numbers that 
had recently appeared. Terrell also found that if the results of Clotfelter and 
Cook  were  converted  to  a  pari-mutuel  system,  there  would  be  frequent 
occurrences when the payout would exceed $500, giving a positive expected 
return to bettors. This is not the case in New Jersey, so bettors appear to bet 
more  evenly  to  avoid  foregoing  the  increased  potential  winnings,  and  this 
diminishes the potential to exploit the fallacy. An alternative explanation for the 
results is that bettors simply prefer not to bet on a recently-seen number, in the 
same  way  that  they  prefer  certain  numbers  (such  as  777).  Similarly,   46 
Papachristou (2004) found only marginal evidence of the gambler’s fallacy in 
the pari-mutuel lottery in the UK. 
 
1.5.2. Evidence of the hot hand fallacy in betting markets 
 
  As indicated above, the hot hand fallacy is also a mistaken perception of 
randomness. However, as with the gambler’s fallacy, this mistaken belief does 
not  necessarily  impose  economic  penalties.  Camerer  (1989)  examined  the 
economic  significance  of  the  hot  hand  fallacy  by  investigating  whether  this 
mistaken belief is represented in gamblers’ betting decisions. He categorized 
basketball teams based on their current winning or losing streak (in games), 
and  then  compared  the  actual  results  with  the  point-spreads  offered  by 
bookmakers6. If bettors believe in the hot hand, point-spreads will overestimate 
the chances of teams currently on winning streaks against the spread, while 
underestimating the chances of teams on losing streaks. The results showed 
that the performance of teams on winning streaks is worse than predicted by 
point-spreads,  and  teams  on  losing  streaks  perform  better  than  predicted. 
However, the results were only marginally statistically significant. 
  Brown  and  Sauer  (1993a,  p.1377)  highlighted  the  importance  of  the 
following critical assumption in Camerer’s (1989) study: “the hot hand is belief 
in  a  myth”.  Camerer  was  effectively  testing  two  alternatives:  either  bettors 
believe in a mythical hot hand, or they do not. However, there is evidence that 
genuine hot hand effects exist (Bar-Eli et al., 2006). Consequently, there is a 
third  alternative:  bettors  believe  in  a  genuine  hot  hand7.  In  this  case,  while 
bettors will move point-spreads to account for the hot hand effect, so teams’ 
performance  levels  will  also  change.  Brown  and  Sauer  considered  all  three 
alternatives in basketball point-spread markets, but found only mixed results. 
They could not reject the hypothesis that the hot hand is real and that bettors 
                                                 
6 The point-spread market is a betting market in which a bet wins if the home team wins by a 
specified margin of points (the point-spread) or, if the point-spread is negative, the home team 
loses by less than the point-spread (this is known as the team winning ‘against the spread’). 
7 There is a fourth alternative - that bettors are unaware of a genuine hot hand effect - but this 
hypothesis is not tested by Brown and Sauer.   47 
correctly  account  for  it,  but  they  could  also  not  reject  the  hypothesis  that 
bettors believe in a mythical hot hand. 
  In a further study on the hot hand in point-spread markets for basketball, 
Oorlog  (1995)  found  strong  evidence  against  the  hypothesis  that  gamblers 
believe in the hot hand. They devised a number of betting strategies to account 
for  possible  hot  hand  effects  but  none  were  profitable.  Avery  and  Chevalier 
(1999) investigated US football betting markets, and also found a small bias as a 
result of the hot hand fallacy, but, again, the magnitude of the effect was small. 
  Further mixed evidence for the hot hand fallacy was provided by Durham, 
Hertzel,  and  Martin  (2005).  They  found  that  point-spreads  over-/under-
estimated US college football teams on short winning/losing streaks against the 
spread,  which  is  consistent  with  the  hot  hand  fallacy.  However,  the  point-
spreads suggested that bettors expected longer winning or losing streaks to end 
rather than continue. Similarly, Paul and Weinbach (2005) found that betting 
against basketball teams on short winning streaks was profitable, while betting 
against teams on longer winning streaks was not. Moreover, they found no hot 
hand  effect  for  teams  on  losing  streaks,  and  suggested  that  this  might  be 
because bettors derived additional utility from betting on teams on winning 
streaks. 
 
1.5.3. The paradox of the hot hand and gambler’s fallacies 
 
  An important consideration is that the hot hand and gambler’s fallacies 
appear at first to be opposite effects. While bettors may believe that long runs in 
the results of players or teams will continue (the hot hand), they simultaneously 
believe that long runs should end (the gambler’s fallacy). This begs the question: 
how can we explain two apparently opposite effects? 
  One  proposed  explanation  for  both  fallacies  is  the  representativeness 
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971), in which decision makers believe that 
sequences should be representative of the generating process. Decision makers 
apply the ‘law of large numbers’ too readily, i.e., they believe in the ‘law of small 
numbers’. That is, while the relative frequencies of outcomes approximate the 
generating process in the long run, people believe that this should also be the   48 
case  in  the  short  run.  So,  the  gambler’s  fallacy  is  explained  because  people 
believe that unusually long streaks are not representative, and so predict an 
alternation  to  make  the  sequence  more  representative.  The  hot  hand  is 
explained because people tend to over-infer from short sequences in a random 
process  and  decide  that  there  is  some  underlying  non-random  process 
generating the sequence (Rabin, 2002). 
  It is potentially problematic to explain opposite phenomena with the same 
principle. However, a solution was provided by Ayton and Fischer (2004; see 
also Burns and Corpus, 2004). They tested whether the type of random process 
employed to generate the result was consequential in whether decision makers 
displayed the hot hand or the gambler’s fallacy. They hypothesized that, when 
outcomes reflect human performance, people believe in the hot hand, whereas, 
when outcomes reflect inanimate mechanisms, people believe in the gambler’s 
fallacy.  This  might  explain  why  winning  streaks  of  basketball  and  roulette 
players  are  perceived  to  exhibit  long  run  tendencies,  whereas  outcomes  of 
roulette games and lotteries are not. They conducted an experiment where they 
asked participants to play a simulated roulette-style game. Participants were 
required first to choose between red and blue, and were then asked to rate their 
confidence  in  their  prediction.  The  results  confirmed  that  while  people  are 
more likely to predict an alternation after a long run of either colour, they are 
also  more  confident  in  their  own  ability  after  a  long  run  of  successful 
predictions. Ayton and Fischer (p.1374) concluded that while the sequences of 
outcomes  (red  or  blue)  and  predictions  (win  or  lose)  are  each  identical 
independent processes, “the two sequences are psychologically perceived quite 
differently;  subjects  simultaneously  exhibited  both  .  .  .  the  hot  hand  and  the 
gambler’s fallacy”. In a second experiment, they found that participants were 
more likely to attribute random sequences with low/high alternation rates to 
human performance/inanimate mechanisms. This line of experimentation goes 
some  way  to  unravel  the  problematic  nature  of  explaining  two  apparently 
opposite effects with the same heuristic. 
  In  summary,  there  is  evidence  from  a  diversity  of  naturalistic  betting 
environments that the decisions of bettors are consistent with the gambler’s 
fallacy. However, the extent of the fallacy is reduced when it results in biased   49 
decisions,  suggesting  that  bettors  are  sensitive  to  its  economic  significance. 
Research  examining  the  hot  hand  fallacy  in  betting  markets  has  been 
inconclusive. None of the above studies found irrefutable evidence that bettors 
believe in the hot hand and that market odds are biased in accordance with this 
belief. If there is a hot hand effect in markets, it is generally so small as to be 
economically insignificant. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
 
  The  theme  of  this  paper  has  been  that,  while  many  biases  in  decision 
making have been demonstrated in laboratory-based studies, there are many 
reasons for suggesting that these findings may not translate to the real world. 
Betting markets offer a valuable naturalistic setting in which to explore biased 
decision making, because participants are making decisions in a situation that is 
more  representative  of  the  environments  in  which  day-to-day  decisions  are 
made. We have argued that bettors display significantly less biased judgements 
in  their  natural  domain  than  those  of  naive  participants  in  laboratory 
experiments. To support this view we have cited a number of examples related 
to rationality and calibration of subjective probability judgements. Furthermore, 
we  have  shown  that  there  is  only  mixed  evidence  that  bettors  anchor  their 
judgements,  engage  in  herding  behaviour,  or  believe  in  the  hot  hand  or 
gambler’s fallacies. Even the FLB, which has been the focus of the majority of 
research in betting markets, is no longer observable in some markets. 
  The  primary  conclusion  of  this  paper  is  that,  while  systematic  biases 
reported in the laboratory have been found in naturalistic betting markets, the 
extent and generality of these biases in these real world environments is often 
significantly less. The context of the decision task, the incentives offered, the 
lack  of  scrutiny  involved,  and  the  experience  of  the  decision  makers  all 
contribute to an explanation for this conclusion. Another consideration is the 
importance of aggregation. It is costly and ethically challenging to obtain betting 
market datasets from which it is possible to discern individual biases. In a more 
typical  dataset,  individual  biases  may  be  eliminated  by  aggregation  of  the 
opinions of a diverse range of bettors. Moreover, even a systematic bias that is   50 
attributed to a large portion of the betting population can be reduced by the 
unbiased  actions  of  a  wealthy  few,  as  there  is  always  a  strong  economic 
motivation to capitalize on the biases of others. 
  A drawback to the heuristics and biases approach to decision making in 
general is highlighted by our discussion of the hot hand and gambler’s fallacies. 
There is initially a problem with explaining two apparently opposite biases with 
the same heuristic, although subsequent research has clarified that there are 
two separate situations when people will use either of these fallacies. On the 
other hand, it can be impossible to narrow down multiple explanations for one 
bias to the single explanation that is most valid. Thus, there have been a wide 
range of explanations proposed for the FLB. Similarly, the hot hand fallacy could 
be explained by the illusion of control, or by the representativeness heuristic, or 
by extrapolation of genuine hot hand effects. As Wagenaar (1988, p.115-116) 
argues, the heuristics and biases approach 
 
does not specify rules telling us which heuristic will be applied in a given 
situation. Even worse, from the individual differences among gamblers, it 
is obvious that several heuristics could be chosen in one and the same 
situation, and that these heuristics lead to opposite behaviors. . . . There 
are  so  many  heuristics,  that  it  will  be  virtually  impossible  to  find 
behaviours that cannot be accounted for. 
 
Hence, while there is some evidence of biased behaviour in betting markets, 
explaining its prevalence is another matter altogether. 
  There are further issues associated with betting market research that may 
lead one to question the generalizability of the conclusions drawn from such 
studies. For example, bettors may be unrepresentative of the wider public since 
they are predominantly older males (Dipboye and Flanagan, 1979), and there 
may be some self-selection effects (indeed, it is not obvious as to why some 
people gamble and some do not; see Rachlin, 1990). We must also retain some 
scepticism  about  generalizability  from  betting  markets  to  other  economic 
settings (Levitt and List, 2007). Just as laboratory research should recognize 
that generalizability of findings is limited, future research into biased decision   51 
making  in  betting  markets  should  acknowledge  that  laboratory 
experimentation is often the first available evidence that heuristics are being 
employed  or  biased  outcomes  are  occurring.  Without  either  the  theoretical 
background  or  the  controlled  elegance  of  laboratory  research,  naturalistic 
research might be confounded by the vast array of potential variables involved 
and  the  often  unintuitive  nature  of  real-world  decision  making.  The  way 
forward appears to be a tandem approach with betting market studies being 
informed by results from laboratory experiments, and the latter being designed 
to examine the causes of phenomena that the former highlight. In this manner, 
the  true  nature  and  real  world  characteristics  of  behavioural  biases  may  be 
revealed.   53 
2. Noise, herding, and the efficiency of market prices: insights 
from markets for state contingent claims 
 
Abstract 
 
We develop new insights into unresolved issues related to the  role of noise 
traders and the nature and effect of herding in financial markets by examining 
an electronic exchange market for state contingent claims. We find that noise 
trading  is  associated  with  increased  market  efficiency,  and  attribute  this  to 
informed traders being attracted by the improved liquidity that noise trading 
creates. We find evidence of differing ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ signal-induced herding in 
the later, more active stages of the market. We demonstrate that this results in 
an economically significant inefficiency; strategies designed to trade against the 
herd show substantial positive returns. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
  An important concern in the financial markets microstructure literature 
has  been  the  role  of  information  and  noise  in  market  efficiency.  Does  noise 
trading result in excessively volatile, inefficient markets, in which added risks 
limit the possibility of arbitrage by informed investors? Or is noise essential in 
providing liquidity to informed investors in order that markets are efficient? A 
related issue is how to reconcile the apparently irrational behaviour of herding 
with the efficient markets hypothesis. If herding is rational, why do some of its 
worst consequences, asset bubbles and crashes, seem so irrational? Answering 
these  questions  has  proved  difficult  using  traditional  financial  market  data. 
Consequently, we examine these issues by employing data from a market for 
state contingent claims, which offers considerable advantages for this research. 
  In Black’s (1986) model, noise and information are contrasted, but each is 
essential for liquid markets. Noise and informed trading are complementary, 
since noise trading is regarded as trading that is not based on information. For 
Black, noise traders are entirely irrational. However, some studies have argued 
that  noise  trading  can  be  rational  because  of  its  potential  to  make  positive   54 
returns (Hong and Stein, 1999). It has been predicted (Black, 1986; De Long et 
al., 1990) and, to an extent, verified empirically (Campbell and Kyle, 1993) that 
a consequence of noise trading is increased volatility in market prices, a result 
that has important implications for policy making (e.g., Shleifer and Summers, 
1990). However, the true role that noise plays in market efficiency remains the 
subject of much debate. On the one hand, it has been argued that noise may 
result  in  volatility  in  excess  of  the  variations  justified  by  underlying 
fundamental information (Shiller, 1981, 1990). In this case, noise is detrimental 
to market efficiency because of its destabilizing effect on long-run equilibrium 
values (De Long et al., 1990, Shleifer and Summers, 1990, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Noise introduces risks for informed traders, such as the risk that the 
market remains inefficient longer than the informed trader can remain liquid. 
Consequently,  because  informed  investors  are  risk  averse,  they  limit  their 
arbitrage; thus, noise is seen as contributing to price inefficiency. 
  On the other hand, noise may be essential for generating liquid, and thus 
efficient, markets (Black, 1986). The seminal models of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and Kyle (1985) each predict that increased noise trading brings forth 
more informed trading. In Kyle’s model, noise does not destabilize prices when 
informed  traders  are  risk  neutral.  In  Grossman  and  Stiglitz’s  model,  the 
increased levels of noise and informed trading cancel each other out, so prices 
are stable. More recently, in the experimental market of Bloomfield, O’Hara, and 
Saar (2009), noise trading is shown to harm market efficiency, but only when 
prices are extreme. When prices are not extreme, noise traders help to make 
prices more efficient by providing liquidity for the informed traders. 
  It  is  difficult  to  resolve  this  issue  in  regular  financial  markets  where 
uncertainty is always present, resulting in difficulties in fully measuring their 
efficiency.  In  Black’s  (1986,  p.529)  model,  “noise  is  what  makes  our 
observations  imperfect.  It  keeps  us  from  knowing  the  expected  return  on  a 
stock or portfolio … It keeps us from knowing what, if anything, we can do to 
make  things  better”.  As  Shleifer  and  Summers  (1990,  p.22)  note,  identifying 
noise trading is tricky, “since price changes may reflect new market information 
which changes the equilibrium price”. To overcome this problem, we examine a 
market that has a defined end point at which all uncertainty in the relation   55 
between  prices  and  fundamental  information  is  resolved.  Specifically,  we 
examine an electronic exchange market for state contingent claims, a horserace 
betting market. “In its simplest formulation, the market for bets in an n-horse 
race corresponds to a market for contingent claims with n states in which the 
ith state corresponds to the outcome in which the ith horse wins the race” (Shin, 
1993,  p.1142).  These  markets  also  offer  the  opportunity  of  quantifying  the 
proportion of market activity attributable to informed trading (using a model 
developed by Shin, 1993). Consequently, we are able to examine variations in 
market efficiency with respect to the levels of noise trading (as the complement 
of the level of informed trading) in the market. 
  While noise is trading based on anything but information, a different, but 
related phenomenon is that of herding, which is trading based on the perceived 
information  of  other  traders.  Specifically,  herding  occurs  when  market 
participants neglect their own private information and adjust their actions to be 
more  representative  of  those  of  other  traders.  They  do  this  in  the  belief 
(perhaps mistaken) that other traders are more informed than themselves. The 
combined activity of many herding traders can result in extraordinary changes 
in asset values over a short period, possibly leading to bubbles, crashes and 
bank runs (Devenow and Welch, 1996). While the consequences of herding are 
irrational at the aggregate level, herding may be rational at the individual level. 
Theoretical models have rationalized herding as ‘information cascades’, where 
decisions are made sequentially by different agents who each hold their own 
private information (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Avery and 
Zemsky,  1998).  There  is  uncertainty  over  the  validity  of  price  signals  and, 
consequently, it may be rational for agents to disregard some of their private 
information when that held by others appears (as revealed by their actions) to 
conflict with their own. In fact, in Hong and Stein’s (1999) model, momentum 
traders  can  earn  positive  profits,  provided  they  trade  early  enough  in  the 
‘momentum cycle’. 
  While  herding  behaviour  has  a  theoretically  sound  basis,  empirical 
evidence for the phenomenon in financial markets is inconclusive (Lakonishok 
et  al.,  1992;  Wermers,  1999;  Sias,  2004).  Similarly,  mixed  results  have  been 
found  in  laboratory-based  studies,  in  which  both  the  decisions  and  the   56 
information on which they are based are observable (e.g., Cipriani and Guarino, 
2005;  Spiwoks  et  al.,  2008).  The  common  finding  from  these  studies  is  that 
participants do herd, but to a lesser extent than theoretical models predict. 
  We  address  the  unresolved  issues  raised  above  and provide  important 
evidence  which  furthers  understanding  of  the  role  of  noise  traders  and  the 
nature  and  effect  of  herding  in  financial  markets.  In  particular,  we  first 
demonstrate that markets are both more volatile and more efficient when there 
is  a  greater  degree  of  noise  trading,  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  noise 
trading improves market efficiency, perhaps by providing liquidity to informed 
traders. Second, we find that herding behaviour is prevalent in the market and 
leads to greater inefficiency than previous studies have suggested. We show 
that trading strategies designed to capitalize on mispricing caused by herding 
can  earn  significant  abnormal  returns,  with  initial  capital  rising  by  95%  on 
around 500 trades (a rate of return on turnover of over 10 percent). In addition, 
we are able to identify inefficiences in over 33 percent of the 1514 separate 
markets considered, indicating that the prevalence of herding is a significant 
issue.  In  addition,  our  results  help  resolve  the  conundrum  of  why  previous 
herding evidence is so mixed, as we are able to measure the extent of herding at 
different  stages  of  the  market  and,  separately,  for  ‘buy’  and  ‘sell’  signals. 
Specifically, we show that it is possible to make abnormal returns by trading on 
herding  activity  because  market  participants  overestimate  the  information 
contained  in  large  price  movements  in the  later  stages  of  the  market,  when 
there is little time for the inefficiency to be corrected. Furthermore, we show 
that the extent of herding is greater following ‘sell’ (cf. ‘buy’) signals. 
  This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2.2,  we  describe  the 
advantages betting markets offer for gaining insights into noise and herding in 
financial markets. In section 2.3, we develop the hypotheses, and in section 2.4, 
we outline the data and methods employed. We present the results in section 
2.5, discuss them in section 2.6, and conclude in section 2.7. 
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2.2. Noise and herding in betting markets 
 
Betting markets are valuable settings in which to explore behaviour in 
financial  markets  (Sauer,  1998).  They  share  many  characteristics with  other 
financial  markets,  including  the  complexity  and  interdependence  of  factors 
which  influence  an  asset’s  value,  ease  of  entry,  and  a  large  number  of 
participants who have access to a range of information (Vaughan Williams and 
Paton, 1997). In addition, as indicated above, betting markets (based on events 
such as political elections or horseraces) are markets for state contingent claims 
(Shin, 1993). 
  Furthermore,  there  is  an  important  reason  for  believing  that  insights 
regarding  noise  trading  and  herding  in  financial  markets  may  be  more 
forthcoming when studying betting markets. In an efficient market, we should 
expect  market  prices  to  precisely  reflect  revealed  fundamental  information. 
However,  in  financial  markets,  prices  are  never  entirely  derived  from  the 
current  fundamental  information;  rather,  prices  represent  the  current 
expectation  of  future  prices.  Hence,  even  if  current  fundamentals  were  fully 
known, there remains some uncertainty in prices. Betting market data enable us 
to overcome this concern. In particular, markets for an event (e.g., a race) close 
at  a  pre-defined  end  point.  Bets  are  then  settled,  with  all  bettors  receiving 
unambiguous payoffs. Consequently, in these markets there is a time when all 
uncertainty is resolved; the underlying fundamental information is revealed, in 
the  sense  that  a  winner  is  declared.  This  is  repeated  often,  with  several 
thousand separate markets per annum. 
  Exploration of noise trading and herding in betting markets also offers 
advantages over laboratory enquiry. In particular, betting involves uncertain 
and dynamic information, time stress, and rewards and penalties that matter to 
decision-makers:  features  that  Orasanu  and  Connolly  (1993)  argue  are  only 
present in real-world decision contexts. Anderson and Brown (1984) confirm 
that  risk-taking  behaviour  in  high-stakes,  real-world  contexts  is  difficult  to 
reproduce in laboratory settings. In addition, caution must be exercised when 
inferring  from  laboratory-based  studies  (which  often  involve  non-experts 
making decisions in alien domains: Johnson and Bruce, 2001) the behaviour of   58 
experts  such  as  those  populating  regular  financial  and  betting  markets. 
Consequently, betting markets appear to offer an ideal environment in which to 
develop insights into noise trading and herding. 
  Despite these advantages, relatively few studies have investigated these 
topics in betting markets. Brown and Sauer (1993b) found that, in a basketball 
betting market, the noise component in price variation was small relative to 
that associated with unobserved fundamentals, i.e., “noise is news” (p.1208). 
Those studies investigating herding in betting markets have generally shown 
that,  as  expected,  betting  on  events  (e.g.,  a  horse  winning  a  race)  that 
subsequently attract a high degree of betting interest (known as a ‘plunge’) is 
profitable (Crafts, 1985; Schnytzer and Shilony, 1995). The problem, of course, 
is identifying such opportunities before the fact, and this is where bettors with 
access to privileged information can gain an advantage. Herding behaviour may 
ensue when a plunge is regarded by noise traders as a signal that the horse is 
being backed by those with privileged information. However, Camerer (1998) 
found that ‘fake’ privileged information signals (he placed large early bets in US 
pari-mutuel  pools)  failed  to  cause  herding  behaviour.  This  may  have  been 
because the fake bets were not large enough for other bettors to perceive them 
as genuine informed bets. Alternatively, bettors had little incentive to herd on 
the  initial  price  movement,  since,  in  pari-mutuel  markets,  payoffs  are  only 
known at the market close. 
  Law  and  Peel  (2002)  examined  occasions  when  genuine  privileged 
information resulted in significant price movements in UK bookmaker markets. 
They  found  that  positive  returns  were  obtainable  by  betting  on  horses  that 
plunged  as  a  result  of  informed  trading,  whereas  returns  were  negative 
otherwise. Notably, it is the absence of herding which leads to the inefficiency, 
i.e., bettors fail to recognize genuine signals of privileged information. However, 
plunges resulting from trading by agents with privileged information were rare. 
  Schnytzer  and  Snir  (2008)  developed  a  model  of  cash-constrained 
informed traders in a bookmaker market. If mispricing becomes apparent early 
in the market, informed traders bet to take advantage, and herd betting by noise 
traders may ensue, causing a large price movement. However, there may be 
occasions  when  the  price  then  returns  to  inefficient  levels;  at  this point  the   59 
informed  traders  have  no  cash  remaining  to  exploit  the  inefficiency,  which 
remains in the final prices. Consistent with the model, they find that positive 
returns can be made by betting on horses for which there has been a significant 
early plunge, but a later reversal in price. However, the set of such horses is 
again very small, so it is still unclear whether the results represent a genuine 
inefficiency. Their study is reminiscent of Hong and Stein’s (1999) model, in 
which ‘newswatchers’ are cash-constrained and so underreact to their private 
information.  This  enables  momentum  traders  to  initially  profit  from  the 
newswatchers’  revealed  information,  but  later  a  herding  effect  is  created  as 
momentum  traders  follow  each  other’s  trades  rather  than  those  of  the 
newswatchers. 
  To develop important new insights, our study differs from these previous 
studies in a number of ways. First, we adopt a method (unlike that of Brown and 
Sauer,  1993b)  that  enables  us  to  distinguish  between  noise  and  informed 
trading, allowing us to reveal the effect of noise trading on market efficiency. 
Second,  we  employ  data  from  a  betting  exchange,  where  prices  are  derived 
entirely from the relative levels of supply and demand. This avoids the difficulty 
of interpreting lowering prices in bookmaker markets (employed in Law and 
Peel, 2002) as evidence of herding, since these price movements may result 
from bookmakers artificially lowering prices and may not be related to changes 
in  bettors’  demand.  Finally,  previous  betting  market  studies  have  been 
conducted in markets (bookmaker or pari-mutuel), where ‘assets’ can only be 
‘bought’. We examine betting exchanges, which more faithfully represent wider 
financial markets. Importantly, in these markets participants can both buy and 
sell assets (i.e., ‘back’ or ‘lay’ a contestant to win or lose, respectively), allowing 
us to assess the relative importance of ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ trading signals. 
 
2.3. Betting exchanges, Shin z, and hypotheses 
 
2.3.1. Betting exchanges 
 
  We employ data from Betfair, the largest exchange betting market in the 
world by traded volume, with horserace betting revenues of £103 million in   60 
2011 (Betfair, 2011). We consider ‘win’ markets, in which bettors must predict 
which horse will win (or, alternatively, which horses will lose). The odds for 
horse i in race j, are the best odds  ij R  at which it is currently possible to back 
the horse to win. This represents the return to a £1 winning bet (e.g., a winning 
£1 bet with odds of 3.00 returns £3 for a profit of £28). However, as is typical of 
exchanges,  Betfair  generally  take  a  commission  of  5%  on  net  winnings9. 
Consequently, the effective odds, which we use in our analysis, are given by 
) 1 ( 95 . 0 1 − + = ij ij R R . It is standard in the betting markets literature to make a 
distinction  between  ‘odds’  Rij  and  ‘price’  ij ij R r / 1 = ,  and  we  adopt  this 
convention. The odds-implied probability qij of horse i winning race j, with nj 
runners, is then given by 
(2.1)    
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=
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While the horses’ true winning probabilities are not knowable explicitly, each 
race j results in a vector of outcomes 
T
j n j j j y y y ) ,..., , ( 2 1 , where yhj = 1 for the 
winning horse h and yij = 0 otherwise. If markets are efficient, then, over many 
races,  odds-implied  probabilities  should  approximate  true  winning 
probabilities as realized by race results. 
 
2.3.2. The Shin measure of informed trading 
 
  Shin  (1993)  developed  a  means  (known  as  Shin  z)  of  measuring  the 
proportion  of  market  participation  that  can  be  attributed  to  traders  with 
privileged information. His model describes a game based around a horserace, 
consisting of an expected profit-maximizing market maker (bookmaker) and a 
randomly  selected  bettor  who  is  either  perfectly  informed  (i.e.,  they  know 
                                                 
8 Exchange odds are expressed inclusive of unit stake and are often referred to as ‘decimal’ odds; 
this is in contrast to bookmaker markets where odds are expressed as, say, 2/1 for the 
equivalent of exchange decimal odds of 3.00.  
9 At the time the data used in this study was collected, the commission structure on Betfair was 
considerably more complicated than this, with a lower base commission rate applied to high 
volume bettors, and an additional charge applied to consistent winners. Thus our assumption 
of 5% commission on average is an estimate (and the true average commission rate is of little 
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precisely the winner of the race) or a noise trader. The model predicts that, 
since  the  bookmaker  is  not  perfectly  informed,  they  will  depress  odds  on 
longshots (the horses with the least chances of winning the race) relative to 
those on favourites in order to protect themselves from the possibility of large 
losses from an informed trader, who is in possession of superior information. 
Although  in  Shin’s  original  model,  informed  traders  are  perfectly  informed, 
Fingleton  and  Waldron  (1999)  relaxed  this  assumption,  showing  that  it  is 
equivalent to suppose that the precision of the informed trader’s information 
can vary, and that the Shin z value is equal to the level of informed trading times 
the  degree  of  precision.  Hence,  we  can  assume  a  more  general  situation  in 
which a range of different types of informed traders operate, but that the level 
of influence they have in the market is likely to vary in tandem. The Shin z value 
itself  is  directly  derived  from  final  bookmaker  prices  and  has  been  used 
extensively in betting market studies in order to investigate claims relating to 
the level of informed trading (e.g., Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997; Smith et 
al.,  2006).  An  explanation  of  the  method  used  to  derive  Shin  z  is  given  in 
Appendix 1. 
  If  the  proportion  of  traders  holding  priviliged  information  is  low  in  a 
market, then the proportion of traders whose information is shared by other 
market participants (in the case of Shin’s model, shared with the bookmaker) is 
high,  and  vice  versa.  If  this  shared  information  is  already  incorporated  into 
market prices (through odds-setting by the bookmaker), any further trading by 
participants with shared information is uninformed and is hence noise trading. 
Thus, we use the complement of Shin z to measure the degree of noise trading 
in the markets. As in Smith, Paton, and Vaughan Williams (2009), we note that 
Shin’s model predated the advent of betting exchanges, and so the assumption 
that prices are set by a monopoly bookmaker is no longer valid. However Shin’s 
model can be adapted for exchange markets with a few reasonable assumptions. 
For example, instead of a monopoly bookmaker, we can assume that there is an 
oligopoly of 'big players' who act as market makers. The motivation behind this 
idea is that it is well known that there are well-informed traders controlling a 
vast  share  of  the  wealth  that  is  traded  in  betting  exchange  markets.  These 
traders  are  subject  to  lower  commission  rates  due  to  their  large  historical   62 
traded volumes, and this enables them to maintain their dominant status. With 
these appropriate modifications to Shin’s model, Shin z can again be employed 
to assess the degree of noise trading in the market. 
 
2.3.3. Hypotheses 
 
  We  first  test  the  predictions  of  Black  (1986)  and  De  Long,  Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990) that, in the absence of new information, noise 
trading increases short term volatility. Previous tests of these predictions (e.g., 
Campbell and Kyle, 1993) are rare and those that have been conducted are only 
marginally conclusive. Second, as indicated above, there is some debate as to 
whether noise trading has a net positive or negative effect on efficiency. On the 
one hand, noise trading moves prices away from efficient levels, and informed 
traders,  who  can  restore  efficiency,  may  fail  to  do  so  because  they  are  risk 
averse  (Shleifer  and  Summers,  1990;  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997).  However, 
when prices are not extreme, noise trading can provide liquidity to informed 
traders, enabling them to arbitrage away inefficiency (Bloomfield et al., 2009). 
Hence, our first hypothesis is: 
1.  Increased  noise  is  associated  with  increased  market  price  (i)  volatility,  (ii) 
efficiency. 
  In  betting  exchanges,  the  demand  for  bets  on  a  particular  outcome  is 
directly represented in the current market price. Thus, if a large unidirectional 
price  movement  results  in  a  price  differing  from  that  expected  (given  the 
complete  set  of  fundamental  information),  then  that  price  movement  is 
evidence of herding. 
  It is well established that bets placed in the later stages of a betting market 
are more informative than early bets (Asch et al., 1982; Gandar et al., 2001)10. 
One explanation is that the timing of bets is variably incentivized depending on 
the quality of the bettors’ information (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2005). More 
informed bettors have an incentive to bet late to avoid revealing their private 
information to other bettors. In addition, liquidity is lower in the early stages of 
                                                 
10 While not reported here, we have verified that this is also the case in our exchange market 
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exchange betting markets, so bettors incur additional transactional costs in the 
form of wider bid-ask spreads, and are unable to place large enough bets to 
compensate  them  for  revealing  their  information.  Consequently,  herding  on 
price movements that are believed to be signals of informed trading are likely to 
be more commonplace in the later stages of the market (when there may be 
insufficient  time  for  informed  traders  to  arbitrage  away  the  resulting 
inefficiency). Moreover, on-course bookmaker prices are posted online just 10 
minutes  before  the  start  of  each  race,  at  which  point  there  is  usually  a 
considerable adjustment in off-course and online prices due to the information 
contained in the on-course prices (Schnytzer and Snir, 1995). Thus, we should 
expect herding to be more prevalent in this final window of betting before the 
race starts. These considerations motivate our second hypothesis: 
2. Bettors display herding behaviour, but to a greater extent in the later stages of 
the market than in the early stages. 
  In betting exchanges, as in other financial markets, ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ signals 
may  provide  different  information  signals.  Consequently,  we  investigate 
whether bettors’ herding behaviour differs depending on the direction of large 
price  movements.  This  investigation  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  betting 
exchanges facilitate the laying of ‘known losers’: horses which are deliberately 
prevented  from  running  to  their  potential  (Marginson,  2010).  This  practice 
could benefit horse owners who know that their horse will lose. Despite rules 
which  forbid  such  behaviour,  its  prevalence  is  the  subject  of  much  debate, 
suggesting that bettors might be more likely to interpret ‘sell’ signals as genuine 
informed trading. Consequently our third hypothesis is: 
3. Bettors herd to a greater extent on ‘sell’ (lay) signals than ‘buy’ (back) signals. 
  Herding  leads  to  inefficiency  if  the  deviation  in  market  prices  from 
fundamental information is sufficiently large such that an arbitrage opportunity 
arises.  We  believe  this  is  likely  to  be  the  case,  so  this  motivates  our  fourth 
hypothesis: 
4. Herding presents an inefficiency, such that it is possible to make positive returns 
by betting against those who herd. 
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2.4. Data and methods 
 
2.4.1. Data 
 
  The data employed are sequences of odds for 62,124 horses running in 
6058 races in the UK and Ireland from August 2009 through August 2010. The 
data were downloaded in real-time using the Betfair API and consist of the odds 
on the exchange for each horse in each race (as indicated above, the odds are 
the best price at which it is possible to back the horse to win11). The data were 
collected  at  1-minute  intervals  throughout  the  duration  of  the  market,  from 
9:00 a.m. on the morning of the race, through to race start time (resulting in 
over 8.4 million data points). We segment the market on each race into four 
time periods, depending on the amount of time left before the race start, in 
order  to  determine  the  prevalence  and  direction  of  herding  over  different 
periods of the market. While markets are often activated on the evening before 
the  race,  or  earlier  for  the  most  popular  events,  the  vast  majority  of 
participation in markets takes place on the day of the race, so segment 1 begins 
at 9:00 am and ends at the race start time. The most active stage of the market 
then begins 30 minutes before the race start, since this is the typical length of 
time between races at each racetrack, so is the period when most participants 
direct their attention to the race. We divide this period of time up into three 
segments: segments 2 and 3 end at the race start time and begin 30 minutes 
before the race and 15 minutes before the race, respectively, and segment 4 
begins 30 minutes before the race and ends 15 minutes before the race. Hence 
segment 1 lasts at least 4 hours, depending on the race start time, segment 2 
lasts 30 minutes, and segments 3 and 4 last 15 minutes. 
  For our analysis of noise trading, we split the dataset into ‘high noise’ and 
‘low noise’ subsets, consisting, respectively, of those races with below-/above-
median Shin z (with 3029 races in each set). We compare the levels of informed 
trading  and  the  efficiency  of  market  prices  between  the  two  sets.  For  our 
                                                 
11 Instead of ‘back’ prices we could have used ‘lay’ prices or the mid-point of ‘back’ and ‘lay’ 
prices. Similarly, we make a minor assumption that odds are equally valid as prices whatever 
the stake limit. Neither of these considerations have more than a very minor effect on our 
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analysis of price movements, we split the full dataset into a training set of the 
first 75% of races (4544: 47,196 horses), and a holdout set of 25% of races 
(1514: 14,928 horses). We estimate conditional logit models (McFadden, 1974) 
on  the  training  set,  in  order  to  determine  whether  bettors  exhibit  herding 
behaviour. We use these models to predict horses’ winning probabilities in the 
holdout set and construct betting strategies based on these probabilities to test 
the  market  efficiency  implications  of  any  observed  herding.  Hence,  our 
conclusions about market efficiency, which are based only on the holdout set, 
can be relied upon, because they are out-of-sample and thus are not influenced 
by fitting our models on the training set. 
 
2.4.2. Measures of trend and volatility of odds 
 
  We generate an odds curve for each horse in each segment of the market 
for a given race, using the method of Johnson, Jones, and Tang (2006). That is, 
for each horse i in race j, and for each market segment k, we have a sequence Sijk 
of  Lijk  pairs  of  times  ) (l tijk  and  odds  ) (l Rijk ,  i.e., 
)]} ( ), ( [ )],..., 1 ( ), 1 ( {[ ijk ijk ijk ijk ijk ijk ijk L R L t R t S = . We record price changes so that, for 
each  time  in  the  sequence,  the  odds  are  different  from  the  preceding  time. 
Consequently, for any time T, where  ) 1 ( ) ( + ≤ ≤ l t T l t ,  ) (l R R =  (here, and in the 
following, we drop the subscripts i, j and k when their use is not required). The 
first/last pair is the first/last time in the segment along with the first/final odds 
recorded. The final odds recorded in segment 1 (the full duration of the market) 
are the odds at which the horse started the race (or ‘starting price’); this special 
case is used to calculate the final odds-implied probability, which is given by 
∑ = =
j n
s sj sj ij ij ij ij L R L R L q
1 )] ( / 1 [ / )] ( / 1 [ ) ( .  Finally,  we  rescale  all  the  sequences  so 
that  0 ) 1 ( = t ,  1 ) ( = L t ,  and  1 ) ( = L R .  The  result  of  this  procedure  is  that  each 
odds curve is a piecewise continuous step function  ) (t Φ  on the interval [0, 1], 
such that  1 ) 1 ( = Φ . From the odds curve, we measure underlying trends in the 
odds. Specifically, the trend µ is estimated as the slope of the ordinary least 
squares regression line fitted to the pairs in S, constrained to pass through (1, 1), 
i.e.,   66 
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and is therefore given by 
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A trend variable is estimated for each horse in each race for each of the 
four segments. Further, because bettors might infer differing information from 
‘lay’  and  ‘back’  bets,  increasing  or  decreasing  prices  may  be  interpreted 
differently.  Consequently,  we  derive  two  trend  variables,  ) 0 , max(    =
+  and 
) 0 , min(    =
− , for each horse in each segment (i.e., eight trend variables for 
each horse in each race). Hence, for horse i in race j, and for market segment k, 
) 0 , max( ijk ijk     =
+  and  ) 0 , min( ijk ijk     =
− . 
  Since  racetrack  betting  markets  are  based  on  a  significant  amount  of 
information that is revealed in real time (e.g., the condition of the horses, the 
weather), it is reasonable to expect, ex ante, that prices will fluctuate around an 
underlying trend. The trend represents the bettors’ collective opinion of the 
horse’s  chances  at  the  close  of  the  market,  relative  to  their  chances  at  the 
opening of the market. So, in order to obtain a meaningful measure of volatility, 
we calculate, for each horse, in each race, the trend μij in the odds curve, and 
then the volatility σij is given by the variance of the odds around the regression 
line in (2.2)12, i.e., 
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To illustrate, Figure 2.1 shows an example of an odds curve with the 30 minute 
trend, along with the deviation for each  1 ,..., 2 , 1 − = L l . The volatility measure 
discussed  above  relates  to  each  horse  in  turn.  However,  we  are  primarily 
interested in volatility on a race-by-race basis. Consequently, we use the mean 
of σij over all the horses in each race,  ∑ = =
j n
i ij j j n
1 ) / 1 ( σ σ . 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 A range of other measures of volatility were tested, but the results were the same.   67 
Figure 2.1. Example of the least squares regression method for determining the 
trend and volatility of the odds curve for a horse. 
 
 
2.4.3. The conditional logit model and herding 
 
  The conditional logit (CL) model (McFadden, 1974) has been employed in 
many betting market studies (Asch et al., 1984; Bolton and Chapman, 1986; 
Benter, 1994; Sung and Johnson, 2010). It allows us to estimate the winning 
probability of each horse, taking into account competition between horses in 
the race. Formulation of the CL model begins with an estimate of horse i’s ability 
to win race j, 
(2.5)     ij
m
l ij ij l x l W ε β + =∑ =1 ) ( ) ( , 
where  ) (l β , for l = 1, … , m, are the coefficients that determine the importance 
of the variables  ) (l xij , and εij is an independent error term. If the independent 
errors  are  identically  distributed  according  to  the  double  exponential 
distribution, the estimated winning probability for horse h, phj, is given by 
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  The coefficients  ) (l β  are estimated by maximizing the joint probability of 
observing  the  results  of  all  the  races  in  the  dataset;  this  is  achieved  by 
maximizing  the  log-likelihood  (LL)  of  the  full  model  (i.e.,  one  including  all 
independent variables in which we are interested): 
(2.7)     ∑ ∑ = = =
N
j
n
i ij ij
j p y full L
1 1 ln ) ( ln , 
where yij = 1 if horse i won race j and yij = 0 otherwise, and N is the total number 
of races in the dataset. For this study an appropriate measure of the predictive 
accuracy of the model is Maddala’s (1983)13 pseudo-R2, given by 
(2.8)     )]} ( ln ) ( )[ln / 2 exp{( 1
2 full L naive L N R − − = , 
where  ) ( ln naive L  is the LL of the naive model (where each horse in a race is 
assigned the same probability of winning): 
(2.9)     ∑ = =
N
j j n naive L
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The  standard  normal  test  statistic  )] ( .[ . / ) ( ) ( l E S l l z β β =  is  used  to  test  if 
variable  coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  0,  i.e.,  variables  add 
predictive power to the model. An additional test to justify augmenting simpler 
models with additional variables utilizes the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic 
)] ( ln ) ( [ln 2 naive L full L − , which is χ2 distributed with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of additional variables. 
  In our analysis, the first variable in the CL models will always be log of 
final odds-implied probability, i.e.,  )] ( ln[ ) 1 ( ij ij ij L q x = . If the estimated value of 
the coefficient of this variable,  ) 1 ( β , is equal to one when there are no other 
variables  in  the  model,  this  implies  that  there  is  no  favourite-longshot  bias 
(FLB),  where  FLB  is  the  widely-reported  phenomenon  whereby 
favourites/longshots are under-/over-bet (e.g., Dowie, 1976). The greater the 
value of  ) 1 ( β , the greater is the degree of the FLB (Bacon-Shone et al., 1992). 
However, previous studies have indicated that betting exchanges display little, if 
any,  FLB,  (Smith  et  al.,  2006),  suggesting  that  1 ) 1 ( = β .  Whatever  its  value, 
                                                 
13 We  use  Maddala’s  pseudo-R2  rather  than  McFadden’s  (1974)  more  popular  definition, 
because McFadden’s R2 has the unfortunate property of varying with the average number of 
horses in each race, which is not the case for Maddala’s pseudo-R2. Our results would be the 
same using the McFadden pseudo-R2, but if we used this measure we could not account for 
variations in market efficiency due to the differing numbers of runners in the high and low 
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having  developed  a  model  incorporating  an  appropriate  value  of  ) 1 ( β  (i.e., 
having adjusted for any FLB), the pseudo-R2 of a single-variable CL model is an 
appropriate measure of the predictive accuracy of market prices, and thus the 
market efficiency. 
  To compare the effects of increased noise levels on efficiency, we estimate 
single-variable CL models on the high and low noise subsets, and compare the 
models’ pseudo-R2s. We estimate the distributional properties of the pseudo-
R2s using a bootstrap method (Efron, 1979). For each of the high and low noise 
sets (each of 3029 races), we repeat 1000 times a random sampling of 3029 
races, with replacement, and fit a single-variable CL model to each sample. The 
random sampling is stratified so that the proportions of handicap races (where 
horses are allocated weights to carry based on their previous performances) are 
approximately  equal  in  the  samples  and  the  full  dataset.  This  controls  for 
potential effects on the accuracy of odds-implied probabilities from the greater 
complexity  involved  in  handicaps  (Johnson  and  Bruce,  1998).  The  sample 
means,  ) (
2
H R    and  ) (
2
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L R s ,  of  the  resulting 
sets of pseudo-R2s are used to derive a standard normal test statistic, 
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This is used to test part (ii) of our first hypothesis, that high market noise is 
associated with increased market efficiency (similar test statistics are derived 
for the levels of FLB and volatility). 
  Herding occurs when bettors alter their actions to be more representative 
of the actions of others. It may be rational for individual bettors to rely on the 
private  information  of  bettors’  that  they  believe  are  more  informed  than 
themselves. However, a multitude of simultaneously herding bettors can lead to 
significant movements in prices that cannot possibly be fully accounted for by 
the underlying objective information of a handful of informed bettors. Hence, 
when a horse’s odds decrease/increase significantly (i.e., resulting from bets on 
that horse to win/lose), and that price movement is not fully attributable to a 
genuine increase/decrease in that horse’s chances of winning, then the horse’s 
final odds will imply a probability that is greater/lower than the horse’s true   70 
winning probability, i.e., the odds will be too low/high. Therefore, the second 
variables  we  employ  in  the  CL  models  are  the  two  trend  variables  that  we 
derived  previously  for  each  market  segment.  Higher  values  for  the  trend 
variables imply steeper price changes. If large price movements correspond to 
herding, the coefficients of the second variables should be significantly different 
to zero (and the corresponding LL ratio tests should also be significant): when 
odds  increase/decrease,  a  significantly  positive/negative  variable  implies 
herding, i.e., horses whose odds-implied probabilities decrease/increase over 
time win more/less often than implied by the odds. Determination of the extent 
to which bettors herd over the different time periods when odds increase or 
decrease allows us to test our second and third hypotheses. 
 
2.4.4. Betting strategies 
 
  If bettors herd to the extent that final odds-implied probabilities are not in 
line  with  true  winning  probabilities,  it  should  be  possible  to  find  profitable 
betting opportunities. To investigate this possibility, we estimate a CL model 
involving a combination of variables relating to herding behaviour, estimated 
on  the  training  set  of  4544  races.  We  use  this  model  to  predict  winning 
probabilities for horses running in the 1514 holdout races. If herding results in 
inefficiency, betting strategies based on the model should be profitable in the 
long term and involve relatively low risk. Considering each holdout race j in 
turn, with initial wealth £1000 and current wealth Wj, we use the estimated 
probabilities as the basis for the following betting strategies: 
 
1.  Level staking: For each horse i, if pi > ri, bet 1% of current wealth on 
horse i. Therefore, if a bet is to be placed, the size of the bet is £Wj/100. 
2.  Proportional staking: For each horse i, if pi > ri, bet an amount such that 
the profit from a win, after commission, is 10% of Wj, i.e., bet size is 
£ ) 1 ( 10 / − i j R W . An advantage of this strategy in assessing inefficiency is 
that returns are not unduly influenced by ‘lucky’ wins on horses with 
very high odds (Schnytzer and Snir, 2008).   71 
3.  Kelly staking: The Kelly strategy (Kelly, 1956) assigns bet sizes xi over all 
n horses in the race to maximize the log of expected wealth after the race, 
∑ = =
n
i i i n F p x x x G
1 2 1 ln ) ,..., , ( ,  where  ) ( 95 . 0 1
1 ∑ = − + =
n
s s i i i x R x F  
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1 1  otherwise  (since  5% 
commission is only paid if bets result in an overall profit). The xi are 
estimated using numerical optimization. The Kelly strategy is optimal in 
the sense that it maximizes the asymptotic rate of growth of wealth and 
minimizes  the  expected  time  to  reach  a  pre-defined  wealth  target 
(Breiman, 1961). However, since recommended bets may be very large, 
the volatility of returns from a full Kelly strategy over the 1514 holdout 
races may not result in a positive overall return. 
4.  Half  Kelly  staking:  Some  authors  (e.g.,  Benter,  1994)  recommend  a 
fractional Kelly strategy, whereby bet sizes are a fixed proportion (in this 
case, a half) of those recommended by the full Kelly strategy. This is sub-
optimal in that it no longer maximizes the asymptotic growth rate of 
wealth.  However,  fractional  Kelly  strategies  are  less  risky,  and,  over 
medium-length time horizons, may result in a higher expected return as 
a percentage of the total amount bet (MacLean et al., 2010). 
 
  The above strategies all entail a zero probability of ruin, assuming that 
arbitrarily  small  bets  can  be  placed.  A  non-intuitive  property  of  the  Kelly 
strategy is that it may recommend bets on outcomes with negative expected 
returns.  However,  this  is  only  optimal  if  our  estimates  for  the  true  winning 
probabilities,  pi,  are  accurate.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  over-betting  will  occur 
(MacLean et al., 1992). To allow for inaccuracies in our estimates, we adapt the 
Kelly strategies so that no bets are placed on horses for which the expected 
return is negative, i.e., piRi < 1 (Hausch et al., 1981). Second, the strategies might 
recommend large bets on horses with a high probability of winning, so a single 
unfortunate loss may skew the overall returns. Similarly, skewed returns may 
result  from  a  fortunate  win  on  a  horse  with  a  low  winning  probability.  We 
therefore restrict single bet sizes to a maximum of 10% of current wealth. We 
assess the performance of the betting strategies using the following measures:   72 
 
1.  Rate of return: the ratio of the profit (or loss) earned to the total amount 
bet. 
2.  Risk-adjusted  return:  the  risk-adjusted  return,  given  by 
2 / 1 )] ( /[ R Var R , 
where  R  is  the  rate  of  return  and  the  variance  is  estimated  using  a 
bootstrap procedure, by sampling with replacement from the holdout set 
1000 times and calculating returns on each sample. 
3.  Expected final wealth:  ∏ =
N
j j X W
1 0 , where N is the number of races bet on 
and, for race j, X is the expected increase in wealth factor ∑ =
n
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 otherwise,  where  i x ~  is  the  fraction  of  current 
wealth bet on horse i after any restrictions are imposed (MacLean et al., 
1992). 
4.  Probability that final wealth is above x% of initial wealth: this is given by 
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,  where  Φ  is  the  standard  normal 
cumulative distribution function (MacLean et al., 1992). 
 
2.5. Results 
 
2.5.1. Noise, volatility, and efficiency 
 
  The  high  and  low  noise  sets  consist  of  the  races  in  the  dataset  that, 
respectively,  have  Shin  z  less  than  (mean  Shin  z  =  0.0089)  and  higher  than 
(mean Shin z = 0.0129) the median (0.0105). Further characteristics of the data 
in the high and low noise sets, as well as their 1000-bootstrapped samples, are 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
  CL  models,  with  log  of  final  odds-implied  probability  as  the  single 
predictor variable, are estimated for the high and low noise datasets, as well as 
for each of the bootstrap samples. The coefficient of the single variable,  ) 1 ( β , is 
not significantly different from 1 in any case (z = 0.25, p = 0.8037 and z = 0.94, p   73 
= 0.3453 for the original high and low noise sets, respectively; z = 0.20, p = 
0.8421  and  z  =  0.99,  p  =  0.3236  for  the  high  and  low  noise  bootstrapped 
datasets), indicating, as expected, the absence of FLB. Furthermore, we find that 
mean pseudo-R2 values for the high and low noise bootstrapped sets (see Figure 
2.2) confirm that prices are on average both more volatile (high: mean volatility 
0.0286; low: mean volatility 0.0200; z = 11.84, p = 0.0000) and more accurate in 
predicting winners when market prices are noisier (high: mean pseudo-R2 = 
0.6351; low: mean pseudo-R2 = 0.4965; z = 7.91, p = 0.0000). Consequently, the 
results  support  both  parts  of  our  first  hypothesis,  that  increased  noise  is 
associated with greater market volatility and efficiency. 
 
Table 2.1. A description of the data: races with high and low noise. 
  All data 
High noise 
(low Shin 
z) set 
Low 
noise 
(high 
Shin z) 
set 
 
Bootstrapped 
high noise 
set 
Bootstrapped 
low 
noise set 
Number of 
races  6058  3029  3029 
Number of 
races  3029  3029 
Number of 
horses  62,124  39,555  22,569 
Mean number 
of horses  39,511  22,598 
Mean 
number of 
horses per 
race 
10.3  13.1  7.5 
Mean number 
of horses per 
race 
13.0  7.5 
Number of 
handicaps  3255  1747  1508 
Mean number 
of handicaps  1628.2  1628.5 
Proportion 
of 
handicaps 
0.537  0.577  0.498 
Mean 
proportion of 
handicaps 
0.538  0.538 
Mean Shin 
z  0.0109  0.0089  0.0129  Mean Shin z  0.0089  0.0128 
Level of 
FLB β(1)  1.014  1.001  1.026 
Mean level of 
FLB β(1)  1.005  1.027 
        z(β)  -0.64 
(0.035) 
[β(1)-1] / 
S.E.[β(1)] 
0.78 
(0.017) 
0.25 
(0.022) 
0.94 
(0.028) 
[β(1)-1] / 
S.E.[β(1)] 
0.20 
(0.023) 
0.99 
(0.027) 
Mean 
volatility σ   0.0242  0.0280  0.0204 
Mean 
volatility σ   0.0286  0.0200 
        z(σ )  11.84** 
(0.001) 
lnL(naive)  -13,670.0  -7702.9  -5967.3 
Mean 
lnL(naive)  -7699.7  -5974.3 
lnL(full)  -11,125.0  -6224.6  -4900.1  Mean lnL(full)  -6172.0  -4934.8 
Pseudo-R2  0.5684  0.6232  0.5057   μ(R2)  0.6351  0.4965 
        z[μ(R2)]  7.91** 
(0.018)   
** denotes significance at the 1% level in a 2-tailed test. 
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Figure 2.2. Histograms of pseudo-R2 from 1000-bootstrap samples taken from 
high noise and low noise sets (fitted normal curves shown). 
 
 
2.5.2. Herding 
 
  The results of estimating models (using the training set of 4544 races) 
including indicators of possible herding behaviour in the four time segments of 
the market (separated by whether prices increase or decrease) are presented in 
Table 2.2. The coefficient of log of final odds-implied probability in the CL model 
where this is the only variable (Model 0), is significantly different from zero (z = 
51.45, p = 0.0000). In addition, the model’s LL is -8337.6, confirming that the 
odds, as expected, add significant predictive power over the naive model (LL = -
10,307.7). Models 1 to 8 include a second variable that describes a trend in 
prices over time. In Models 1 and 2, which assess the predictability of the trend 
over the full duration of the market, the coefficient of the second variable is not 
significantly different from zero (z = 0.92, p = 0.3576 and z = -0.13, p = 0.8966, 
respectively). These results suggest that large price movements over the full 
duration of the market do not necessarily result in odds-implied probabilities 
differing  from  true  winning  probabilities,  i.e.  herding  is  not  apparent  when 
considering the full duration of the market.    75 
Table 2.2. Conditional logit results using indicators of herding behaviour. 
Model  Variable  Coefficient β(l) 
z(l) = β(l)/ 
S.E. [ β(l)] 
(S.E.) 
lnL  LR test vs. 
Model 0   Pseudo-R2 
Naive  -  -  -  -10,307.7  -  - 
0  lnqij(Lij)  1.015  51.45** 
(0.020)  -8337.6  -  0.5798 
1  lnqij(Lij)  1.025  45.68** 
(0.022) 
  μij1+  0.058  0.92 
(0.063) 
-8337.2  0.82  0.5799 
2  lnqij(Lij)  1.016  50.28** 
(0.020) 
  μij1-  -0.004  -0.13 
(0.028) 
-8337.6  0.02  0.5798 
3  lnqij(Lij)  1.033  48.48** 
(0.021) 
  μij2+  0.182  2.23* 
(0.082) 
-8335.1  4.92*  0.5803 
4  lnqij(Lij)  1.019  51.12** 
(0.020) 
  μij2-  -0.049  -1.25 
(0.039) 
-8336.8  1.59  0.5800 
5  lnqij(Lij)  1.031  48.82** 
(0.021) 
  μij3+  0.215  2.14* 
(0.100) 
-8335.3  4.54*  0.5803 
6  lnqij(Lij)  1.017  51.16** 
(0.020) 
  μij3-  -0.038  -0.74 
(0.051) 
-8337.3  0.56  0.5799 
7  ln(Qij)  1.019  50.75** 
(0.020) 
  μij4+  0.117  0.91 
(0.129) 
-8337.2  0.78  0.5799 
8  lnqij(Lij)  1.014  51.35** 
(0.020) 
  μij4-  -0.471  -3.56** 
(0.132) 
-8330.5  14.27**  0.5812 
9  lnqij(Lij)  1.026  48.52** 
(0.021) 
  μij3+  0.165  1.63 
(0.102) 
  μij4-  -0.442  -3.32** 
(0.133) 
-8329.1  16.89**  0.5814 
* and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level in a 2-tailed test, respectively. 
 
However, considering the last 30 minutes (Models 3 and 4) and the last 15 
minutes of the market (Models 5 and 6), the coefficients of the second variable 
are significant when odds increase (Model 3: z = 2.23, p = 0.0258; Model 5: z = 
2.14, p = 0.0324), but not when odds decrease (Model 4: z = -1.25, p = 0.2150; 
Model 6: z = -0.74, p = 0.4592). Therefore, large price movements in the later 
stages of the market do result in odds-implied probabilities differing from true-
winning  probabilities,  but  only  when  odds  increase,  i.e.,  bettors  herd  on   76 
increasing odds in the late stages, but not on decreasing odds. Finally, Models 7 
and 8 are based on the period between 30 and 15 minutes from the race start. 
Here we find the opposite effect, i.e., bettors herd on decreasing odds (Model 8: 
z = -3.56, p = 0.000) but not on increasing odds (Model 7: z = 0.91, p = 0.3682). 
These results are all supported by LR tests vs. Model 0: only Models 3, 5, 
and 8 add significant predictive power over odds alone (Model 3: χ12 = 4.92, p = 
0.0266;  Model  5: χ12  =  4.54, p  =  0.0331;  Model  8: χ12  =  14.27, p  =  0.0002). 
Consequently,  the  results  support  our  second  hypothesis,  that  herding 
behaviour  is  only  evident  in  the  later  stages  of  the  market.  There  is  mixed 
evidence to support our third hypothesis that bettors herd to a greater extent 
on ‘sell’ signals than ‘buy’ signals. We find that bettors herd to a greater extent 
on ‘sell’ signals in the last 15 minutes of the market (which is the most active 
betting  period),  but  herd  to  a  greater  extent  on  ‘buy’  signals  in  the  period 
between 30 and 15 minutes from to the race start. 
 
2.5.3. Economic significance of herding 
 
  We  estimate  Model  9 using  the  training  data.  This  model  includes two 
variables to account for the herding we observed on increasing odds in the last 
15 minutes, and on decreasing odds in the 30 to 15 minute period prior to the 
race start (μij3+ and μij4-), The results are presented in Table 2.2. We employ this 
model  to  estimate  winning  probabilities  in  the  holdout  sample  and  develop 
betting strategies to exploit any mispricing. The results are presented in Table 
2.3 and Figure 2.3. 
The results show that a strategy of betting against the herd is profitable 
for  all  betting  strategies.  However,  the  level  stakes  strategy  (rate  of  return: 
5.20%)  and  the  proportional  stakes  strategy  (6.49%)  spend  a  significant 
portion of the holdout period betting at a loss relative to initial capital (see 
Figure 2.3 for cumulative wealth for each strategy). On the other hand, the full 
Kelly  (6.16%)  and  half  Kelly  (10.39%)  strategies  rarely  drop  below  initial 
capital.  The  greatest  monetary  accumulation  is  achieved  with  the  full  Kelly 
strategy, with initial capital increasing by over 126%. 
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Table 2.3. Results of betting strategies on the holdout set using probabilities 
estimated from Model 9. 
Strategy  Level stakes  Proportional 
stakes  Full Kelly  Half Kelly 
Number of races bet on  546  546  532  532 
Total number of bets  644  644  625  625 
Number of winning bets  111  111  111  111 
Total amount bet (£)  7479.9  11759.0  20495.0  9114.3 
Final capital (£)  1389.2  1762.9  2262.2  1946.9 
Profit or loss (£)  389.2  762.9  1262.2  946.9 
Rate of return R (%)  5.20  6.49  6.16  10.39 
Risk-adjusted return  0.24  0.48  0.53  0.90 
Expected final wealth (£)  1448.4  1637.0  1922.5  1387.6 
50  0.93  0.69  0.48  0.33 
100  0.94  0.74  0.54  0.40 
150  0.76  0.64  0.55  0.49 
Probability 
that final 
wealth is 
above x% of 
initial 
wealth 
200  0.86  0.64  0.47  0.35 
 
However, it is also the riskier of the two Kelly strategies, with 20.5 times the 
initial capital bet over the course of the holdout period (cf. just 9.1 times for the 
half Kelly strategy). For the half Kelly strategy, initial capital increases by over 
94%.  Consequently,  the  risk-adjusted  return  is  greatest  for  the  half  Kelly 
strategy, with a value of 0.90. Similarly, the full Kelly strategy has the highest 
expected final wealth and the highest probability of doubling wealth (0.49) but 
also the lowest probability of retaining at least half of initial wealth (0.76). In 
summary,  the  positive  returns  identified  for  the  various  betting  strategies, 
including a sizeable return of 10.39% from our preferred strategy (half Kelly), 
provide  support  for  our  fourth  hypothesis,  that  herding  represents  an 
economically significant inefficiency.   78 
Figure 2.3. Log of cumulative wealth relative to initial wealth from betting 
strategies. 
 
2.6. Discussion 
 
2.6.1. Noise, volatility, and efficiency 
 
  Our finding that markets associated with greater noise trading are more 
both volatile and more efficient contributes evidence to the debate concerning 
the  roles  of  noise  and  information  in  financial  markets.  We  find  that  noise 
increases short term volatility, an empirical result that confirms the theoretical 
predictions of Black (1986) and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 
(1990). Previous empirical evidence in this regard has been only marginally 
conclusive. For example, Campbell and Kyle (1993) found that noise was helpful 
in explaining historical stock price volatility, but that its importance depends on 
the  interest  rate  assumption.  Our  results,  from  the  largest  betting  exchange 
market in the world, support the hypothesis that noise trading is associated 
with an increase in market efficiency. This is the first time such a conclusion has 
be drawn from an empirical financial market study. The results support Black’s 
(1986) assertion that noise is essential for liquid, efficient markets and they 
support the theoretical predictions of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle   79 
(1985), that increased noise need not necessarily destabilize markets. Indeed, 
we would go one step further, and suggest that, provided prices are not extreme, 
noise  actually  makes  prices  more  efficient  because  the  improved  liquidity 
allows  informed  traders  to  arbitrage  away  the  inefficiency.  This  conclusion 
echoes that of Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar’s (2009) experimental study. The 
most prominent inefficiencies in financial markets are, of course, bubbles and 
subsequent  corrections,  where  asset  prices  are  pushed  well  above  their 
fundamental values before plummeting when the bubble bursts. Arguably these 
volatile market periods are the times that markets are at their least efficient, 
since crises can occur even when economic fundamentals are sound (Cipriani 
and Guarino, 2008). We have demonstrated, conversely, that noise trading and 
the ensuing volatility can be an important tool for price discovery. 
  It is important to examine why our result that noise can increase market 
efficiency  contrasts  with  the  arguments  of  Shiller  (1990),  De  Long,  Shleifer, 
Summers,  and  Waldmann  (1990),  and  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997),  among 
others, that noise is detrimental to market efficiency because of its destabilizing 
effect  on  long-run  equilibrium  values.  In  fact,  the  reason  for  this  apparent 
contradiction appears to lie not in the destabilizing effect of noise trading, per 
se, but in the limitations to arbitrage. Our  results are drawn from  a market 
where noise traders do not introduce added risks for informed traders, limiting 
their arbitrage. In particular, in regular financial markets, an arbitrageur faces 
the  risk  that  noise  traders  continue  to  keep  prices  away  from  fundamental 
values  for  an  extended  period  of  time,  potentially  forcing  arbitrageurs  to 
liquidate at a loss (De Long et al., 1990). In our study, this risk is not present, 
because  traders  in  betting  markets  need  not  trade  their  assets  in  order  to 
realise returns. Instead, returns from state contingent claims are ensured in the 
initial trade, and traders may simply hold their assets until the market closes 
and receive their contingent return. Thus, even if prices are noisy, arbitrageurs 
can effectively guarantee returns at the moment of the initial trade, and need 
not worry about the future direction of the market. Consequently, our results 
demonstrate the inherent value of noise trading, in that, when noise trader risk 
does not limit the arbitrage of informed traders, market efficiency increases as 
noise trading increases.   80 
  The above discussion still begs the question, if noise trading is apparently 
irrational in the sense that it is loss-making, why does noise trading persist in 
markets? In regular financial markets, the motivation for noise trading is often 
assumed to be some portfolio-based requirement such as hedging or liquidity 
trades  (Bloomfield  et  al.,  2009).  In  betting  markets,  it  is  likely  that,  despite 
financial  losses,  noise  traders  gain  utility  from  the  act  of  gambling  itself 
(Vaughan  Williams  and  Paton,  1998)  or  are  locally  risk-loving  in  the 
appropriate domain (Friedman and Savage, 1948). There is some evidence that 
this may also be true of traders in regular financial markets outside of betting. 
For  example,  Gao  and  Lin  (2011)  present  evidence  that  even  institutional 
investors see lotteries as a substitute for financial market trading. Whatever the 
motivations of noise traders in regular financial markets, it is apparent from our 
results in a large exchange betting market that tighter controls on speculators 
and institutional noise traders, in an effort to reduce more general risks, may 
serve to increase liquidity risks for other traders. 
 
2.6.2. Herding 
 
  While noise trading may have a positive effect on overall market efficiency, 
this is not the case when herding occurs. In fact, we found that, under certain 
conditions, herding has a detrimental effect on efficiency. In particular, some 
price  movements  are  too  large  relative  to  the  underlying  fundamental 
information, and are such that final market prices can differ significantly from 
true  winning  probabilities.  We  infer  from  this  that  traders  herd  on  price 
movements  under  certain  conditions,  pushing  prices  to  inefficient  levels. 
Moreover, the results of our modeling of these price movements show that the 
larger  the  price  movement,  the  greater  the  inefficiency  (i.e.,  larger  price 
movements  correspond  to  greater  disparities  between  final  odds-implied 
probabilities  and  true  winning  probabilities).  However,  this  behaviour  only 
becomes significant in the later stages of the market. Large price changes over 
the full duration of the market do not generally lead to inefficiencies in final 
market prices. This is not unexpected, since there is a lengthy period during 
which any inefficiencies induced by herding can be corrected. Moreover, much   81 
of the information pertaining to horses’ chances is revealed on the day of the 
race.  For  example,  information  concerning  results  of  previous  races,  jockey 
changes, and horses’ condition and behaviour may not be revealed until the 
market on a race has opened (Bruce and Johnson, 1995). Therefore, prices are 
expected  to  change  before  the  final  stages  of  the  market  (resulting  from 
revealed fundamental information) and herding is therefore unlikely to take 
place as a result of early stage market price changes. Consequently, it appears 
that inefficiencies resulting from herding are more likely to occur when (i) there 
is  little  time  remaining  to  correct  the  inefficiency,  and  (ii)  when  traders 
perceive  price  movements  as  evidence  of  trading  by  those  with  privileged 
information. In fact, this conclusion chimes well with classic cases of herding in 
regular financial markets, such as that evidenced in the South Sea Bubble (Dale 
et al., 2005). 
  Our finding that, in the later stages of the market, herding patterns are 
asymmetric, serves to confirm our prediction that noise traders’ perceptions of 
the actions of informed traders are key to the prevalence of herding behaviour. 
In particular, while previous studies of herding in betting markets (Law and 
Peel,  2002;  Schnytzer  and  Snir,  2008)  have  focused on  bookmaker  markets, 
where  bettors  may  only  back  their  preferred  horse  to  win  (leading  to  a 
reduction in its odds), our study examines a betting exchange, where bettors 
may also lay horses to lose (leading to an increase in their odds). There is little 
qualitative difference between backing/laying a horse one thinks will win/lose. 
Consequently,  the  differences  we  observe  in  herding  behaviour  (indicated 
below) must be due to differences in the bettors’ perceptions of ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ 
signals.  In  particular,  we  argue  that  this  stems  from  their  belief  that  those 
traders  with  privileged  information  will  trade  at  different  times,  depending 
upon whether they believe a horse will win or lose a race. 
  We find that bettors do not herd on decreasing odds in the last 15 minutes 
of the market (or in the last 30 minutes, if price changes are considered over the 
whole  30  minute  period).  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  literature  on 
herding in financial markets, which has found little conclusive evidence that 
investors display herding behaviour. It suggests that the average bettor does 
not consider a late ‘plunge’ to be a signal containing valuable information, or, at   82 
least, bettors realize that, by the time the plunge has happened, the information 
is assimilated in the price. Alternatively, the bets placed in the last 15 minutes 
by  informed  traders  could  cancel  out  the  bets  of  herding  traders.  This  is 
consistent with the literature, which suggests that strategies of simply betting 
on horses whose odds decline sharply (‘plungers’) are not profitable once the 
price change has occurred (Crafts, 1985; Bird and McCrae, 1987). 
  On the other hand, we find that bettors do herd on plungers that occur 
early in the betting (in the period between 30 minutes and 15 minutes before 
race  start).  In  this  case,  bettors  herd  to  such  an  extent  that  further  price 
movements, which happen in the last 15 minutes of the market, are insufficient 
to  restore  efficiency.  This  might  be  explained  in  several  ways:  (i)  cash-
constrained  informed  bettors  bet  early,  but they  may  not  have  the  funds  to 
correct prices for a second time, should prices revert to inefficient levels (Hong 
and Stein, 1999; Schnytzer and Snir, 2008), or (ii) bets placed in the 30 to 15 
minute market segment are generally those of less informed bettors (who might 
be more likely to herd), since more informed bettors benefit from placing their 
bets later so as not to divulge their own information (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 
2005). In either case, it appears that uninformed bettors perceive that odds that 
decline sharply in the period 30 to 15 minutes before the race start result from 
the actions of informed traders (presumably believing that any fundamental 
information would have been discounted in prices in the earlier stages of the 
market). It has been found in empirical studies of financial markets that, not 
only do the trades enacted by informed traders move prices towards efficient 
levels,  uninformed  traders  are  able  to  detect  the  informed  trading  via  the 
volume and direction  of the informed trades (e.g., Meulbroek, 1992). Hence, 
herding will or will not occur depending on (i) uninformed traders’ perception 
of the degree of influence over market prices held by traders with privileged 
information,  and  (ii)  the  actual  degree  of  influence  informed  traders  have. 
Consequently, herding will occur only if less informed investors believe that 
market price movements are currently reflecting the opinions of more informed 
investors. On the other hand, the extent of herding will be reduced if informed 
investors have sufficient market power to restore prices to efficient levels.   83 
  The perceptions of uninformed traders also appear to play a part when 
considering whether bettors herd on increasing odds. Large increases in odds in 
the last 30 or 15 minutes prior to market close often lead to situations where 
the odds are too high (i.e., the horse is relatively under-valued). This suggests 
that bettors herd on increases in odds (by laying unfavored horses) even in the 
late  stages  of  the  market.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  ‘sell’  signals  are  treated 
differently  to  ‘buy’  signals.  A  ‘sell’  signal  is  taken  seriously  even  late  in  the 
market.  This  may  arise  because  bettors  perceive  that  it  is  more  likely  that 
individuals with access to privileged information (e.g., horse owners) lay horses 
to lose (rather than back them to win) late in the market, since it is easier for 
them to predict (and/or influence) that their horse will lose (Marginson, 2010). 
It may be perceived that they are more likely to do this later in the market when 
positive information concerning the prospects of other runners has been fully 
discounted in prices. Indeed, it is not even necessary that this practice of laying 
known losers is prevalent, provided bettors perceive that it is. 
  There is also some evidence from regular financial markets that investors 
treat ‘sell’ and ‘buy’ signals differently. For example, Wermers (1999) found 
that the level of herding by mutual funds was greater when selling stocks than 
buying them, particularly if those stocks were shares of small companies with 
low past returns. This can be explained by mutual funds’ particular aversion to 
small stocks, i.e., they would be more likely to sell past losers in small stocks 
than buy past winners. Similarly, the model developed by Epstein and Schneider 
(2008) implies that investors react more strongly to bad (cf. good) news. Our 
results highlight the importance of understanding potential differences in the 
manner in which buy and sell signals are perceived by uninformed traders. 
  Finally,  our  results  demonstrate  that  considerable  inefficiency  can  be 
caused by herding. In particular, we not only find that prices are often out of 
line  with  true  winning  probabilities  after  large  price  movements,  but  that 
trading  strategies  can  be  constructed  that  show  consistent  positive  returns 
from betting against the herd. Such a strategy is based on a model that accounts 
for likely differences in noise traders’ perceptions of the actions of informed 
traders at different times in the market. In fact, we find that a half Kelly strategy 
with some restrictions provides a substantial rate of return (10.39%) over the   84 
holdout  sample;  the  return  is  sufficiently  large  to  compensate  for  potential 
variation in returns and the model risk involved. Previous studies of herding in 
betting  markets  (Law  and  Peel,  2002;  Schnytzer  and  Snir,  2008)  have 
demonstrated that positive returns can be made by avoiding following the herd, 
but these approaches offer very few betting opportunities. On the other hand, 
our results show that it is possible to develop a strategy to profit by betting 
against the herd and that this strategy provides a significant number of betting 
opportunities  (betting  in  over  33  percent  of  markets).  Our  results  clearly 
demonstrate that herding is of considerable economic importance, and should 
be accounted for in more advanced forecasting models. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
  This study is the first to study noise trading and herding in an electronic 
betting exchange (akin to electronic exchanges in regular financial markets). We 
find  evidence  that  increased  noise  trading  in  markets  is  associated  with  an 
increase in efficiency, and we attribute this to informed traders being attracted 
to the resulting increase in liquidity. We also find that bettors herd, but only 
under  certain  conditions.  In  particular,  herding  is  concentrated  in  the  later, 
more active stages of the market. In addition, while herding occurs on both ‘buy’ 
and ‘sell’ signals, it does so differently at various times in the market. 
  Our  findings  contribute  new  evidence  to  the  literature  on  information 
cascades and herding, where results of empirical studies have been inconsistent. 
We find support for the theoretical models of herding, in that the asymmetry of 
information  held  by  bettors  is  clearly  important  as  an  initial  condition  for 
subsequent herd behaviour. Herding is rational at the individual level for less 
informed  traders  when  they  are  aware  that  more  informed  traders  may  be 
participating in the market. However, at the aggregate level, herding results in 
prices  departing  from  efficient  levels,  particularly  when  the  market  has 
insufficient time to correct the resulting mispricing, or when informed traders 
are  not  actively  participating.  We  demonstrate  that  the  inefficiency  which 
remains  offers  the  prospect  of  abnormal  returns  for  those  who  seek  to 
capitalize on the herding behaviour of others. Most importantly, we find that   85 
herding  is  extremely  prevalent,  with  inefficiencies  in  over  one  third  of  the 
markets that we examine. The implications of our findings are that, in wider 
financial markets, regulations should be considered that minimize the impact of 
herding,  and  particular  attention  should  be  given  to  situations  where 
uninformed  traders  may  incorrectly  believe  that  there  are  traders  with 
privileged information operating. Furthermore, markets that involve contingent 
returns at a fixed point in time (such as the markets examined here) should 
always be allowed sufficient time to reach efficient levels. 
  Our  results  also  cast  new  light  on  the  relationship  between  noise  and 
efficiency  in  financial  markets,  a  relationship  that  has  been  difficult  to 
determine  in  previous  studies  because  of  uncertainty  in  the  link  between 
fundamental  information  and  prices.  The  data  we  employ  overcome  this 
problem, and we are able to measure the degree of informed trading, hence 
enabling us to observe a positive correlation between noise and efficiency. Our 
main finding that noise trading, volatility, and efficiency of final market prices 
all move in tandem has important policy implications for all financial markets. 
For example, our results add weight to arguments that regulatory measures to 
protect investors from the destabilizing effects of noise are self-defeating. Of 
course,  the  operations  of  betting  markets  themselves  are  often  restricted  or 
banned outright on the basis that gamblers should be saved from themselves. 
But when they are in operation, no one would suggest that the involvement of 
noise traders should be limited. However, in conventional financial markets, so 
long as there is a social cost to unwitting participants in market volatility, the 
actions of speculators will always be under scrutiny. Our study sheds new light 
on  the  potential  value  and  possible  costs  that  such  traders  can  bring  to  a 
financial market, and suggests that focusing on innovative means of reducing 
the risks to arbitrageurs, rather than discouraging speculators, may be the best 
approach to achieving efficient markets.   87 
3. The favourite-longshot bias in competing betting markets 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides an explanation for the enduring presence of the favourite-
longshot  bias  (FLB)  in  some  betting  markets  and  its  absence  in  others.  We 
develop a theoretical model that suggests the bias may result from competition 
between  bookmakers  and  with  betting  exchanges,  combined  with  bettors’ 
greater demand elasticity with respect to favourites. Further, we propose that 
the FLB will be eliminated when informed traders dominate and transaction 
costs are low. We confirm the model’s predictions by analysing how the bias 
develops throughout the active market in 6058 races run in the UK and Ireland 
from August 2009 through August 2010. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
  The  favourite-longshot  bias  (FLB)  is  a  phenomenon in  betting  markets 
reported over many decades and in many jurisdictions, whereby market prices 
deviate  systematically  from  their  fundamental  value;  favourites  are  under-
valued  while  longshots  are  over-valued  (USA:  Weitzman,  1965;  Ali,  1977; 
Snyder, 1978; Asch et al., 1982; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010; UK: Dowie, 1976; 
Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997; Bruce and Johnson, 2000; Sung and Johnson, 
2010;  Australia  and  New  Zealand:  Tuckwell,  1983;  Gandar  et  al.,  2001). 
However, a few studies have found no evidence of the bias (Busche and Hall, 
1988; Busche, 1994; Swidler and Shaw, 1995) and there is mixed evidence of 
whether the extent of  the bias is substantial enough to result in weak form 
inefficiency (Sung and Johnson, 2010). 
  Many studies have sought to explain the enduring presence of the FLB and 
its absence in some markets, but little consensus has been reached (see Jullien 
and Salanié, 2008, for a recent review). The existing accounts alternatively link 
the  origin  of  the  FLB  to  supply-  or  demand-side  factors,  related  to 
characteristics  of  the  market  or  the  bettors,  respectively.  However,  these 
alternative  accounts  fail  to  provide  a  satisfactory  explanation  for  the   88 
presence/absence of the FLB in the two major competing types of horserace 
betting  market  in  the  UK  and  Ireland  (and  in  other  jurisdictions,  such  as 
Australia):  bookmakers  and  betting  exchanges.  The  rapid  growth  of  betting 
exchanges, and an intensification of competition through internet–based betting 
in  general,  makes  such  an  explanation  an  important  objective.  We  seek  to 
achieve this by exploring two aspects of these parallel markets: competition and 
informed trading. The markets for horserace betting in the UK are increasingly 
competitive,  with  many  different  operators  and  a  wealth  of  information 
regarding prices available to bettors. We develop a model to investigate the 
optimal pricing decisions of bookmakers when the betting public are able to 
rapidly compare prices. We also argue that informed trading has a significant 
effect  on  reducing  the  degree  of  the  FLB  in  the  markets,  but  only  when 
transaction  costs  are  low.  We  use  the  predictions  of  our  model  to  develop 
hypotheses, which we test empirically by analysing how the bias develops over 
the course of the markets for 6058 races run between August 2009 and August 
2010, requiring the analysis of over 5.5 million market prices in total. 
  Our results confirm that three factors contribute to the existence of the 
FLB: the pricing decisions of bookmakers, the availability of information, and 
the level of transaction costs. First, we show that, because of (i) competition 
between  bookmakers  and  with  exchanges,  and  (ii)  bettors’  demand  for 
competitive  prices  on  favourites,  bookmakers’  optimal  pricing  decisions 
necessarily  lead  to  the  FLB.  Second,  we  show  that  the  FLB  is  present  in 
exchange  prices  in  the  early  stages  of  the  market  and  it  is  not  eliminated, 
because of higher transaction costs in the form of wider bid-ask spreads. Finally, 
we  draw  upon  models  of  prediction  markets  (Gjerstad,  2005;  Wolfers  and 
Zitzewitz, 2006b) to suggest that, when informed traders dominate, any FLB in 
betting exchange prices is likely to be short-lived, and we find that this is the 
case. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a 
brief overview of alternative explanations for the FLB. In section 3.3 we develop 
a model of the FLB in competing markets. In section 3.4, we derive hypotheses 
and  introduce  the  data  and  method  employed  to  test  the  hypotheses.  The   89 
results  are  presented  in  section  3.5  and  discussed  in  section  3.6.  We  draw 
conclusions in section 3.7. 
 
3.2. The origins of the favourite-longshot bias 
 
3.2.1. Supply-side explanations 
 
  Some  authors  have  argued  that  market  ecology  must  be  taken  into 
account  when  seeking  explanations  for  the  FLB.  Shin  (1991,  1992,  1993) 
modelled  price-setting  in  bookmaker  markets  as  a  game  between  a  profit-
maximizing bookmaker and a randomly chosen bettor. The model assumes that 
the bettor is likely to be a noise trader, but could be an insider whose superior 
knowledge allows them to bet on the winning horse, to the bookmaker’s cost. 
Shin’s model can explain the FLB in bookmaker market prices, provided one 
accepts that knowledgeable insiders are more likely to bet on longshots than 
favourites. Although some of the assumptions in Shin’s model are unrealistic, 
similar conclusions have been reached where the assumptions are relaxed. For 
example,  Schnytzer  and  Shilony  (2005)  found  that  bookmakers  should  raise 
prices on longshots more than favourites in order to defend themselves against 
insider knowledge, without assuming that insiders know which horse will win 
the race, or that insiders are more likely to bet on longshots. Peirson and Smith 
(2010)  extend  the  Shin  model  while  relaxing  the  assumptions  that  insiders 
know which horse will win the race, and that the amount bet by insiders is fixed 
and  not  related  to  the  odds  on  offer.  Their  model  demonstrates  that 
bookmakers should increase prices on those horses where there is a higher 
probability of inside information being employed. 
  Transaction and information costs have also been identified as possible 
causes of the FLB. Hurley and McDonough’s (1995, 1996) model implies that 
the FLB would not exist in pari-mutuel markets without transaction costs, and 
that  the  extent  of  the  bias  should  increase  as  transaction  costs  increase. 
However, this theory is not supported by their empirical investigation. Terrell 
and Farmer (1996) suggest that the FLB results from costly information. This is 
supported by Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997), who find a lower degree of   90 
FLB in bookmaker market prices in higher grade handicap races (where it is 
assumed information is more widely available and thus is less costly to obtain). 
Sobel and Raines (2003) also found a greater level of the FLB in races that, 
because there is less information available to inform decisions, attract lower 
betting  volumes.  Smith,  Paton,  and  Vaughan  Williams  (2006)  compared  the 
effect  of  altering  the  level  of  transaction  costs  on  the  level  of  the  bias  in 
bookmaker  markets  and  exchanges,  which  typically  have  higher  and  lower 
transaction costs, respectively. They found that there was significantly more 
bias in bookmaker market prices. However, Smith (2010) noted an exception to 
the predictions of the transaction costs model: there is little FLB in UK pari-
mutuel  market  prices,  yet  these  markets  involve  relatively  high  transaction 
costs. 
 
3.2.2. Demand-side explanations 
 
  Two broad approaches have emerged that seek to attribute the FLB to 
factors associated with the decision-making processes of bettors. On the one 
hand, it has been suggested that bettors have unbiased expectations, but are 
risk-loving (Weitzman, 1965; Quandt, 1986; Hamid et al., 1996). Alternatively, 
bettors are risk-neutral, but have biased expectations (Henery, 1985; Chadha 
and Quandt, 1996). The former approach was originated by Weitzman (1965), 
who suggested that the bias must be explained by hypothesising a convex utility 
of wealth function for the average bettor (i.e., the average bettor is risk-loving). 
Quandt  (1986)  extended  this  model  to  show  that  the  bias  is  a  natural 
consequence of equilibrium in a market where bettors are risk-loving. Variants 
of  the  model  have  been  developed,  including  replacing  bettors’  risk-loving 
nature with their desire for skewness (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998) or the extra 
utility  they  gain  from  long-odds  betting  (Thaler  and  Ziemba,  1988).  In  sum, 
these studies argue that it is bettors’ motivations that cause the FLB, not bias in 
their expectations. The second broad set of demand-side explanations for the 
FLB is based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In this case, 
bettors  are  risk-neutral,  but  misestimate  probabilities,  attaching  moderate 
winning probabilities to horses which are more likely to win or lose. Snowberg   91 
and Wolfers (2010) compare these two sets of competing demand-side theories 
by testing the implications for the pricing of compound events (e.g., exactas, 
where the bet is to choose both the winner and the runner-up in the correct 
order) and find evidence in support of the latter, biased-expectations approach. 
 
3.2.3. Competing markets 
 
  The  search  for  a  full  explanation  of  the  FLB  anomaly  is  further 
complicated by the presence of different types of betting market, with varying 
rules,  costs  and  participants.  In  the  UK,  bookmaker  and  exchange  markets 
account for most betting activity, with 94% of horserace betting turnover (over 
£5.7 billion) in the year to March 2010 in the UK (cf. £356 million for the pari-
mutuel  operator,  the  Tote)  (Gambling  Commission,  2010).  These  markets 
operate in parallel in the UK, Ireland, and a number of other jurisdictions. There 
are  three  significant  differences  between  the  two  types  of  market.  First,  in 
bookmaker  markets,  individuals  are  allowed  to  bet  on  their  preferred 
contestant  (e.g.,  a  horse  in  a  race)  at  the  advertised  odds.  In  exchanges, 
individuals can either bet on their preferred contestant to win, or, alternatively, 
can lay a contestant to lose (i.e., offer to match bets placed by other bettors on 
this contestant). Second, in bookmaker markets, odds are set by the bookmaker, 
whereas  the  prices  in  exchanges  are  a  strict  representation  of  supply  and 
demand, and are reached as an implied consensus of all the market participants. 
Finally,  in  exchanges,  participants  typically  pay  only  a  small  commission  on 
their net winnings (e.g., 5%), whereas bookmaker transaction costs (implicit in 
the over-round; see later) are typically significantly higher (e.g., 18%). For a full 
explanation of betting exchanges, see Smith and Vaughan Williams (2008). Both 
types of market involve a number of competing operators, the latest odds are 
readily available to bettors through the internet, and bets can be easily and 
rapidly placed with exchanges or with any chosen bookmaker using a mobile 
phone, from wherever the bettor is located (e.g., racetracks, home, high street 
betting  shops).  This  is  important,  because  it  has  been  found  that  demand 
becomes  increasingly  price-sensitive  and  frictionless  when  internet  price 
search is available (Ellison and Ellison, 2009).   92 
  A  few  recent  studies  have  examined  the  degree  to  which  the  FLB  is 
present in betting exchanges and their relation to other types of market, and 
have shown that betting exchanges are significantly more efficient, with a lower 
degree of the FLB (Smith et al., 2006) and greater predictive accuracy of market 
prices (Smith et al., 2009; Smith, 2010; Franck et al., 2010). However, these 
studies focus on market prices at one point in time (early or final prices). In 
addition, many of the studies discussed above explain the FLB in terms of the 
average bettor (e.g., Weitzman, 1965) and fail to account for clear differences in 
the behaviour of informed and uninformed bettors (e.g., Shin, 1993; Sobel and 
Raines, 2003). Hence, we will define uninformed bettors as those who display 
non-neutral  risk  tendencies  or  are  biased  in  their  expectations;  informed 
bettors are risk-neutral and have unbiased expectations. The latter behaviour is 
to  be  expected  of  bettors  who  have  developed  expertise  through  repeated 
practice and extensive study. We also consider insider traders to be informed 
bettors  since,  as  Schnytzer  and  Shilony  (1995)  demonstrated,  inside 
information is a significant predictor of race outcomes. 
 
3.3. A model of competing markets 
 
3.3.1. Bookmaker markets and competition 
 
  We  develop  a  model  to  explain  the  FLB  in  bookmaker  markets  by 
considering  two  competing  markets,  a  bookmaker  and  an  exchange,  both  of 
which offer prices on all horses running in a single race with n runners. Traders 
buy contracts on horse i, which pay out £1 if the horse wins the race, and which 
cost  £qi  and  £ri  in  the  bookmaker  and  exchange  markets,  respectively. 
Consequently, the implied bookmaker market odds (it is odds that are normally 
quoted by bookmakers rather than prices) of horse i are the reciprocal of the 
price  minus  one,  i.e.,  1 / 1 − i q ,  and  represent  the  profit  on  a  winning  £1  bet. 
Similarly, the implied exchange market odds of horse i are given by  1 / 1 − i r  and 
represent the profit on a winning £1 bet less 5% commission (which is the 
typical amount). The over-round is the sum of purchase prices across all the 
horses in the race minus one, and represents the average transaction cost to a   93 
bettor. A lower over-round, therefore, allows a more competitive set of prices. 
The bookmaker and exchange odds-implied probabilities of horse i winning the 
race are given by  ) 1 /( b i B q +  and  ) 1 /( e i B r + , respectively, where  1
1 − =∑ =
n
i i b q B  
and  1
1 − =∑ =
n
i i e r B  are the bookmaker and exchange over-rounds, respectively, 
and we assume that the exchange is able to offer lower transaction costs, i.e., 
e b B B > . 
  The task for the bookmaker is two-fold: to estimate the true probabilities 
pi for each horse to win the race, and to set their own prices so as to maximize 
their overall profit from the race. Since the true probabilities are unknown, we 
assume that the bookmaker’s best estimates for them are simply the exchange 
odds-implied probabilities, i.e.,  ) 1 /( e i i B r p + = . Later, we will show empirically 
that  this  is  appropriate.  Finally,  we  make  the  approximation  that  the  qi  are 
continuous  on  the  interval  (0,  1).  Considering  a  small  time  interval,  the 
bookmaker’s goal is to maximize their expected returns from overall bets taken 
in this interval. We allow this interval to be small because the bookmaker can 
update their prices at the end of the time interval, and we suppose that they are 
able  to  do  this  very  frequently.  Since  this  interval  is  small,  we  make  the 
restriction that Be, Bb, and the ri are constant in this period. Then the bookmaker 
aims to maximize their expected returns G ) ,....., ( 1 n q q over this time interval, 
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subject to the over-round condition  b
n
i i B q + = ∑ = 1
1 . The demand curve  ) , ( i i r q f  is 
the amount bet on horse i, when the bookmaker and exchange prices are qi and 
ri, respectively. We expect that when the bookmaker and exchange prices are 
equal,  the  demand  in  the  two  markets  will  be  identical.  Consequently,  we 
normalize  the  demand  curve  so  that  it  satisfies  ) 1 /( ) , ( e B r r r f + = .  If  the 
bookmaker  price  is  set  above/below  the  exchange  price,  the  demand  will 
fall/rise.  The  rate  at  which  the  demand  changes  with  respect  to  changes  in 
bookmaker prices, relative to exchange price r, depends on the price elasticity 
of demand at r. Although we do not know the exact shape of f, it represents the 
amount  by  which  bettors  are  either  discouraged/attracted  by   94 
uncompetitive/favourable  prices,  and  we  imagine  that  its  shape  could  be 
empirically  derived  given  knowledge  of  actual  bets  taken  by  bookmakers. 
Assuming that f is continuously differentiable on (0, 1), we at least know that a 
sensible demand curve would require  0 ) ( < ′ q f on this interval. In addition, f, 
strictly speaking, would need to be non-negative, but we need not impose this. 
As an example, the form of a linear demand curve with elasticity which can vary 
with r is given by 
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) , ( r q r g
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r q f
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where  ) ( / ) , ( ' r g q f r q f − = ∂ ∂ =  defines the price elasticity of demand at r. 
  For  fixed  ri,  Bb  and  Be,  this  is  a  constrained  optimization  problem  to 
maximize  ) ,..., ( 1 n q q H  where H is given by 
(3.3)     ) 1 ( ) ,..., ( ) ,..., (
1 1 1 b
n
i i n n B q q q G q q H − − − = ∑= λ , 
where λ is a constant. The solutions are given by the system of equations 
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We do not seek to solve this system of equations, but note a sufficient condition 
for the FLB in the bookmaker prices: for two horses j (a longshot) and k (a 
favourite: rj < rk), with odds-implied probabilities equal across the exchange and 
bookmaker markets ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e j b j B r B q + + = , ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e k b k B r B q + + = ), the marginal 
increase in expected returns for an increase in price is greater for the longshot 
( k j q H q H ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ / / ); furthermore, the greater the difference, the greater is the 
level of FLB. So, denoting  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ˆ e i b i B r B q + + = , 
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We have now the following as a sufficient condition for the FLB: 
(3.6)     ) , ( ) , ( k k j j r xr f r xr f ′ > ′ , 
for all x such that  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 e b B B x + + ≤ ≤ .   95 
  If this condition is satisfied, then so is (3.5) (for a proof, see Appendix 2). 
Moreover,  the  difference  k j q H q H ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ / /  is  increasing  in  both  Bb  (holding 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( e b B B + +  fixed) and  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e b B B + + , i.e., the level of FLB as imposed by 
optimal bookmaker prices should increase both with bookmaker over-round 
and the level of competition between the bookmaker and the exchange14. Also, if 
there is no competition (Bb = Be), then there is still FLB (provided (3.6) holds), 
and further, if there is no over-round (Bb = 0) then there is no FLB (for proofs of 
each of these propositions, see Appendix 2). Condition (3.6) holds if bettors’ 
price elasticity of demand is greater for  favourites than for longshots, i.e., if 
bettors are driven away from betting at uncompetitive prices more rapidly for 
favourites than for longshots (or if bettors are attracted by favourable prices 
more strongly for favourites than for longshots). Provided this is the case, it 
follows that bookmakers are driven to post competitive prices on favourites or 
risk losing business to their competitors, even if, as a result, they must offer 
‘poor value’ prices on longshots. Finally, it should be noted that the competition 
need not be an exchange; the analysis is identical if the competition comes from 
another bookmaker. 
  In the case of a linear demand curve with variable elasticity (equation 3.2), 
condition (3.6) is satisfied if  ) ( ) ( j k r g r g > , for example, if  i i Ar r g = ) (  for some A 
>  0.  Table  3.1  shows  the  optimal  q  for  various  values  of  r,  A,  Bb  and 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( e b B B + +  in a race with two runners, and indicates that the level of FLB 
increases with elasticity, over-round and competition. Figure 3.1 shows how 
this curve varies for different values of r. For a linear demand curve, there is 
FLB  in  the  optimal  bookmaker  prices,  provided  elasticity  is  greater  for 
favourites  than  for  longshots.  This  would  also  be  the  case  for  non-linear 
demand curves. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Smith and Vaughan Williams (2010) show empirically that the level of FLB in bookmaker 
markets fell after the introduction of exchange markets. Although the correlation between 
increased competition and reduced FLB is inconsistent with the prediction of our model, it was 
also the case that bookmaker over-rounds fell during the same period, which could account for 
the reduced FLB.   96 
Table 3.1. A model of competing markets: the favourite-longshot bias in a two-
horse race. 
A = 10, Bb = 0.18, 
(1+Bb)/(1+Be) = 
1.18/1.05 
r = 0.700, Bb = 0.18, 
(1+Bb)/(1+Be) = 
1.18/1.05 
r = 0.700, A = 10, 
(1+Bb)/(1+Be) = 
1.18/1.05 
r = 0.700, A = 10, 
Bb = 0.18 
R  q ˆ   A  q ˆ   Bb  q ˆ   (1+Be)/(
1+Bb)  q ˆ  
0.100  0.163  1  0.690  1.13  0.678  1.18/1.0
5  0.676 
0.200  0.246  5  0.679  1.17  0.676  1.18/1.0
4  0.674 
0.300  0.331  10  0.676  1.21  0.675  1.18/1.0
3  0.672 
0.400  0.417  50  0.672  1.25  0.675  1.18/1.0
2  0.671 
0.500  0.503  100  0.671  1.29  0.675  1.18/1.0
1  0.669 
0.600  0.590  500  0.671  -  -  1.18/1.0
0  0.667 
0.700  0.676  1000  0.671  -  -  -  - 
0.800  0.761  -  -  -  -  -  - 
0.900  0.846  -  -  -  -  -  - 
) 1 ( / ) 1 ( ˆ e b B q B q + + = , where q denotes the optimal bookmaker price for the horse, as estimated 
from the model in section 3.3. 
   
Figure 3.1. Linear demand curves with variable elasticity g(r) = 10r. 
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  In  summary,  provided  we  accept  some  reasonable  assumptions,  and  a 
sensible  demand  curve,  this  model  demonstrates  that  when  bettors’  price 
elasticity of demand is greater for favourites than for longshots, the optimal 
pricing decision of the bookmaker leads to FLB in their prices, and this FLB 
increases  with  the  level  of  competition  between  the  bookmaker  and  their 
competitors. We note that our model is consistent with the argument of Levitt 
(2004), who showed that the optimal pricing policy of bookmakers is to distort 
prices to reflect the biases of bettors. 
 
3.3.2. Betting exchanges and informed trading 
 
  Now we consider an exchange market, where traders can both buy and 
sell contracts on horse i for £ri. As Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006b) and Gjerstad 
(2005) demonstrate, if we assume that traders’ beliefs and wealth levels are 
heterogeneous and that the difference between buy and sell prices (the bid-ask 
spread) is zero, and denote an individual trader’s belief of the probability of 
horse  i  winning  as  pi,  and  the  trader’s  wealth  as  w,  each  drawn  from  a 
distribution  ) , ( w p F i , then the equilibrium price is a ‘wealth-weighted average’ 
of the beliefs of all traders, 
(3.7)     ∫
∞
∞ − = ) , (
1
w p wdF p
w
r i i i , 
where w  is  the  average  wealth  level  across  all  traders.  Now,  suppose  that 
traders  are  either  informed  or  uninformed.  We  assume  that  the  informed 
traders  know  the  true  probability  pi  of  horse  i  winning  the  race  and  have 
combined  wealth  X.  The  uninformed  traders  have  beliefs  piy  drawn  from 
distribution  ) ( iy p F  and combined wealth Y. Uninformed traders do not know 
the true probability, so  i iy p p E ≠ ) ( . Without loss of generality, suppose X + Y = 1. 
Consequently, from (3.7), 
(3.8)     iy i i p Y Xp r + = . 
This is the ‘wealth-weighted average’ of beliefs of the informed bettors and the 
uninformed traders. A consequence is that if informed or uninformed traders 
dominate the market, the price will be close to pi or  iy p , respectively.   98 
  Now we relax the assumption that bid-ask spreads are zero, i.e., contracts 
may only be bought for £ ) ( t ri +  and may only be sold for £ ) ( t ri − , for some t > 0. 
Now, when supply meets demand, we have that 
(3.9)     0 ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( = + ≥ − + − < − ∫ ∫ w t r p dF r p w w t r p dF r p w i i i i i i i i . 
It is clear from (3.9) that higher transaction costs decrease both supply and 
demand. In addition, as Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006a) note, transaction costs 
increase  the  proportion  of  trading  done  by  the  traders  with  the  noisiest 
observations, as the trades contributing to supply and demand in (3.9) result 
from  those  traders  with  beliefs  further  away  from  the  median  belief.  This 
causes prices to deviate from objective probabilities further, a result which is 
consistent  with  Hurley  and  McDonough  (1995,  1996)  and  Sobel  and  Raines 
(2003) in that transaction costs increase inefficiency in market prices. We now 
employ the models developed in this section to derive testable hypotheses. 
 
3.4. Hypotheses, data, and method 
 
3.4.1. Hypotheses 
 
  Equation (3.8) approximates the mechanism by which prices are set on 
betting exchanges and suggests that the FLB can only arise on an exchange as a 
result  of  some  proportion  of  wealth  belonging  to  uninformed  traders,  who 
under-/over-estimate  the  winning  chances  of  favourites/longshots. 
Furthermore, the extent of any FLB is exacerbated by two factors: a lack of 
informed  trading,  and  higher  transaction  costs.  Markets  for  horse  races 
typically begin on the evening before the race and informed traders are likely to 
be more in evidence in the later stages of the market for the following reasons. 
First, significant information may only emerge in the later stages of the market, 
including details concerning results of previous races at the race meeting, non-
runners, jockey changes, and, even later in the market, the horses’ condition and 
behaviour (Bruce and Johnson, 1995). All these details can impact the way the 
race is run, so bettors may benefit from waiting to discern this information. 
Second, trading is light in the early stages of the market, enabling only relatively   99 
small  bets  to  be  placed.  Consequently,  informed  traders  are  unlikely  to  be 
prepared to give away their information cheaply to other bettors, as would be 
the case if they placed what would have to be relatively small bets in this early 
market (Asch et al., 1982). Third, the lighter trading in the early stages of the 
market  is  likely  to  lead  to  higher  over-rounds  (since  there  is  a  greater 
divergence of opinions) and this is likely to deter informed traders who are 
looking for value. As liquidity increases, and opinions become less divergent, we 
expect spreads to narrow. Indeed, as discussed above, we expect Y to decrease 
and X to increase over the period of the market, until, in (3.8), ri ≈ pi for all 
horses in the race (i.e., prices will be accurate and not include the FLB). This 
motivates our betting exchange hypotheses: 
In betting exchanges, 
1. prices approach true winning probabilities over time, 
2. the FLB is eliminated in the later stages of the market. 
  However,  we  have  argued  above  that  the  FLB  is  likely  to  persist  in 
bookmaker  prices  because  they  are  competing  with  other  bookmakers  or 
exchanges, and bettors demand competitive prices on favourites (equation 3.6). 
The models developed above predict that bookmakers’ prices on favourites will 
be very close to their respective exchange prices. In addition, because of higher 
over-rounds, the prices in bookmaker (cf. exchange) markets on longshots are 
likely to be significantly higher. Furthermore, bookmaker prices cannot be said 
to  follow  a  ‘wealth-weighted  average’  of  beliefs.  Consequently,  if  the  FLB  is 
present  in  bookmaker  markets,  there  is  no  obvious  mechanism  by  which  it 
might be eliminated by informed traders. In particular, informed traders are 
likely to be deterred by the significantly higher over-rounds in these markets. In 
addition, bookmakers impose restrictive limits on bet size on the most informed 
and  wealthy  traders  (Smith  et  al.,  2009),  or  may  refuse  to  do  business 
altogether. The combined effect of less informed trading and more FLB is likely 
to  mean  that  bookmaker  prices  do  not  predict  race  results  as  accurately  as 
exchange prices. However, we would expect their accuracy to increase as more 
information becomes available in the later stages of the market. This motivates 
our bookmaker hypotheses: 
In bookmaker markets,   100 
3. prices approach true winning probabilities in the later stages of the market, but 
not as quickly as exchange prices, 
4. the FLB is present at all stages of the market, 
5. prices on favourites closely match exchange prices. 
 
3.4.2. Data 
 
  The  data  employed  are  odds  and  finishing  positions  for  62,124  horses 
running in 6058 races in the UK and Ireland from August 2009 through August 
2010. In particular, we collected matched bookmaker and exchange prices on 
each horse throughout the duration of the market on each race, from 4 hours 
before the race start and at intervals up until the start of the race (3 hours, 2 
hours, 1 hour, 30, 15, 10, and 5 minutes). The data were downloaded using the 
Betfair API and directly from the bookmakers’ websites. The exchange prices 
are those of the largest UK betting exchange by traded volume, Betfair, and we 
use the best prices at which it is possible to back the horse to win, in order to 
make a fair comparison with equivalent prices in bookmaker markets15. The 
bookmaker prices are recorded as the mean prices offered by a broad cross 
section  of  nine  leading  bookmakers;  the  data,  therefore,  includes  over  5.5 
million price points. The number of runners per race ranges from 2 to 30, with a 
mode of 9. 
  We focus on ‘win’ bets, so the finishing positions were recorded as 1 for a 
winner and 0 otherwise. We also captured the mean betting volume (amount 
traded) on Betfair. We find that this trading volume is concentrated in the last 
moments  before  the  race  starts;  with  an  average  of  57.5%  of  total  volume 
matched in the last 5 minutes of the market (see Table 3.2 in section 3.5.1). We 
suspect that a similar pattern may be true in bookmaker markets, but this data 
is not available. There is a strong positive correlation between exchange betting 
volume  and  accuracy  in  each  market  (exchange:  corr.  =  0.80,  p  =  0.0046; 
bookmaker: corr. = 0.91, p = 0.0004; see section 3.5.1). 
 
                                                 
15 We do make a minor assumption in that prices are equally valid whatever the stake limit at 
that price. This will have the effect of slightly understating the over-round and the level of FLB, 
but the inaccuracy will be small enough to be negligible.   101 
3.4.3. Method 
 
  To measure the extent of the FLB in bookmaker and exchange prices, we 
use a conditional logit (CL) modelling approach (McFadden, 1974), which has 
been employed in several betting market studies (Figlewski, 1979; Asch et al, 
1984; Bolton and Chapman, 1986; Benter, 1994; Sung and Johnson, 2010). The 
CL model enables us to estimate, based on previous race results, the objective 
probability of a particular horse winning a particular race, given a set of horse-
related variables, whilst taking into account the competition in the race. With 
price as the single variable, the CL model is an effective method for estimating 
the level of FLB, and is formulated as follows. 
  Define an estimate of horse i’s ability to win race j as 
(3.10)    ij ij ij q W ε β + = ln , 
where β is the parameter that determines the importance of the log of the price 
qij for horse i in race j and εij is an independent error term. McFadden (1974) 
shows that if the independent errors are identically distributed according to the 
double exponential distribution, then the probability of horse i winning race j is 
given by 
(3.11) 
∑ ∑ = =
= = ≠ = > =
j j n
k kj
ij
n
k kj
ij
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where nj is the number of horses in race j. 
  The  parameter  β  is  estimated  by  maximizing  the  joint  probability  of 
observing  the  results  of  all  the  races  in  the  sample.  This  is  achieved  by 
maximizing the log-likelihood 
(3.12)    ∑ ∑ = = =
N
j
n
i ij ij
j p y L
1 1 ln ln  
where yij = 1 if horse i won race j and yij = 0 otherwise, and N is the total number 
of races in the sample. If the estimated value of β is one, this implies that the 
odds-implied probabilities are equal to the true probabilities, as realized by the 
race results. If this estimated value is greater than one, this implies that the FLB 
is present; the greater the value of β, the greater is the degree of FLB (Bacon-
Shone et al., 1992). To test whether the FLB is present, we employ the standard 
normal test statistic  ) .( . / ) 1 ( β β E S z − = .   102 
  The log-likelihood also gives rise to a natural measure of the predictive 
accuracy  of  the  bookmaker  and  exchange  prices,  which  can  be  compared 
through time as the market evolves. This is the McFadden pseudo-R2, which is 
given by 
(3.13)   
n L
L
R
ln
ln
1
2 − = , 
where lnLn is the log-likelihood of the naive model, where each horse in a race is 
assigned an identical probability of winning: 
(3.14)    ∑ = =
N
j j n n L
1 ) / 1 ln( ln  . 
In order to test if the predictive accuracy of prices increases over time, and if 
the predictive accuracy of exchange prices is greater than that of bookmaker 
prices,  we  compare  pseudo-R2  values  over  time.  However,  it  is  not 
straightforward to apply a measure of precision to values of pseudo-R2, because 
their distributions are complex and depend on unknown parameters. Here, we 
adapt the method of Hu, Shao, and Palta (2006) and estimate the asymptotic 
distribution of the pseudo-R2s, i.e., the expected distribution as the number of 
races tends to infinity. For more details, see section 5.4.2. 
  Finally, in order to compare the actual prices offered by the exchange and 
the bookmakers, we follow Ali (1977) and rank horses by whether they are the 
favourite, the second favourite, and so on (by exchange prices). An approximate 
standard normal test statistic to compare exchange prices r with bookmaker 
prices q is given by 
(3.15)   
N
q q r r
q r
q r SE
q r
z
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , ( − + −
−
=
−
= . 
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3.5. Results 
 
3.5.1. Predictive accuracy 
 
  First,  we  examine  the  predictive  accuracy  of  exchange  and  bookmaker 
prices  throughout  the  duration  of  the  market.  The  results  are  presented  in 
Table  3.2.  Comparing  the  predictive  accuracy  of  prices  at  the  time  the  race 
starts (starting prices) with prices available throughout the market, we find that 
the pseudo-R2 of CL models including price as the only independent variable 
(see  equation  3.11)  increases  over  time  in  both  markets  (see  Figure  3.2), 
although  this  finding  is  not  statistically  significant  over  the  last  hour  of  the 
market duration. Similarly, exchange prices are consistently more accurate than 
bookmaker  prices  at  predicting  race  winners,  but  the  difference  is  not 
statistically significant at any time point. 
 
Figure 3.2. Predictive accuracy of exchange and bookmaker odds through time, 
with betting volume. 
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Table 3.2. Betting volume and predictive accuracy in exchange and bookmaker 
odds over time. 
Time 
until 
race 
start 
(mins) 
Cumulative 
exchange betting 
volume vol 
(£ 000) 
(% of final volume) 
Exchange 
pseudo-R2 
) (
2 t Re  
ze(t) 
Bookmaker 
pseudo-R2 
) (
2 t Rb  
zb(t)  z(t) 
240  14.7 
(2.9)  0.1639  2.84**  0.1634  2.29*  0.06 
180  19.8 
(3.9)  0.1658  2.59**  0.1650  2.12*  0.13 
120  27.0 
(5.3)  0.1700  2.06*  0.1661  1.95*  0.48 
60  39.0 
(7.7)  0.1735  1.62  0.1682  1.70*  0.67 
30  51.2 
(10.0)  0.1761  1.28  0.1694  1.55  0.85 
15  78.1 
(15.3)  0.1773  1.37  0.1714  1.30  0.74 
10  109.9 
(21.6)  0.1784  1.00  0.1732  1.08  0.65 
5  216.3 
(42.5)  0.1825  0.48  0.1778  0.53  0.60 
START  509.5 
(100.0)  0.1862  -  0.1820  -  0.52 
  Corr(vol, Pseudo-R2)  0.79**    0.90**     
* Significant at the 5% level, ** 1% level (1-tailed test). 
Standard errors are 0.008 to 3 decimal places in all cases so are omitted.  
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3.5.2. FLB and over-round 
 
  Eight  CL  models  (as  per  equation  3.11)  were  developed  for  both  the 
bookmaker  and  the  exchange  markets,  respectively,  incorporating  prices 
available at the eight different time periods before the race start. The estimated 
parameters in these models were used to compare the degree of FLB in these 
markets at different times before the race start (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for the 
exchange  and  bookmaker  markets,  respectively;  Table  3.4  also  includes  the 
difference in the level of FLB between bookmaker and exchange markets).   105 
Table 3.3. The FLB in exchange odds over time. 
Time until 
race start 
(mins) 
FLB β  SE (β) 
) (
1
β
β
SE
−
 
) , ( START
START
SE β β
β β −   Over-round 
Be 
240  1.080  0.0186  4.31**  2.630**  0.113 
180  1.072  0.0185  3.92**  2.328*  0.101 
120  1.056  0.0181  3.12**  1.718  0.079 
60  1.052  0.0181  2.89**  1.552  0.070 
30  1.047  0.0180  2.60**  1.331  0.064 
15  1.042  0.0180  2.34*  1.143  0.064 
10  1.036  0.0178  2.02*  0.909  0.063 
5  1.028  0.0176  1.59  0.584  0.058 
START  1.014  0.0173  0.79  -  0.057 
Corr(β,Be)  0.918**         
*: significantly different from 1.00 at the 5% level, **: 1% level (2-tailed test). 
 
Table 3.4. The FLB in bookmaker odds over time. 
Time until 
race start 
(mins) 
FLB β  SE (β) 
) (
1
β
β
SE
−
 
) , ( START
START
SE β β
β β −  
) , ( EXCH
EXCH
SE β β
β β −   Over-
round Bb 
240  1.215  0.0205  10.47**  0.293  4.85**  0.198 
180  1.216  0.0204  10.56**  0.351  5.22**  0.207 
120  1.216  0.0204  10.58**  0.345  5.85**  0.214 
60  1.216  0.0204  10.77**  0.478  6.14**  0.217 
30  1.220  0.0204  10.82**  0.499  6.40**  0.217 
15  1.224  0.0204  11.01**  0.624  6.71**  0.200 
10  1.226  0.0204  11.09**  0.683  7.01**  0.190 
5  1.214  0.0201  10.65**  0.286  6.98**  0.180 
START  1.206  0.0198  10.40**  -  7.33**  0.181 
Corr(β,Bb)  0.394           
*: significantly different from 1.00 at the 5% level, **: 1% level (2-tailed test). 
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  The results show that there is FLB in exchange prices 30 minutes or more 
before the race start (the parameter is significantly greater than 1.00 at the 1% 
level: z = 2.60, p = 0.0096) when just 10% of final volume has been traded at 
this stage. Most importantly, the results show that there is no significant FLB in 
exchange prices in the later stages of the market (e.g., based on prices 5 minutes 
before the race start: z = 1.59, p = 0.1142). In addition, the FLB in exchange 
prices is significantly greater 3 hours before the race start than it is at race start 
(z = 2.33, p = 0.0204). On the other hand, there is FLB in bookmaker prices 
available at all times before and at race start (i.e., the parameter in the CL model 
is significantly greater than 1.00 at the 1% level based on all these sets of prices, 
e.g., at race start: z = 10.40, p = 0.0000). Moreover, when comparing the level of 
FLB in the bookmaker prices at different times throughout the market with that 
at race start, there is no apparent trend (see Figure 3.3). In addition, the FLB is 
greater in the bookmaker prices than in the exchange prices at all times (e.g., 
comparing the FLB in bookmaker vs. exchange prices at race start: z = 6.98, p = 
0.0000). 
 
Figure 3.3. Level of FLB over time in exchange and bookmaker markets. 
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  We find that bookmaker over-rounds are much greater than those on the 
exchanges (even after allowing for commission in exchange markets: see Tables 
3.3  and  3.4),  with  bookmaker/exchange  over-rounds  ranging  between 
0.180/0.057 and 0.217/0.113 at different stages of the market. These results 
confirm that bettors face significantly higher costs in bookmaker (cf. exchange) 
markets.  In  addition,  we  find  a  strong  positive  correlation  between  the 
exchange  FLB  and  over-round  (corr.  =  0.92,  p  =  0.0002),  but  no  such  clear 
relationship  in  bookmaker  markets  (corr.  =  0.39,  p  =  0.1474).  In  fact,  the 
exchange over-round decreases through the duration of the market, along with 
the level of FLB, whereas it remains fairly stable in bookmaker markets. 
  Finally, we compare starting prices in exchange and bookmaker markets 
for horses with greater and smaller chances of success (as predicted by their 
prices). In particular, the favourite is ranked 1, the second favourite is ranked 2, 
and so on. Horses which are ranked 12th or more are grouped together. The 
results of comparing exchange and bookmaker prices are presented in Table 3.5 
and illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4. True winning probability and prices by horse rank. 
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  We find that there is no significant difference in exchange and bookmaker 
prices for the first three ranks, but for horses ranked 4th favourite or greater, 
the exchange prices are significantly lower, representing better value for the 
bettor  (e.g.,  for  rank  4:  z  =  2.22,  p  =  0.0264).  In  sum,  our  results  confirm 
hypotheses 2 and 4 that the FLB is eliminated in the later stages of the market 
for  the  exchange,  but  that  the  FLB  in  the  bookmaker  market  is  present 
throughout.  Furthermore,  we  find  support  for  hypothesis  5,  that  bookmaker 
and exchange prices for the favourites are similar, but bookmaker prices on 
longshots are significantly higher than exchange prices. 
 
Table 3.5. Comparison of true winning probabilities and mean starting prices by 
horse rank in exchange and bookmaker markets. 
Horse rank 
by 
exchange 
price 
Number 
of horses 
True 
winning 
prob. p 
Exchange 
price r 
Bookmaker 
price q  SE (r,q) 
) , ( q r SE
q r −
 
1  6058  0.3310  0.3434  0.3463  0.0086  0.34 
2  6058  0.2053  0.2121  0.2184  0.0075  0.86 
3  6055  0.1371  0.1461  0.1569  0.0065  1.67 
4  6012  0.0913  0.1052  0.1180  0.0057  2.22* 
5  5857  0.0761  0.0784  0.0920  0.0052  2.62** 
6  5522  0.0525  0.0596  0.0739  0.0047  3.01** 
7  5074  0.0449  0.0458  0.0605  0.0045  3.30** 
8  4496  0.0309  0.0361  0.0504  0.0043  3.32** 
9  3886  0.0280  0.0291  0.0437  0.0042  3.45** 
10  3241  0.0216  0.0238  0.0381  0.0043  3.33** 
11  2656  0.0215  0.0198  0.0338  0.0044  3.16** 
12 or more  7209  0.0126  0.0133  0.0295  0.0024  6.74** 
*: significantly different from 1.00 at the 5% level, **: 1% level (2-tailed test). 
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3.6. Discussion 
 
  Our  first  two  hypotheses,  related  to  exchange  prices,  were  that  they 
should  approach  the  true  winning  probabilities  over  time,  and  that  the  FLB 
would be eliminated over time. We argued that this would occur because an 
increasing betting volume from more informed bettors is likely as the market 
develops, because of a reduction in spreads as liquidity increases (increased 
liquidity reduces the divergence of opinions allowing lower bid-ask spreads) 
and a reduction in uncertainty as new information is revealed. We found that 
exchange  prices  develop  in  the  manner  predicted.  However,  whilst  the 
correlation  between  exchange  betting  volume  (i.e.,  of  matched  bets)  and 
accuracy is high, the increase in accuracy of exchange prices in the later stages 
of the market is not statistically significant, which suggests that at least some 
informed betting occurs early. We also found that there was a significant FLB in 
the early stages of the exchange market. This suggests that early-stage bettors 
are generally uninformed and may, as suggested in earlier studies, create the 
FLB because of their risk-loving tendencies (e.g., Weitzman, 1965; Quandt, 1986; 
Hamid et al., 1996) or biased expectations (Henery, 1985; Chadha and Quandt, 
1996;  Snowberg  and  Wolfers,  2010).  However,  we  learn  very  little  about 
exchange bettors as a population from the early-stage group because so little of 
the total betting volume is matched at this time (on average, only 2.9% of final 
volume is matched 4 hours before the race start). We find that the FLB in the 
exchanges is eliminated over time, suggesting that the exchanges are dominated 
by informed bettors who bet in a manner which eliminates any FLB. Clearly, 
there may be some bettors who display risk-loving attitudes or exhibit biased 
expectations  but  either  their  bets  are  matched  by  more  informed  bettors 
(taking advantage of the lower over-rounds in exchanges), or such bettors may 
bet with bookmakers. 
  Our third hypothesis was that bookmaker prices would approach the true 
probabilities over time, but not as quickly as exchange prices. Our finding that 
bookmaker  prices  are  not  as  accurate  a  predictor  of  the  race  winner  as 
exchange  prices  corroborates  the  findings  of  previous  studies  (Smith  et  al., 
2009; Franck et al., 2010). Our results lead us to agree with their conclusions   110 
that this is an indication of the type of bettors that bet in these markets, and not 
a  reflection  on  the  bookmakers  themselves.  In  particular,  the  higher  over-
rounds  in  bookmaker  markets  result  in  less  competitive  prices,  driving 
informed betting towards the exchanges, and it is the bets of these informed 
traders which, in turn, lead to the improved accuracy in exchange prices. 
  Our finding, in support of hypothesis 4, that the FLB is present in final 
bookmaker  prices,  is  not  controversial;  many  previous  studies  have  found  a 
greater FLB in bookmaker markets than in parallel pari-mutuel markets (Bruce 
and Johnson, 2000; Peirson and Blackburn, 2003) and exchange markets (Smith 
et al., 2006). However, we discovered that the FLB is present in bookmaker 
prices  at all times  throughout  the  market,  and  that  the  level  of  FLB  is  not 
correlated with over-round, neither is there any trend in the level of FLB over 
the  duration  of  the  market.  We  are  not  aware  of  any  study  which  has 
investigated the level of FLB over the duration of the market, and our finding 
that there is no correlation between over-round and the level of FLB contrasts 
with the view that higher transaction costs are the cause of a greater FLB in 
bookmaker markets (Smith et al., 2006). We also found evidence in support of 
our fifth hypothesis that prices of favourites are similar in the exchange and 
bookmaker markets (for horses ranked 1-3rd favourite). 
  Taken  together,  our  findings  support  our  argument  that  the  FLB  in 
bookmaker  markets  is  largely  the  result  of  the  bookmakers’  pricing  policy. 
Specifically, it appears that the FLB in these markets results from bookmakers 
deciding to price in this manner in the presence of specific conditions related to 
bettors’  demand  (that  bettors’  demand  is  more  elastic  for  favourites  than 
longshots). This represents both a supply- and a demand-side explanation for 
the phenomenon. We now consider three previous explanations for the FLB in 
turn, and discuss how our theory is consistent with these explanations, or at 
least how these explanations may be adjusted to be consistent with our theory. 
We label these explanations: demand-side explanations, the Shin pricing policy, 
and transaction and information cost explanations. 
  Demand-side explanations, as discussed above, generally focus on one of 
two  sources  for  the  bias:  bettors  are  risk-loving  (e.g.,  Weitzman,  1965),  or 
bettors  have  biased  expectations  (e.g.,  Henery,  1985).  In  both  cases,  it  is   111 
believed  that  the  FLB  directly  results  from  bettors’  decisions.  For  example, 
using  an  extremely  large  dataset  of  North  American  races  Snowberg  and 
Wolfers (2010) found that the mispricing of exotic bets was more consistent 
with  the  FLB  being  driven  by  biased  expectations  than  risk-love.  Their 
investigation was restricted solely to pari-mutuel market odds (which are the 
monopoly market in the USA). It could also be the case in bookmaker markets 
that bettors’ preferences are consistent with them being risk-loving or subject 
to  biased  expectations.  However,  we  found  that  an  alternative  explanation 
based on bookmakers’ optimal pricing policy was more satisfactory: demand-
side explanations do not adequately explain why there is a FLB in bookmaker 
prices  at  the  outset  of  the  market,  when  there  has  been  little  or  no  betting 
volume, and it does not explain why this FLB reduces through time. The current 
study has investigated the two major types of betting market in the UK (i.e., 
bookmakers  and  exchanges),  neither  of  which  are  pari-mutuel,  and  found 
significantly  different  results,  which  are  more  consistent  with  supply-side 
factors being the cause of the FLB in bookmaker markets, and informed betting 
eliminating the FLB in exchange markets. 
  Shin’s (1991, 1992, 1993) bookmaker pricing policy model suggests that 
bookmakers  deliberately  increase  prices  (or  reduce  odds)  on  longshots  to 
protect their interests against insider traders. In Shin’s model, as in later studies 
by Schnytzer and Shilony (2005) and Peirson and Smith (2010), insiders are 
defined as being more informed than anyone else, including the bookmaker. 
Shin assumes that insider trading is likely to be more associated with longshots 
than with favourites, and, consequently, he argues that bookmakers stand to 
lose  more  if  they  allow  prices  on  longshots  to  be  ‘fair’.  Rather,  we  have 
suggested that bookmakers increase prices on longshots in order to allow them 
to  offer  competitive  (lower)  prices  on  favourites,  to  address  the  demand 
preferences  of  bettors.  Shin’s  model  makes  a  number  of  simplifying 
assumptions (e.g., insider traders are perfectly informed traders) which we do 
not make in our model of bookmaker competition. In particular, the Shin model 
and other similar models rely heavily on the idea that there are insider traders 
operating in the market, and that these are feared by the bookmaker, resulting 
in their pricing policy. However, this view does not account for the reality of the   112 
betting market. In particular, bookmakers are able to refuse business or restrict 
betting  from  bettors  who  they  believe  to  be  insiders,  and  bookmakers  have 
extensive intelligence systems which reduces the chance of ‘unknown’ insiders 
damaging their profits. In addition, we have argued that insider traders are far 
more likely to bet with the exchanges, particularly because of lower transaction 
costs. By contrast, our belief is that bookmakers are far more concerned with 
competition amongst themselves and with exchanges than with the activities of 
insiders. In particular, they are more interested in the average customer in a 
competitive market who is simply concerned with getting a competitive price. It 
is these who provide bookmakers with the majority of their betting volume. 
Under this assumption, our model demonstrates that there is an incentive for 
bookmakers to set their prices incorporating the FLB if bettors’ demand is more 
elastic  for  favourites  than  for  longshots,  particularly  if  the  bookmaker  is 
competing with operators (e.g., exchanges) who are able to offer much lower 
transaction costs. 
  The transaction and information costs explanation for the FLB suggests 
that  this  phenomenon  results  from  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  obtaining 
information  or  placing  bets.  This  is  consistent  with  some  of  our  results.  In 
particular, we found that the FLB was significantly higher in the bookmaker 
market,  where  transaction  costs  are  significantly  higher  (and  the  cost  of 
obtaining information does not differ for those betting with an exchange or with 
a bookmaker). Furthermore, we found that the level of FLB in the exchange was 
higher when the over-round was higher (i.e., in the early stages of the market). 
However, we found that the FLB in the bookmaker market was not significantly 
correlated with over-round. We believe that informed traders eliminate the FLB 
in both exchange and bookmaker markets at any time when over-rounds are 
not set at a level which prohibits betting at an acceptable price. However, the 
high over-rounds in the bookmaker markets deter informed traders, resulting 
in the FLB remaining throughout the duration of the market. Similarly, the FLB 
in the early stages of the exchange market is not eliminated because spreads are 
higher  (as  a  result  of  lower  liquidity)  and  there  is  a  greater  degree  of 
uncertainty about future developments. Consequently, our results suggest that   113 
transaction costs are a factor which influences the amount of informed trading 
in the market which, alongside competition, affects the level of FLB. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
  Previous  research  has  shown  that  the  FLB  has  existed  in  a  variety  of 
jurisdictions over many decades. Whilst many studies have identified FLB in the 
UK  bookmaker  market,  there  is  little  evidence  in  the  growing  literature  on 
betting exchanges that these markets also exhibit the FLB. Our study aimed to 
provide  an  explanation  for  this  contrasting  evidence.  Consequently,  we 
developed a model to explain the FLB in competing bookmaker markets and 
tested resulting hypotheses related to how the predictive accuracy, over-round, 
and the FLB develop over the duration of the betting market for a typical race. 
The  model’s  predictions  were  confirmed  using  empirical  data  from  the  UK 
horserace betting market.  
  This  study  makes  a  number  of  important  contributions.  First,  we  have 
found further evidence of (i) FLB in bookmaker markets, and (ii) no FLB in 
exchange  markets.  Second,  we  confirm  that  predictive  accuracy  of  exchange 
prices is largely superior to that of bookmaker prices. However, in the case of 
exchange markets, we have also uncovered significant relationships between 
the FLB and betting volume (or time remaining before race start, each of which 
is  related  to  the  level  of  informed  trading),  and  between  the  FLB and  over-
round using a unique dataset consisting of matched bookmaker and exchange 
odds on each runner throughout the course of the market on each race. We also 
discovered that there were no such relationships in bookmaker markets. More 
importantly,  we  have  developed  a  model  which  suggests  that  the  optimal 
pricing policy for a bookmaker, who competes with other operators for betting 
on favourites, is to set prices which include the FLB. Our empirical results are 
largely supportive of the predictions of this model. 
  We have set our explanations for the FLB within the wider context of the 
ongoing debate about the cause of FLB in betting markets, and have shown that 
both supply- and demand-side explanations are important contributors to the 
bias. Transaction and information costs explanations are still relevant, but only   114 
in the sense that higher costs restrict informed betting, which, in turn, prevents 
the  FLB  being  eliminated.  Furthermore,  we  demonstrate  that  bookmakers’ 
optimal  pricing  policy,  arising  as  a  consequence  of  competition  between 
operators  and  bettors’  demand  for  competitive  prices  on  favourites,  is  an 
important contributor to the existence of the phenomenon.   115 
4. New evidence for a prospect theory explanation of systematic 
decision making bias in a market for state contingent claims 
 
Abstract 
 
The  favourite-longshot  bias  (FLB)  is  the  widely-reported  systematic  bias  in 
markets for state contingent claims, such as prediction and betting markets, 
whereby  market  prices  under-/over-value  favourites/longshots.  We  provide 
new  and  unique  evidence  to  support  the  view  that,  where  the  bias  exists 
independently of a market maker (e.g., in pari-mutuel betting markets), it is due 
to  cognitive  errors  of  traders  rather  than  their  preference  for  risk.  This  is 
achieved in two stages: first, we derive a model that shows that prospect theory, 
and not risk-love, predicts a ‘strong favourite’ effect, where the level of the FLB 
is reduced in events where the variance of odds for non-favourites is low. Then 
we test the predictions of the model by employing pari-mutuel market price 
data  related  to  2447  UK  horseraces.  An  analysis  using  the  conditional  logit 
model verifies that the extent of the FLB is indeed reduced in races with strong 
favourites, as well as in handicap races. Furthermore, unlike previous attempts 
to confirm that traders’ cognitive errors are the source of the FLB, our results 
are independent of parametric assumptions or assumptions about the choice 
set of the decision maker. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
  The  favourite-longshot  bias  (FLB)  is  the  systematic  bias  reported  in 
markets for state contingent claims, such as prediction and betting markets, 
whereby market prices are such that high-probability outcomes (favourites) are 
under-valued and low-probability outcomes (longshots) are over-valued. First 
discovered in a laboratory setting by psychologists Preston and Baratta (1948), 
and  in  the  naturalistic  setting  of  betting  markets  for  horseracing  by  Griffith 
(1949),  the  FLB  has  been  shown  to  be  present  in  many  jurisdictions  and 
throughout many decades (e.g., Dowie, 1976; Ali, 1977; Snowberg and Wolfers, 
2010), with a few studies finding contrasting evidence (e.g., Busche and Hall,   116 
1988; Busche, 1994). In the context of markets for state contingent claims, the 
presence of the bias, and its absence in some settings, has been attributed to a 
variety  of  causes  including,  among  others,  the  risk-loving  nature  of  traders 
(Weitzman, 1965), errors in the estimation of probabilities (Henery, 1985), the 
pricing policies of bookmakers (Shin, 1993), and limited information of traders 
(Sobel  and  Raines,  2003).  However,  it  is  empirically  difficult  to  discriminate 
between  the  various  competing  explanations  because  the  decision  making 
processes  of  individual  market  participants  are  not  observable.  Rather,  the 
market prices result from the combined decisions of traders, and represent the 
market’s subjective assessment of the probability of each outcome occurring; 
the  FLB  is  observed  when  comparing  these  subjective  probabilities  with 
observed  event  outcomes  (Griffith,  1949).  Hence,  competing  theories  of 
decision  making  in  general  (expected  utility  theory  and  non-expected  utility 
models such as prospect theory) are observationally equivalent (Snowberg and 
Wolfers, 2010). 
  As a result of this difficulty, there is no standard method for assessing the 
relative  strengths  of  the  various  hypotheses,  and  so  there  have  been  few 
attempts  to  do  so.  Those  that  have  attempted  this  task  have  relied  on 
parametric  assumptions  or  assumptions  relating  to  the  choice  set  of  the 
decision  maker.  In  this  study,  we  develop  a  new  methodology  for  choosing 
between the hypotheses, which does not rely on these assumptions. 
  We first develop a model based on the representative agent that predicts a 
‘strong favourite’ effect on the level of FLB. Specifically, we demonstrate that the 
level of bias in an individual event varies in a predictable manner depending on 
the  traders’  risk  preferences.  If  the  representative  agent  is  risk-seeking,  the 
model predicts an increased FLB in events where the variance of the odds on 
competitors other than the favourite is relatively low, ceteris paribus. Convesely, 
if the representative agent is risk-averse, the level of FLB is reduced or a reverse 
bias is predicted when the same variable is relatively low. This prediction is 
independent of whether probabilities enter the decision process linearly (as in 
expected utility) or nonlinearly (as in prospect theory). Hence, empirical tests 
can  be  conducted  that  distinguish  between  hypotheses  that  do  and  do  not 
require the representative agent to be risk-loving. We also show that, in events   117 
where the rules are designed to equalize the competitors’ winning chances (e.g., 
in handicap horse races), the model predicts an equivalent result to the strong 
favourite effect, i.e., an increased/reduced FLB when the representative agent is 
risk-seeking/averse.  
  We  test  both  predictions  of  the  model  using  a  large  set  of  data  from 
betting  markets  for  UK  horseraces,  and  find  strong  evidence  to  support  the 
hypothesis that in markets independent of a market maker (e.g., a bookmaker), 
the  FLB  is  caused  by  the  cognitive  errors  of  traders,  rather  than  a  general 
preference  for  risk.  Our  paper  contributes  new  and  unique  evidence  to  the 
existing  literature  that  examines  the  relative  merits  of  prospect  theory, 
expected utility theory, and other hypotheses in explaining biases in naturalistic 
decision making contexts. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, we review representative 
agent models of the FLB at the level of demand-side factors, i.e., explanations of 
the FLB based only on factors related to the decisions of traders. In section 4.3, 
we outline our model, and in section 4.4 we derive hypotheses and introduce 
the  data  and  the  method  employed  to  test  the  hypotheses.  The  results  are 
presented in section 4.5 and discussed in section 4.6. We draw conclusions in 
Section 4.7. 
 
4.2. Representative agent models of the FLB in horserace betting markets 
 
  It  is  widely  recognized  that  horserace  betting  markets  offer  a  valuable 
naturalistic  setting  in  which  to  explore  decision  making  (Sauer,  1998).  In 
particular, horserace bettors operate in a setting that involves uncertain and 
dynamic information, time stress, regular outcome feedback, and meaningful 
incentives.  These  features  are  only  present  in  real  world  decision  contexts 
(Orasanu and Connolly, 1993) and risk-taking in the high stakes betting context 
is  not  easily  reproduced  in  comfortable  laboratory  settings  (Anderson  and 
Brown, 1984). Consequently, horserace betting markets appear to offer an ideal 
environment in which to explore decision making biases in a real world setting 
(Bruce and Johnson, 2003).   118 
  The FLB is one such bias, and has received much attention in the literature 
(for reviews, see Vaughan Williams, 1999; Ottaviani and Sørenson, 2008; Jullien 
and  Salanié,  2008).  A  range  of  explanations  for  the  phenomenon  have  been 
proposed. While some studies have proposed explanations related to supply-
side  factors,  such  as  the  pricing  polices  of  bookmakers  (Shin,  1993),  most 
studies associate the FLB with the decisions of bettors. A simplified but useful 
categorization  of  these  explanations  is  provided  by  Snowberg  and  Wolfers 
(2010,  pp.  724-725):  “each  yields  implications  for  the  prices  of  gambles 
equivalent  to  stark  models  of  either  a  risk-loving  representative  agent  or  a 
representative  agent  who  bases  her  decisions  on  biased  perceptions  of  true 
probabilities”. So, bettors have unbiased expectations, but are risk-loving (e.g., 
Weitzman,  1965),  or  have  biased  expectations,  but  are  risk-neutral  or  risk-
averse (e.g., Henery, 1985). This categorization warrants attention because it 
addresses  the  relative  merits  of  competing  theories  for  explaining  decision 
making  in  wider  fields:  specifically,  expected  utility  (EU)  theory  and  non-
expected utility models such as prospect theory. 
  The former class of models originates from the proposition that, in order 
to  explain  the  FLB,  the  representative  agent  must  be  risk-loving  over  the 
relevant part of the decision making domain. So, Weitzman (1965) introduced 
the ‘representative bettor’ Mr. Avmart, who represents the ‘social average’ of all 
bettors.  Instead  of  concentrating  on  individuals,  Weitzman  inferred  the 
preferences of the most typical bettor from the population in order to construct 
Mr.  Avmart’s  utility  of  wealth  curve  (the  mathematical  representation  of 
preferences over various monetary outcomes and the basis of EU theory). He 
found that the FLB in his data was best explained by a convex utility of wealth 
curve, indicating that the average bettor is locally risk-loving (i.e., the average 
bettor prefers the riskier, low probability outcomes). Quandt (1986) extended 
the analysis by showing that the bias is the natural result of equilibrium in a 
market  where  the  average  bettor  is  risk-loving.  This  theory  was  confirmed 
empirically by the EU models of Ali (1977) and Hamid, Prakash, and Smyser 
(1996).  More  generally,  for  the  FLB  to  be  explained  with  reference  to  the 
bettor’s utility of wealth function, the bettor need not be monotically risk-loving 
over the whole decision making domain. Indeed, it is possible for bettors to be   119 
risk-averse in general, but with a preference for skewness of returns (Golec and 
Tamarkin, 1998; Walls and Busche, 2003). Alternatively, bettors may be risk-
averse over some parts of the domain and risk-seeking over others (Cain and 
Peel, 2004). However, these alternatives are all equivalent to the risk-loving 
representative agent model (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). 
  A broad alternative classification of explanations for the FLB stems from 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory (PT), in which the value of an 
outcome is defined relative to a reference point and bettors are risk-averse for 
gains and risk-loving for losses. Crucially, PT can explain some violations of EU 
theory, such as the Allais (1953) paradox, as well as explaining the FLB, because 
objective  probabilities  are  transformed  into  subjective  decision  weights  that 
allow for biases in the estimation of probabilities. If the assumptions of PT hold, 
then  the  FLB  can  be  explained  solely  with  reference  to  bettors’  systematic 
misestimation of probabilities, i.e., bettors need not be locally risk-loving. While 
PT is a formal model of decision making under uncertainty, this alternative class 
of explanations can effectively include any model in which probabilities enter 
the  decision  objective  function  nonlinearly  in  order  to  explain  the  FLB.  For 
instance, Sobel and Raines (2003) derived an alternative specification to the 
risk-love model that allows for the representative bettor to be risk-neutral. In 
this specification, the FLB can be explained by limited information of bettors, 
since  either  underreaction  to  new  information  or  limited  precision  in  the 
decision  making  process  (or  a  combination  of  the  two)  results  in  relatively 
large/small probabilities being under-/over-estimated. Henery (1985) argues 
that  bettors  systematically  discount  a  constant  proportion  of  losses;  since 
longshots  lose  more  often,  this  leads  bettors  to  over-estimate  the  winning 
chances of longshots. Effectively, the above explanations can be incorporated 
into  the  biased  expectations  class  of  models  (Snowberg  and  Wolfers,  2010) 
because in each case it is the distortion of probabilities that explains the FLB, 
and no restriction must be made on the risk preferences of the representative 
bettor. 
  The  literature  discussed  above  suggests  that  there  are  two  broadly 
competing sets of theories regarding the explanations for the FLB in terms of 
the  representative  bettor:  bettors  are  unbiased  in  their  estimation  of   120 
probabilities, but risk-loving, or they are risk-neutral or risk-averse, but biased 
in  their  estimation  of  probabilities.  These  two  explanations  appear  to  be 
empirically indistinguishable, because it is not immediately apparent how to 
employ  data  related  to  actual  decisions  to  differentiate  between  risk 
preferences  and  biased  estimation  of  probabilities  (Yaari,  1965).  However, 
some researchers have employed innovative methods for doing so. In particular, 
Golec and Tamarkin (1995) attempted to test the two competing hypotheses 
using  data  related  to  alternative  bets  offered  by  bookmakers  in  addition  to 
standard ‘win’ bets (bets that a horse will finish in first place). In this instance, 
these  alternative  bets  were  so-called  ‘teaser’  bets  on  outcomes  which  were 
more likely to pay off than ‘win’ bets, but had a corresponding lower return. 
Since  ‘teaser’  bets  are  relatively  low-risk  compared  to  ‘win’  bets,  risk-love 
would predict that bettors demand an extra return to compensate them for the 
low risk. However, they found returns from the side bets were relatively unfair, 
which  is  a  result  that  risk-love  cannot  explain.  Instead,  they  suggested  that 
overconfidence  (which  is  consistent  with  bettors  overestimating  small 
probabilities) better explains the FLB. Jullien and Salanié (2000) and Bradley 
(2003) also offered support for the view that PT (cf. EU) better explains the FLB, 
although they relied on parametric assumptions about the functional forms of 
the  utility,  value,  and  probability  weighting  functions  of  the  representative 
agent. 
  More recently, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) set out to test the competing 
theories using a novel approach and a large dataset of all the horseraces run in 
North America from 1992 to 2001 (over 865,000 races). They first estimated 
the parameters of the two models (the EU model and the PT model) by fitting 
the models to standard ‘win’ bets. They then examined compound exotic bets, 
such as the ‘exacta’, a bet that two horses will finish a race in first and second 
place in a specific order. Snowberg and Wolfers reasoned that bettors would bet 
in the same manner in the exotic and win betting pools, so the same models 
should apply for each bet type. Accordingly, they used model predictions based 
on win bets to forecast expected market prices in the exotic betting pools. They 
found that the model based on misestimation of probabilities predicted exotic 
bet  prices  more  accurately  than  the  risk-love  model.  Snowberg  and  Wolfers   121 
concluded that, with respect to the representative bettor, PT explained the FLB 
more effectively than EU theory. 
  While  the  general  consensus  from  the  literature  has  been  that  non-
expected  utility  (cf.  EU)  models  better  explain  decision  making  in  the 
naturalistic  context  of  horserace  betting,  each  study  has  conducted  different 
empirical tests. Indeed, despite the availability of rich and detailed quantitative 
data  on  the  decisions  of  traders  in  this  context,  the  key  difficulty  in 
distinguishing between risk-love and biased expectations is a methodological 
one. Hence, there have been relatively few attempts to arrive at an empirical 
solution to the problem, and those that have been made have relied either on 
parametric assumptions (Jullien and Salanié, 2000; Bradley, 2003) or on the 
assumption that bettors’ decision making models are identical over different 
choice  sets  (Golec  and  Tamarkin,  1995;  Snowberg  and  Wolfers,  2010).  The 
purpose of this study,  therefore, is to address this problem with a  new and 
alternative methodology that does not rely on these assumptions. In the next 
section, we develop a model that leads to a new empirical test between the 
alternative  hypotheses,  based  on  the  risk  preferences  of  the  representative 
agent, independent of the probability weighting function. 
 
4.3. Representative agent models: the ‘strong favourite’ effect 
 
  Here we demonstrate that two simple models, based on the representative 
agent, result in alternative predictions of a ‘strong favourite’ effect. Specifically, 
they  predict  that  the  level  of  FLB  is  higher  or  lower  in  races  where, ceteris 
paribus, the variance of odds for non-favourites is relatively low. The first model 
is based on PT, in which the representative agent is risk-averse for gains: this 
model  predicts  that  the  FLB  will  be  decreased  in  races  with  the  ‘strong 
favourite’ condition. Conversely, our second model is based on EU and so the 
representative agent must be risk-loving in order to explain the FLB. This model 
predicts  that  the  FLB  will  be  increased  in  races  with  the  strong  favourite 
condition. 
  Following  a  number  of  FLB  studies  (e.g.,  Ali, 1977;  Jullien  and  Salanié, 
2000; Bradley, 2003; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010), we make the assumption of   122 
the representative agent, i.e., we assume that: (i) each bettor is identical and 
bets an equal amount x under any circumstances, (ii) bettors bet on at most one 
horse in a race (with n runners), (iii) each horse is bet by at least one bettor, 
and (iv) each bettor has identical beliefs that each horse i will win the race with 
probability pi, where  1
1 = ∑ =
n
k k p , and these beliefs are unbiased, i.e., each horse 
i does win with probability pi. 
  The above conditions give rise to an equilibrium condition: bettors must 
be indifferent between all horses in the race, i.e., denoting the desirability of 
horse i by Di, we must have that Di = Dj for all i, j (Ali, 1977). Otherwise, there 
would be at least one pair of horses such that Di > Dj and no one would bet on 
horse j (contravening the assumption that each horse is bet on by at least one 
bettor).  With  two  mild  assumptions  (continuity  of  the  Di  and  first-order 
stochastic dominance), the equilibrium condition is unique (Jullien and Salanié, 
2000). 
  The intuition in the following models is that, when equilibrium prices are 
biased due to bettors being subject to EU theory or PT, the level of bias in prices 
changes depending on the distribution of prices across all of the horses in the 
race. In our PT model, each bettor has value function  ) (t v , which is concave for 
gains  and  convex  for  losses,  and  their  decisions  are  based  on  a  weighted 
probability  ) ( i p w  (for  simplicity,  we  make  the  assumption  that,  as  in  the 
original PT, the weighting function is the same for gains and losses). Each horse 
i has pari-mutuel ‘win’ odds Ri, i.e., a bet of size x on horse i returns a profit of 
xRi if horse i wins and a loss of –x otherwise. Thus, the value to a bettor of a 
winning bet of size x on horse i is given by  ) ( i xR v  and the value of a losing bet is 
given by  ) ( x v − . Then the desirability of a bet of size x on horse i is given by the 
expected value of profits, where the associated probabilities are weighted by 
) ( i p w , i.e., 
(4.1)     ∑ ≠ = − + =
n
i j j j i i i x v p w xR v p w D
, 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( . 
Empirical estimates have found that the weighting functions typically sum to an 
amount less than one (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), so we suppose that 
(4.2)     1 ) (
1 < = ∑ = c p w
n
k k ,   123 
although  the  exact  amount  c  is  not  important  in  our  model.  Hence  (4.1) 
becomes 
(4.3)     ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( x v p w c xR v p w D i i i i − − + = . 
Solving the equlibrium condition A Di = , where A is a constant, for  ) ( i p w  gives 
(4.4)    
) ( ) (
) (
) (
x v xR v
x cv A
p w
i
i − −
− −
= . 
Then, condition (4.2) gives 
(4.5)    
∑ = − −
+ − =
n
k
i x v xR v
c
x cv A
1 ) ( ) (
1
) ( . 
Substituting this back into (4.4) gives 
(4.6)    
∑ = − −
− −
=
n
k
k
i
i
x v xR v
c
x v xR v
p w
1 ) ( ) (
1 ) ( ) (
1
) ( . 
  In our EU model, each bettor has an increasing utility of wealth function 
) (t u , has rational expectations, and current wealth a. So, the utility to a bettor of 
a winning bet of size x on horse i with odds Ri is given by  ) ( i xR a u +  and the 
utility of a losing bet is given by  ) ( x a u − . Then the desirability of such a bet is 
given by the expected utility of future wealth, i.e., 
(4.7)     ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( x a u p xR a u p D i i i i − − + + = . 
This model leads to an equivalent expression to that in (4.6), which is 
(4.8)    
∑ = − − +
− − +
=
n
k
k
i
i
x a u xR a u
x a u xR a u
p
1 ) ( ) (
1
1
) ( ) (
1
. 
This  equation  is  also  Jullien  and  Salanié’s  (2000)  explicit  formula  for  the 
probabilities in terms of the odds for an EU model. Equation (4.6) is our PT 
equivalent.  We  extend  their  rationale  and  show  that  the  PT  model  not  only 
explains the FLB but also predicts a reduced or reverse FLB in races where the 
variance of odds for non-favourite is low, i.e., races with strong favourites and 
handicaps. On the other hand, for the EU model to explain the FLB, we require 
that  ) (t u  is convex. In this case, the model predicts an increased FLB in strong 
favourite races or handicaps.   124 
  In order to achieve the above, we index the favourite by 1, and note that 
we can rearrange (4.6) and (4.8) to give 
(4.9)    
v X x v xR v
c
p w
)] ( ) ( [ 1
) (
1
1 − − +
= , 
     
u X x a u xR a u
p
)] ( ) ( [ 1
1
1
1 − − + +
= , 
where 
(4.10)    ∑ = − −
=
n
k
k
v x v xR v
X
2 ) ( ) (
1
 , 
      ∑ = − − +
=
n
k
k
u x a u xR a u
X
2 ) ( ) (
1
. 
Now, Xv is proportional to the sum of the prices on each non-favourite (indexed 
by k = 2, 3, … , n), after each price has been modified by the value function for 
gains, where the prices are given by rk = 1/Rk. To see this, note that, since  ) ( x v −  
is independent of k, we can set  0 ) ( = −x v . Then, representing the value function 
for gains by a concave power function 
α t t v = ) ( , 0 < α < 1, we have that 
(4.11)    ∑ =
− =
n
k k v r x X
2
α α . 
So Xv varies in a predictable way depending on the variance of the odds for non-
favourites, and hence so does the equilibrium condition in (4.6); Xu has a similar 
interpretation. 
  Recall  two  conditions  on  the  value  function  ) (t v  in  PT:  first,  it  is  an 
increasing function, and second, it is concave for gains. Hence, the  ) ( k xR v  are 
concave and increasing. These conditions ensure that Xv is decreasing in the 
variance of the odds for non-favourites (see Appendix 3), i.e., Xv is greater in the 
‘strong  favourite’  condition  (associated  with  low  variance  of  odds  for  non-
favourites).  Thus,  since  (4.6)  is  an  equilibrium  condition,  if  we  increase  Xv, 
ceteris  paribus,  we  must  also  decrease  ) ( 1 xR v .  Consequently,  since  ) (t v  is 
increasing, we must decrease R1, which is the odds for the favourite. Hence, this 
model based on PT predicts that the FLB will be reduced in races with lower 
variance of odds for non-favourites. Note that this result is unique to the PT 
model; the EU model would only predict the FLB if the representative bettor’s 
utility function is convex, i.e., if the representative bettor is risk-loving. However,   125 
in this case, the EU model predicts the opposite effect to the PT model: since the 
) ( k xR a u +  are  convex  and  increasing,  Xu  is  lower  in  the  strong  favourite 
condition. Thus, if we decrease Xu, ceteris paribus, we must also increase R1, i.e., 
there is an increased FLB. Crucially, these differing predictions are independent 
of whether probabilities are weighted or not. So, while the EU model predicts an 
increased  FLB  in  the  strong  favourite  condition  because  the  utility  function 
must be convex, under PT, bettors can have a concave value function for gains, 
because it is the probability weighting function that explains the FLB. 
  The model we have developed has a further testable implication. Around 
half  of  races  in  the  UK  are  ‘handicap’  races,  where  horses  are  allocated 
differential  weights  to  carry  (based  on  their  previous  performances),  in  an 
effort to equalize the winning chances of all horses in the race. The result of this 
equalizing procedure is that handicap races have lower variance of odds over all 
runners than non-handicap races. Hence, we might also expect the variance of 
odds for non-favourites to be lower. Testing this prediction using our data, we 
find that this is the case; the standard deviations of odds for non-favourites 
being 15.6 and 22.8 in handicaps and non-handicaps, respectively. Hence, in 
handicap  races  (at  least  for  our  dataset),  we  should  expect  the  FLB  to  be 
reduced. We now develop hypotheses related to the implications of the model. 
 
4.4. Hypotheses, data, and method 
 
4.4.1. Hypotheses 
 
  Our models, based on PT and EU theory, respectively, predict that the FLB 
will be reduced/increased in races with low variance of odds for non-favourites 
(which  we  call  the  ‘strong  favourite’  effect).  Although  previous  studies  have 
made assumptions that we do not make in this paper, the weight of evidence 
from  these  studies  is  in  favour  of  PT  as  an  explanation  for  the  FLB. 
Consequently, we test the following as a ‘strong favourite’ hypothesis: 
1. The level of the FLB will be reduced in races where the variance of odds for non-
favourites is lower.   126 
  Our  PT  and  EU  models  predict  that  the  level  of  FLB  will  be 
reduced/increased,  respectively,  when  the  variance  of  the  odds  for  non-
favourites  is  relatively  low.  In  handicap  races,  the  variance  of  odds  over  all 
runners is generally lower because weights are distributed to horses in an effort 
to  equalize  horses’  winning  chances.  We  therefore  might  also  expect  the 
variance of odds for non-favourites to be lower, and this is empirically the case 
in our dataset. The weight of evidence from previous studies is in favour of the 
PT explanation; consequently, we test the following hypothesis: 
2. The level of the FLB will be reduced in handicap (cf. non-handicap) races. 
 
4.4.2. Data 
 
  The data employed in this study are final pari-mutuel odds and finishing 
positions for 25,644 horses running in 2447 races in the UK. Pari-mutuel odds 
are profits from a winning £1 bet on each horse, before transaction costs (track 
take and breakage) are deducted from the winnings. So, in order to adjust for 
transaction  costs,  odds-implied  probabilities  (hereafter,  odds-probabilities), 
which are the probabilities of each horse winning the race as implied by the 
odds available, are given by 
(4.12)   
∑ = +
+
=
j n
k
kj
ij
ij
R
R
q
11
1
1
1
, 
where Rij is the pari-mutuel odds for horse i in race j and nj is the number of 
horses running in race j. The number of runners in each race in the database 
ranges from 2 to 29, with a mode of 8. 
 
4.4.3. Method 
 
  In order to quantify the level of the FLB in the data, we use a conditional 
logit (CL) modeling approach (McFadden, 1974), which has been employed in 
many studies of the efficiency of betting markets (e.g., Figlewski, 1979; Asch et 
al, 1984; Bolton and Chapman, 1986; Benter, 1994; Sung and Johnson, 2010). In   127 
the context of horseracing, the CL model estimates the probability of each horse 
winning  that  race,  from  variables  related  to  the  horses,  while  taking  into 
account the competitive nature of the race. With log of odds-probability as the 
only independent variable, the CL model is an effective method for estimating 
the  level  of  FLB,  and  has  the  advantage  of  accounting  for  the  intensity  of 
competition between runners in each race. It is formulated as follows. 
  First, define an estimate of the horse i’s ability to win race j, Wij, as 
(4.13)    ij ij ij q W ε β + = ln , 
where β is the parameter that determines the importance of the log of odds-
probability  qij  for  horse  i  in  race  j,  and  εij  is  an  independent  error  term. 
McFadden  (1974)  shows  that  if  the  independent  errors  are  identically 
distributed according to the double exponential distribution, then the winning 
probability for horse i in race j is given by 
(4.14) 
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  The  parameter  β  is  estimated  by  maximizing  the  joint  probability  of 
observing the results of all the races in the sample, i.e., by maximizing the log-
likelihood 
(4.15)    ∑ ∑ = = =
N
j
n
i ij ij
j p y L
1 1 ln ln , 
where yij = 1 if horse i won race j and yij = 0 otherwise, and N is the total number 
of races. On estimating a CL model with log of odds-probabilities as the only 
independent  variable,  we  refer  to  its  parameter  as  the  FLB β.  An  estimated 
value of the FLB β of one implies that the odds-probabilities are, on average, 
equal to the true winning probabilities. A value of the FLB β greater than one 
indicates a standard FLB, where longshots are relatively overbet. The greater 
the value of β, the greater is the degree of the FLB (Bacon-Shone et al., 1992). On 
the  other  hand,  a  value  of  β  less  than  one  indicates  a  reverse  FLB,  where 
favourites are relatively overbet. 
  Before addressing our hypotheses, it is instructive to investigate to what 
extent the FLB is present in all the races in our dataset. To test whether the FLB 
is  present  we  employ  the  following  standard  normal  test  statistic  to  test 
whether the FLB β value significantly exceeds or is less than one:   128 
(4.16)   
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1
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β
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  Subsequently, in order to address the issue central to each hypothesis, we 
divide the dataset into races that (i) do or do not satisfy the ‘strong favourite’ 
condition, and (ii) are handicap or non-handicap races. Here, a race satisfies the 
‘strong  favourite’  condition  when  the  standard  deviation  of  odds  for  non-
favourites is lower than x, where we choose x to be 5 or 10. Then a race that 
does not satisfy this condition has this same variable greater than x. To test the 
strong favourite hypothesis, we separately estimate β in races that satisfy the 
strong favourite condition and races that do not. We then compare the two β 
values using the standard normal test statistic 
(4.17)   
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2 1
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A similar test is carried out to test the handicaps hypothesis. We note that the 
choices for x of 5 and 10 are fairly arbitrary, so we also investigate the effect of 
altering these choices on the level of the FLB.  
 
4.5. Results 
 
4.5.1. Strong favourite hypothesis 
 
The first row of Table 4.1 shows that there is a FLB over all the races in 
our  data,  with  favourites  underbet  and  longshots  overbet  (β  =  1.091,  p  = 
0.0014). To test whether the decisions of horserace bettors are consistent with 
a reduced FLB in races with a strong favourite (races with low variance of odds 
for  non-favourites),  we  estimate  the  levels  of  FLB  in  races  with  the  strong 
favourite condition. The results of these estimations are displayed in Table 4.1. 
We  split  races  into  those  where  the  standard  deviation  of  odds  for  non-
favourites is lower and greater than some cut-off value. When we set the cut-off 
value for a strong favourite race at 5, we find that the level of FLB is significantly 
lower  in  races  with  a  strong  favourite  compared  to  races  with  no  strong 
favourite (NSF: β = 1.109, SF: β = 0.820, p = 0.0061). 
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Table 4.1. Results of estimating conditional logit models with log of odds-
implied probability as the single explanatory variable for UK races from 2004, 
assessing the prevalence of a strong favourite effect. 
  Number of 
races 
Mean 
number of 
runners 
Level of 
FLB β 
z 
(S.E.)  p 
All races  2447  10.5  1.091  3.19*** 
(0.041) 
0.0014 
NSF(5)  2173  11.0  1.109 
SF(5)  274  6.2  0.820 
2.51*** 
(0.115) 
0.0061 
NSF(10)  1691  11.7  1.118 
SF(10)  756  7.6  0.994 
1.83** 
(0.068) 
0.0337 
Non-handicaps  1161  9.5  1.128 
Handicaps  1286  11.4  1.043 
1.47* 
(0.057) 
0.0703 
z = (β - 1)/S.E. (all races), z = [β (1) - β(2)]/S.E. (comparisons). 
‘SF(x)’ indicates a race where the standard deviation of odds for non-favourites (where the 
favourite is the horse believed by the bettors to be most likely to win the race) is lower than x. 
‘NSF(x)’ indicates a race where the the standard deviation of odds for non-favourites is higher 
than x. 
***: significant at the 1% level; *: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level (1 
tailed-test). 
 
  In fact, the strong favourite effect is so strong here that the level of FLB in 
races with a strong favourite is such that there is a reverse FLB for these races. 
When we set the cutoff value at 10, we also find lower FLB in races with a 
strong favourite than races without this condition (NSF: β = 1.118, NSF: β = 
0.994, p = 0.0337). Hence, there is strong evidence to suggest that the FLB is 
reduced  in  races  with  a  strong  favourite.  In  order  to  see  whether  different 
values  of  the  standard  deviation  of  odds  for  non-favourites  would  give  a 
different result, we plot the value of the FLB β for other values in Figure 4.1. 
We see that when examining the races in the dataset there is general trend 
of increasing FLB as the standard deviation increases (i.e., for lower variance, 
the bias is lower). However, the effect appears to be marginally lower as the 
standard  deviation  of  odds  for  non-favourites  increases,  suggesting  that  the 
strong  favourite  effect  is  most  prominent  for  races  with  a  relatively  strong 
favourite (i.e., relatively low variance of odds for non-favourites). 
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Figure 4.1. The level of FLB with differing standard deviation of odds for non-
favourites (where the favourite is the horse believed by the bettors to be most 
likely to win the race); number of races for each data-point are shown. 
 
 
  In sum, these results support the strong favourite hypothesis, i.e., they 
suggest that the  level  of the FLB is reduced  in races with strong favourites. 
Hence, we find strong evidence to support our PT (cf. EU) model in explaining 
the FLB in these markets. 
 
4.5.2. Handicaps hypothesis 
 
  We now compare the level of FLB in handicap and non-handicap races. 
The results are presented in the last row of Table 4.1. We find that there is a 
modest reduction in of the level of FLB in handicap (cf. non-handicap) races 
(non-handicaps: β = 1.128, handicaps: β = 1.043, p = 0.0703). This provides 
some evidence to support the handicaps hypothesis, i.e., as a result of the strong 
favourite effect, the level of FLB is reduced in handicap races. This provides 
further  evidence  to  support  PT  as  an  explanation  for  decision  making  bias 
under uncertainty. 
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4.6. Discussion 
 
  The main prediction of our model is that when the variance of odds for 
non-favourites is lower, favourites will be relatively under-/overbet, depending 
on the risk preferences of the representative bettor; specifically, there will be an 
increased/decreased  FLB  if  the  bettor  is  risk-loving/averse.  In  addition,  our 
model predicts that the strong favourite effect should be replicated in handicap 
races, since the rules of entry for these races aim to equalize horses’ chances; 
this in turn is likely to have the effect of reducing the variance of the odds for 
non-favourites.  Hence, the  model  offers  two  related  methods  for  empirically 
distinguishing  between  two  competing  theories  of  decision  making  under 
uncertainty. If decisions are made under PT, we should expect a reduced FLB in 
strong favourite races. Conversely, if decisions are consistent with EU theory, 
we  should  expect  an  increased  FLB  in  strong  favourite  races.  Our  empirical 
findings support the former alternative, with stronger evidence provided by the 
strong  favourite  effect  tests  than  the  handicaps  test.  The  slightly  weaker 
evidence from the handicaps test could be explained by noting that, while it is to 
be  expected  that  handicap  races  have  reduced  variance  of  odds  over  all 
competitors,  this  does  not  directly  mean  that  variance  of  odds  for  non-
favourites will be low. Instead, there are unlikely to be many strong favourites 
in  handicap  races.  Thus,  while  we  empirically  see  that  there  is  a  negative 
correlation between a race being a handicap and its variance of odds for non-
favourites, we might expect the strong favourites’ effect to be slightly less in 
evidence. 
  We also found that, while the strong favourite effect is prominent for races 
with low variance of odds for non-favourites, the effect is less significant for 
higher variances (Figure 4.1). This could be due to a confounding effect related 
to the number of runners in each race. As we show in Figure 4.2, there is a 
strong positive correlation between the number of runners in a race and the 
average standard deviation of odds for non-favourites. 
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Figure 4.2. The relationship between the number of runners in each race and 
the average standard deviation of odds for non-favourites (where the favourite 
is the horse believed by the bettors to be most likely to win the race); races with 
3 or fewer runners, or 16 or more runners, are grouped. 
 
 
  Consequently, higher values of the variance are associated with greater 
numbers of runners, and this suggests that we may be observing a complexity 
effect which reduces the level of FLB. In particular, it has been shown that, as 
the complexity of a decision task increases (i.e., the number of alternatives in 
the  choice  set  increases),  decision  makers  opt  for  simplistic,  compensatory 
strategies,  including  the  ‘take-the-best’  heuristic  (Gigerenzer  and  Goldstein, 
1999), in which the decision maker prepares an order of cues based on their 
relative  prediction  validity,  before  choosing  according  to  the  first  cue  that 
discriminates between the alternatives. In a betting decision associated with a 
horserace, odds have the highest cue validity of all sources of information (they 
are the best predictor of race results), and we can, therefore, expect that under 
increased task complexity bettors are likely to adopt such heuristic strategies, 
leading to the relative overbetting of strong favourites in races with a higher 
number of runners.   133 
  Primarily,  our  results  provide  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  cognitive 
errors (i.e., prospect theory), rather than a preference for risk, explain the FLB. 
Our empirically verified predictions are only consistent with a representative 
bettor  model  based  on  PT,  rather  than  EU  theory.  Specifically,  our  results 
demonstrate that the representative bettor must be risk-averse for gains, and 
expected utility models where the average bettor is risk-averse are unable to 
explain  the  FLB.  Hence,  EU  models  are  not  consistent  with  our  data.  This 
conclusion, unlike that arrived at in other studies attempting to determine the 
origin of the FLB, is independent of parametric assumptions (Jullien and Salanié, 
2000; Bradley, 2003) and makes no assumptions about the choice set of the 
decision maker (Golec and Tamarkin, 1995; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010).  
  There have been a wide variety of previous explanations for the FLB: risk-
love  (Weitzman,  1965),  the  pricing policies  of  bookmakers  (Shin,  1993),  the 
limited information of bettors (Sobel and Raines, 2003), and misperceptions of 
probabilities  (Henery,  1985).  Our  study  sheds  new  light  on  this  issue  by 
showing  definitively  that,  in  markets  that  do  not  involve  a  market  maker, 
prospect  theory  (specifically,  risk-aversion  with  biased  probabilities)  is 
necessary to explain an observed reduction in the level of the FLB in races with 
strong favourites or in handicaps. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
   
  In  sum,  we  find  evidence  that  decisions  in  a  real-world  environment 
appear  consistent  with  a  ‘strong  favourite’  effect,  whereby  bettors  who 
generally  underbet  favourites  give  undue  preference  to  favourites  in  races 
where the variance of the odds of their rivals is low. This effect is predicted by a 
representative  agent  model  employing  prospect  theory  as  the  driving  force 
behind bettors’ decisions. A similar effect is also observed when comparing the 
FLB in handicap and non-handicap races. The fact that our empirical results are 
consistent  with  prospect  theory  rather  than  expected  utility,  without 
parametric or choice set assumptions, contributes powerful new evidence that 
prospect theory (cf., expected utility theory) is better able to explain decision 
making biases under uncertainty in naturalistic environments. Demonstrating   134 
such biases in the real world is crucial to establishing the generalizability of 
laboratory research, and while the original experimental evidence supporting 
the conclusions of prospect theory was compelling, future work in this area 
could further investigate the consistency of empirical evidence of other large 
populations of decision makers with the predictions of theoretical models.  
  Finally, there have been a wide range of proposed explanations for the 
FLB,  from  risk  preferences  and  cognitive  errors  to  limited  information  of 
traders. However, we have demonstrated in this paper that the decisions made 
by  a  large  population  of  traders  in  a  naturalistic  environment  are  only 
consistent with risk-averse traders with biased subjective probability estimates. 
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5. Properties of pseudo-R2 as an estimate of forecast accuracy 
for discrete choice models 
 
Abstract 
 
While R2 in ordinary least squares linear regression is a widely-used and well-
justified  measure,  the  same  is  typically  not  true  of  pseudo-R2s  in  logistic 
regression. This has important implications for the evaluation of pseudo-R2s as 
estimates  of  forecast  accuracy  for  discrete  choice  models.  We  show  both 
theoretically and empirically that at least one of the definitions of pseudo-R2 is 
not  robust  to  variations  in  the  number  of  alternatives,  and  suggest  an 
adjustment to correct for this bias. We describe and evaluate the relative merits 
of  two  methods  (bootstrap  and  asymptotic)  for  estimating  the  variance  of 
pseudo-R2s so that their values can be compared across non-nested models or 
across models fitted on different datasets. Finally, we derive relationships that 
describe the usefulness of pseudo-R2 measures in terms of their economic value 
in  the  context  of  competitive  event  prediction.  As  a  result  of  the  above,  we 
arrive  at  a  far  more  rigorous  understanding  of  the  value  of  pseudo-R2s  in 
evaluating the predictions of discrete choice models. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
  Discrete choice models are a widely used class of statistical models, and 
include the multinomial logit, conditional logit, multinomial probit, mixed logit, 
and other models (Maddala, 1983). Their primary use is in the modelling of 
choice,  specifically  prediction  of  individuals’  choices  from  a  range  of 
alternatives. Hence, they have wide applications in marketing (McFadden, 2001) 
and econometrics (Maddala, 1983), although they have also been adopted in 
such  diverse  fields  as  epidemiology  (Breslow  and  Day,  1994),  operations 
research (Cheng and Stough, 2006), and the forecasting of competitive events 
(Smith et al., 2009). While a great degree of attention has been given to the 
development of effective discrete choice models (Edelman, 2007), particularly 
for the forecasting of competitive events (e.g., Lessman et al., 2007), there has   136 
been little consideration of the best method for evaluating the predictions of 
these models. A key property of any means of evaluation of a forecast is its 
comparability  across  empirical  models  (Kvålseth  1985).  Otherwise,  the 
researcher  can  not  be  certain  whether  differences  in  the  evaluator  arise 
because  of  changes  in  the  predictive  power  of  the  model  or  because  of 
alternative confounding factors, such as properties of the datasets on which the 
models were fitted. Moreover, it is desirable in any forecasting context to assign 
degrees of uncertainty to any point estimates reported, in order to ensure that 
conclusions drawn from evaluating such statistics are statistically significant. 
  In linear regression, the coefficient of determination R2 is widely used as a 
measure  of  a  model’s  ability  to  explain  variation  in  the  data,  and  thus  the 
accuracy of the model’s predictions, and its properties and correct usage are 
now well understood (e.g., Kvålseth 1985, Draper and Smith, 1998). However, a 
similar consensus has not been reached for its analog for logistic regressions, 
the  pseudo-R2,  because  of  significant  differences  between  the  two  types  of 
measure. So, while pseudo-R2s are commonly reported, their usage is seldom 
justified (Veall and Zimmerman, 1996). There are in fact a number of issues 
associated with pseudo-R2s that reamin unresolved: first, unlike R2, there is no 
single definition of pseudo-R2 that is universally employed. Instead, a variety of 
measures have been proposed, which are not necessarily mathematically (as in, 
the same formula) or conceptually (the same interpretation) equivalent to R2 
(Menard, 2000). Second, care must be taken when comparing values of pseudo-
R2  between  datasets  with  different  characteristics.  For  instance,  one  of  the 
advantages of the conditional logit model in its application to discrete choice 
modelling is that each observation (event) need not consist of an equal number 
of competitors (e.g., in predicting a consumer’s choice of healthcare products, 
the number of products available could be different for each consumer). Finally, 
the  distributions  of  R2s  are  complex  and  depend  on  unknown  parameters 
(Ohtani,  2000),  so  while  R2  values  are  often  reported,  they  are  seldom 
accompanied  by  standard  errors  (Press  and  Zellner,  1978).  Hence,  the 
comparability of these measures between models is difficult. For pseudo-R2s, 
this issue is exacerbated because not only are the distributional properties of 
pseudo-R2s different to those of R2, they also depend on the particular defintion   137 
of pseudo-R2 employed and the choice of model. Little attention has previously 
been  given  to  the  consequences  that  these  considerations  have  for  the 
evaluation of discrete choice models using pseudo-R2s. 
   One  of  the  many  applications  for  discrete  choice  models  is  in  the 
forecasting  of  competitive  event  outcomes.  A  competitive  event  is  a  contest 
between at least two rival participants where one or more winners are declared 
and the outcome is uncertain: political elections or sporting events, for example. 
Often, these events are asssociated with markets for betting or trading on their 
outcome,  e.g.,  betting  markets  in  the  case  of  sporting  events,  or  prediction 
markets for political contests or the outcomes of business policies (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz, 2006a). Since the outcomes of competitive events are of particular 
interest  for  economic  reasons  (in  the  case  of  sporting  events)  or  policy 
implications (elections), the forecasting of competitive events is a prominent 
subject  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  Schnytzer  et  al.,  2010;  Smith  and  Vaughan 
Williams,  2010).  Particular  attention  has  been  given  to  the  properties  of 
competitive events that mean that modelling techniques that would normally be 
effective in forecasting are not suitable for the forecasting of competitive events. 
For instance, the modeller must take into account the intensity of competition 
between the participants: hence, the standard modelling approach is to view 
competitors as alternatives in a choice set with the winner being the participant 
whose attributes lead it to being preferred (Lessman et al, 2011). If there is 
some uncertainty about the precise values of the attributes of each competitor, 
this is reflected in error terms, and the outputs of the model are the probability 
that  each  competitor  will  emerge  as  the  preferred  alternative,  given  the 
distribution of the error terms; thus, models typically involve some form of the 
logistic  function.  The  use  of  pseudo-R2s  in  competitive  event  forecasting  is 
similar to any other use of discrete choice models. However, while the typical 
motivation for pseudo-R2s is as a measure of improvement from null model 
(where each alternative is considered equally likely) to fitted model, a more 
useful measure would be improvement to fitted model from a model based on 
the predictions of prices from the associated market, a measure that we call 
relative pseudo-R2. Then, there is a direct link between relative pseudo-R2s and 
the economic value of the estimated model probabilities.   138 
  In this paper we address the various unresolved issues related to pseudo-
R2s  and  illustrate  these  points  with  specific  reference  to  the  forecasting  of 
competitive  events.  Consequently,  throughout  the  paper  we  refer  to  the 
conditional  logit  (CL)  model,  which  is  the  most  widely-used  model  in  this 
context. We define two alternative pseudo-R2 measures, and show that at least 
one  of  these  is  not  robust  to  changes  in  the  number  of  alternatives  in  each 
choice  problem.  Consequently,  in  order  for  discrete  choice  models  to  be 
comparable  using  these  measures  across  non-nested  models  or  across  data 
fitted on different datasets, we suggest an adjustment to account for the bias. 
Then,  we  describe  and  compare  two  methods  for  obtaining  the  variance  of 
pseudo-R2 measures, the bootstrap and asymptotic methods. We find that each 
method  results  in  variances  that  are  reasonably  close;  hence,  either  method 
could  be  used  to  conduct  significance  tests  for  comparing  pseudo-R2  values. 
Finally, we define relative pseudo-R2s as improvement to fitted model from a 
model based on the predictions of prices  from the associated market in the 
context of the forecasting of competitive events. The purpose of this is to show 
that there is a relationship between relative pseudo-R2s and the economic value 
of estimated model probabilities, a finding that has implications for assessing 
the efficiency of financial markets. 
  The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, we 
outline the CL model and define two alternative pseudo-R2 measures. In section 
5.3,  we  explore  properties  of  these  measures  in  relation  to  the  number  of 
alternatives. In section 5.4, we discuss the bootstrap and asymptotic methods. 
In section 5.5, we discuss relative pseudo-R2s. We conclude in section 5.6. 
 
5.2. The conditional logit model and pseudo-R2s 
 
5.2.1. The conditional logit model 
 
  The conditional logit (CL) model (McFadden, 1974) is a widely used model 
of discrete choice, and is particularly useful in the forecasting of the outcomes of 
competitive events, such as horseraces (e.g., Figlewski, 1979; Asch et al., 1984; 
Bolton  and  Chapman,  1986;  Benter,  1994;  Sung  and  Johnson,  2010).  For  a   139 
discrete  choice  problem,  it  results  in  estimates  of  the  probabilities  of  each 
alternative being chosen based on variables relating to the alternatives. So, in 
the context of competitive events, it provides, for each event, estimates of the 
probabilities of each competitor winning the event based on variables related to 
the  competitors,  while  taking  into  account  the  competition  between  the 
participants  in  the  event.  Its  primary  advantage  over  other  discrete  choice 
models in the forecasting of competitive events is that the probabilities can be 
expressed  in  an  analytic  form,  thus  estimation  of  the  parameters  is 
straightforward. 
  The formulation of the CL model begins with an estimate of the ability of 
competitor i to win event j, given by 
(5.1)     ij ij
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the  variables 
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and εij is an independent error term. The key assumption for the CL model, 
which makes the estimated probabilities analytically tractable, is that the errors 
are identically distributed according to the double exponential distribution 
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which is plotted in Figure 5.1 with a normal curve for comparison. 
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Figure 5.1. The double exponential distribution. 
 
 
The  coefficients β  are estimated  by  maximizing  the  joint  probability  of 
observing the results of all the events in the dataset, i.e., by maximizing the log-
likelihood (lnL) of the full model (the model that includes all the independent 
variables in which we are interested), 
(5.5)     ∑ ∑ = = =
N
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where yij = 1 if competitor i won event j and yij = 0 otherwise, and N is the total 
number of events in the dataset. We denote the maximized likelihood function 
for the full model by  ) ˆ ( ln β L . 
  Since the estimated probabilities in the CL model are analytically tractable, 
it  is  straightforward  to  estimate  the  parameters  using  the  Newton-Raphson 
method. In this case, if we let 
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5.2.2. Pseudo-R2s 
 
  In  linear  regression,  a  popular  measure  of  ‘goodness-of-fit’  is  the 
coefficient  of  determination  R2  (Draper  and  Smith,  1998);  indeed,  this  is 
perhaps  the  most  widely  used  statistic  in  ordinary  least  squares  regression 
(Kvålseth 1985). It varies between 0 and 1, and can be interpreted in a number 
of ways. First, it is the variation in the data that is explained by the model, a 
value of 1 implying that the model fully explains variability in the data. Second, 
it is the square of the correlation between the model’s predicted values and the 
actual  values.  Third,  it  is  the  improvement  from  null  model  (a  model  that 
includes no independent variables) to fitted model, with 1 being a model that 
perfectly predicts any new datapoint. 
  However,  the  standard  definition  of  R2  is  not  applicable  in  logistic 
regression models, such as CL. Rather, several alternative pseudo-R2 measures 
have been proposed. The motivating criterion for pseudo-R2s is primarily the 
same as the third interpration of R2 above, i.e., as improvement from null model 
to fitted model. The CL model is an example of a model that is estimated by 
maximum likelihood, and in fact, for any model that is estimated by maximum 
likelihood, pseudo-R2s that satisfy this criterion can be defined. 
  The  most  popular  measure  (e.g.,  Benter,  1994)  is  McFadden’s  (1974) 
pseudo-R2, which is given by 
(5.8)    
) 0 ( ln
) ˆ ( ln
1
2
L
L
RM
β
− = , 
where  ) ˆ ( ln β L  is the maximized log-likelihood (lnL) of the full model, including 
all independent variables, 
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and lnL(0) is the lnL of the naive model, where each competitor in the event is 
assigned the same probability of winning: 
(5.10)    ∑ = =
N
j j n L
1 ) / 1 ln( ) 0 ( ln . 
An alternative is the Maddala (1983) pseudo-R2, given by 
(5.11)    )]} ˆ ( ln ) 0 ( )[ln / 2 exp{( 1
2 β L L N RD − − = . 
Note that, although the McFadden pseudo-R2 possesses the desirable property 
that it takes a maximum value of 1, this is not true of the Maddala pseudo-R2, 
which  has  a  maximum  of  )} 0 ( ln ) / 2 exp{( 1
2 L N RD − = .  While  there  are  many 
other definitions of pseudo-R2, for the remainder of this chapter, we consider 
only  these  two  definitions,  but  our  results  are  easily  extended  to  other 
definitions.  We  begin  with  a  consideration  of  their  comparability  across 
datasets. 
 
5.3. Pseudo-R2s and dependence on the number of alternatives 
 
  In this section, our primary motivation is to ensure that pseudo-R2s are 
comparable  between  similarly  specified  models  on  alternative  datasets.  The 
concern here is that, in any discrete choice problem, alternative datasets may 
differ  in  their  characteristics.  Specifically,  depending  on  how  the  data  are 
sampled, the average number of alternatives available to each subject may vary. 
For example, in predicting a consumer’s preferred medical care, the number of 
alternatives available to them might depend on their geographical location. To 
give an extreme example from competitive events, suppose a researcher seeks 
to  analyze  variations  in  the  predictability  of  horseraces  depending  on  the 
number  of  horses  in  each  race.  In  this  instance,  the  researcher  will  sample 
alternative datasets depending on the number of runners in each race, and so 
necessarily the average number of competitors in each subset of the data will 
differ.  In  this  section,  we  investigate  whether  each  of  the  McFadden  and 
Maddala pseudo-R2s are robust to variations in this particular characteristic of 
the data. We find that the value of the McFadden pseudo-R2 varies predictably 
depending  on  the  average  number  of  alternatives,  even  while  the predictive 
power  of  model  estimates  remains  constant.  Consequently,  we  define  an   143 
adjusted  version  that  does  not  have  this  undesirable  property,  while  still 
satisfying the original criterion of improvement from null model to fitted model. 
  Recall that the motivation behind the formulation of pseudo-R2s is that 
they  represent  the  degree  of  improvement  from  null  model  to  fitted  model. 
Suppose, therefore, that, in each event j, the model assigns a winning probability 
to the eventual winner of  j j n n f / ) ( , i.e., if yij = 1,  j j ij n n f p / ) ( =  (note that since 
the pij are probabilities,  j j n n f ≤ ≤ ) ( 0  for all j). Then the dependence of the two 
definitions  of  pseudo-R2  can  be  evaluated  for  their  dependence  on  (or 
independence from) the number of competitors in each event. The formulae are 
given by the following proposition (for a proof, see Appendix 4). 
 
Proposition 1. If the model probabilities are  j j ij n n f p / ) ( = , then the McFadden 
and Maddala pseudo-R2s are given by 
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  Here,  f
~
 can be thought of as the part of the pseudo-R2 that measures the 
predictive power of the model probabilities. In each case, as  f
~
 increases, so 
does  the  pseudo-R2.  However,  the  McFadden  pseudo-R2  has  a  predictable 
dependence on the the number of alternatives: if the number of alternatives in 
each  choice  problem  increases, 
2
M R  decreases.  Hence,  in  order  to  define  an 
adjusted McFadden pseudo-R2 that is independent of the number of alternatives, 
we multiply 
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Note that this definition no longer has a maximum value of  1; it now has a 
maximum  value  of  n ~ ln .  For  the  Maddala  pseudo-R2,  we  find  that  it  is,  as 
required,  already  independent  of  the  number  of  alternatives  in  each  choice 
problem. However, it has a maximum value of 
2 ~ / 1 1 n − . 
  For an empirical demonstration that the adjusted McFadden and Maddala 
pseudo-R2s are consistent even when the number of alternatives is varied, we 
fit CL models on subsets of horserace betting data categorized by the number of 
competitors in each event. The data employed are final bookmaker odds from 
6064 UK races from 2009 and 2010. The CL models have just one independent 
variable,  which  is  the  log  of  odds-implied  probability;  the  coefficient  of  this 
variable is given by β. The results are presented in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2. 
 
Table 5.1. Conditional logit models with log of odds-implied probability as the 
single variable fitted to different subsets of the data depending on the number 
of competitors in each event. 
Number of 
competitors 
Number 
of events  n ~   β ˆ   lnL(0)  lnL(β ˆ ) 
2
M R  
2 ~
M R  
2
D R  
4 or fewer  201  3.7  1.10  -264.2  -212.7  0.195  0.256  0.401 
5  335  5  1.24  -539.2  -412.0  0.236  0.379  0.532 
6  448  6  1.19  -802.7  -645.7  0.196  0.351  0.504 
7  578  7  1.05  -1124.7  -952.4  0.153  0.298  0.449 
8  611  8  1.11  -1270.5  -1060.7  0.165  0.343  0.497 
9  646  9  1.24  -1419.4  -1141.3  0.196  0.430  0.577 
10  585  10  1.17  -1347.0  -1111.1  0.175  0.403  0.554 
11  572  11  1.23  -1371.6  -1107.8  0.192  0.461  0.602 
12  533  12  1.17  -1324.5  -1095.1  0.173  0.430  0.577 
13  450  13  1.21  -1154.2  -959.3  0.169  0.433  0.580 
14  345  14  1.24  -910.5  -742.3  0.185  0.488  0.623 
15  222  15  1.46  -601.2  -470.0  0.218  0.591  0.693 
16  189  16  1.38  -524.0  -415.2  0.208  0.576  0.684 
17  83  17  1.72  -235.2  -180.9  0.231  0.654  0.730 
18 or more  266  20.0  1.29  -797.2  -674.5  0.154  0.461  0.603 
All events  6064  9.6  1.21  -13686.1  -11194.8  0.182  0.411  0.560 
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Figure  5.2.  A  comparison  of  the  pseudo-R2s  across  subsets  of  the  data 
categorized by the number of competitors in each event. 
 
 
  Clearly, the adjusted McFadden and Maddala pseudo-R2s vary consistently 
with each other when the number of competitors is changed, while the standard 
definition of the McFadden pseudo-R2 does not vary in the same way. Hence, 
while there appears to be an increasing trend in model goodness-of-fit as the 
number  of  runners  is  increased,  this  trend  is  not  captured  by  the  standard 
definition of the McFadden pseudo-R2, because it has the tendency to decrease 
as the number of runners is increased; see equation (5.12). We confirm this by 
fitting  linear  regressions  of 
2 2
M D R R −  and 
2 2 ~
M D R R −  on  the  number  of  runners; 
gradients are given by 0.0174 (t = 10.67, p = 0.0000) and -0.0035 (t = 0.20, p = 
0.4211), respectively, i.e., the difference between the Maddala and McFadden 
pseudo-R2s increases with the number of runners while the difference between 
the Maddala and adjusted McFadden pseudo-R2s do not. In the next section, we 
continue  to  address  the  comparability  of  pseudo-R2s,  by  describing  and 
comparing two methods for estimating their distributions. 
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5.4. Distributional properties of pseudo-R2s 
 
5.4.1. Bootstrapping pseudo-R2s 
 
  It is straightforward to compare nested CL models (i.e., models where one 
of  the  models  includes  all  the  independent  variables  from  the  other  model) 
fitted on the same data (e.g., using the likelihood ratio statistic). However, as 
researchers  we  run  into  difficulty  when  attempting  to  compare  either  non-
nested models fitted on the same data or models that are fitted on mutually 
exclusive  data.  One  approach  would  be  to  make  comparisons  between  the 
pseudo-R2s for each model. However, it is not a simple task to assign a measure 
of precision to values of pseudo-R2 because their distributions are complex and 
depend  on  unknown  parameters.  An  alternative  method  for  estimating  the 
distribution of pseudo-R2s is to adopt an M-bootstrap approach (Efron, 1979), 
as recommended by Ohtani (2000) for ordinary R2s. The bootstrap is commonly 
used when the theoretical distribution of a statistic is complicated, which is the 
case for the CL model. Suppose we have fitted CL models to two datasets, D1 and 
D2,  consisting  of  N1  and  N2  events,  respectively.  The  M-bootstrap  method 
proceeds as follows: 
 
1.  Sample N1 events, with replacement, from D1, to form a new dataset BD1. 
Similarly, sample N2 events, with replacement, from D2, to form a new 
dataset BD2. 
2.  Fit CL models on BD1 and BD2 and record the resulting values of pseudo-
R2. 
3.  Perform M iterations of steps 1 and 2. 
4.  The sample means,  ) (
2
1 R    and  ) (
2
2 R   , and sample variances,  ) (
2
1
2 R s  and 
) (
2
2
2 R s , of the sets of M pseudo-R2s are used to derive a standard normal 
test statistic,  ) ( ) ( / )] ( ) ( [ )] ( [
2
2
2 2
1
2 2
2
2
1
2 R s R s R R R z + − =       , which can be 
used to test the alternative hypothesis that the estimated probabilities 
from one model are more accurate than the other vs. the null hypothesis 
of no difference.   147 
5.4.2. The asymptotic distribution of pseudo-R2s 
 
  An  alternative  method  is  to  estimate  the  asymptotic distribution  of  the 
pseudo-R2,  i.e.,  the  expected  distribution  as  the  number  of  events  tends  to 
infinity.  Hu,  Shao,  and  Palta  (2006)  derive  analytically  the  asymptotic 
distribution of the Maddala pseudo-R2 in the multinomial logit model (like the 
conditional logit model, the multinomial logit model is a model of discrete of 
choice,  but  with  different  underlying  assumptions).  Here,  we  adapt  their 
analysis to derive the asymptotic distribution of the McFadden and Maddala 
pseudo-R2s for the conditional logit model. 
 
Proposition 2. Assume that the independent variables xij, j = 1, 2, … , N, i = 1, 2, … , 
nj,  are  independent  and  identically  distributed  random  m-vectors  with  finite 
second moment (i.e.,  ) (
2
ij x E  finite). Let 
(5.15)    ) (ln 1 j n E H = , 
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Then, as  ∞ → N ,   148 
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Proof. For a proof, see Appendix 4. 
The above proposition gives the asymptotic distributions of the McFadden 
and Maddala pseudo-R2s. Hence, to obtain estimates of the variance of point 
estimates  of  these  pseudo-R2s,  we  can  replace  the  unknown  quantities  with 
consistent  estimators.  So,  denote  by n , n ~ ,  and  ) (
2 n s  the  arithmetic  mean, 
geometric  mean,  and  sample  variance  of  the  number  of  competitors, 
respectively, i.e., 
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Then estimates of the variance of the McFadden and Maddala pseudo-R2s are 
given by 
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respectively. 
 
5.4.3.  An  empirical  comparison  of  the  asymptotic  method  with  the  bootstrap 
method 
 
  Now we discuss the differences between the two alternative methods for 
estimating variances of pseudo-R2s  described above. Teebagy and Chatterjee 
(1989) show that the bootstrap method overestimates standard errors in large 
samples  for  standard  logistic  regression  (relative  to  the  asymptotic 
distribution). Here we briefly compare values of the standard deviations of the 
pseudo-R2s from CL models estimated using each method on some real data. 
The data employed are final exchange odds from 6058 UK races from 2009 and 
2010. There are two subsets of the data, consisting, respectively, of those races 
with above-/below-median Shin z (with 3029 races in each set), where Shin z 
measures  the  extent  of  informed  trading  in  the  market  (see  Appendix  1  for 
more  details).  We  again  fit  CL  models  with  just  the  log  of  odds-implied 
probability as the single explanatory variable; the coefficient of this variable is 
given by β. The results are presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. A comparison of the asymptotic and bootstrap methods for 
estimating the distributions of the McFadden and Maddala pseudo-R2s. 
Dataset  High Shin z  Low Shin z 
Number of events  3029  3029 
Mean number of competitors  7.5  13.1 
β  1.03  1.01 
lnL(0)  -5967.3  -7702.9 
lnL(β ˆ )  -4900.1  -6224.6 
Asymptotic 
2
M R   0.1788  0.1919 
) .( .
2
M R E S   0.00757  0.00690 
2
D R   0.5057  0.6232 
) .( .
2
D R E S   0.01282  0.01218 
Bootstrap 
) (
2
M R     0.1793  0.1925 
) .( .
2
M R E S   0.00671  0.00649 
) (
2
D R     0.5064  0.6240 
) .( .
2
D R E S   0.01307  0.01235 
F3028,3028(
2
M R )  1.27**  1.13** 
F3028,3028(
2
D R )  1.04  1.03 
**: significant at the 1% level (1-tailed F test). 
 
It  is  clear  that,  while  the  asymptotic  and  bootstrap  methods  produce 
estimates of the variances of the pseudo-R2 statistics that are reasonably close, 
there is some difference: the asymptotic method appears to overestimate the 
variance of the McFadden pseudo-R2 relative to the bootstrap method, while 
relatively underestimating the variance of the Maddala pseudo-R2. However, the 
difference is only statistically significant for the McFadden pseudo-R2, with F-
tests of differences of variances for the high and low Shin z datasets given by 
1.27  (p  =  0.0000)  and  1.13  (p  =  0.0004),  respectively.  The  F  values  for  the 
Maddala pseudo-R2s for the high and low Shin z datasets are given by 1.04 (p = 
0.1383) and 1.03 (p = 0.2269), respectively. 
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5.5. Pseudo-R2 as a predictor of the economic value of a discrete choice 
model 
 
  Competitive events are often associated with a market for trading on the 
outcome. For example, horseraces have an associated betting market in which 
traders can wager money on their predicted outcome. This results in it being 
possible to derive from market prices ‘public’ predictions of the probabilities of 
each outcome occurring. This is important because discrete choice models are 
often employed to test for market efficiency, i.e., the degree to which the market 
appropriately  discounts  the  value  of  information.  Hence,  in  this  context,  the 
standard motivation for pseudo-R2s, as improvement from null model to fitted 
model, is less relevant. Instead, it is more useful to the modeller to have some 
understanding of the improvement of their model over the public model. We 
denote this measure relative pseudo-R2 and show theoretically that there is a 
direct link between this measure, the transaction costs for betting on an event, 
and the expected profit to a bettor employing this measure. 
  Recall that our dataset consists of N events, where each event j is between 
an integer number nj ≥ 2 competitors i; for each event, there is just one winner, 
given by yij, where yij = 1 if competitor i wins, and yij = 0 otherwise. Suppose 
further that the decimal odds are denoted by Rij > 1, with corresponding prices 
given by rij = 1/Rij. The over-round is given by  1
1 − =∑ =
j n
i ij j r B , so odds-implied 
probabilities  are  given  by  ) 1 /( j ij ij B r q + =  for  all  i.  Suppose  that  the  bettor 
assigns winning probabilities to each competitor of pij. Then the expected profit 
from  a  £1  bet  on  competitor  i  in  event  j  is  1 − ij ijR p .  Denote  the  winning 
probability that the bettor assigns to the eventual winning competitor by pj, and 
the odds-implied probability of the same competitor by qj. Then the bettors’ 
expected profit from a bet on the eventual winner, or ‘edge’, is given by  
(5.24)    1
) 1 (
−
+
=
j j
j
j B q
p
W . 
Now, define the relative McFadden pseudo-R2 by 
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and the relative Maddala pseudo-R2 by 
(5.26)    )]} ( ln ) ( )[ln / 2 exp{( 1
2 p L q L N RD − − = , 
where the log likelihood of the bettor’s model is given by 
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1 1 ln ) ( ln  
and the log likelihood of the public’s model is given by 
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i ij ij
j q y q L
1 1 ln ) ( ln . 
Defined  in  this  way,  the  relative  pseudo-R2s  measure  the  degree  of 
improvement of the model over the public odds for the winning competitor only. 
Thus we can derive a link between the bettor’s realised edge on the winning 
competitor and the relative pseudo-R2 of the model. 
Since the relative McFadden pseudo-R2 can be written as 
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and (5.24) can be rewritten as 
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substituting this into (5.29) gives 
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Rearranging this gives 
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where 
N N
j j j x x GM
/ 1
1 ) ( ) ( ∏ = =  denotes  geometric  mean.  Hence,  the  McFadden 
pseudo-R2 is, ceteris paribus, increasing in average edge, increasing in average   153 
odds-implied probability of the winner, and usually increasing in average over-
round (since, typically,  j j W R + >1 ). Rearranging (5.34) gives 
(5.35)   
2
) / 1 ( ) / (
M R
j j j q q p GM = , 
i.e, the bettor’s edge over the public is this function of their relative McFadden 
pseudo-R2 and the odds-implied probability of the winning competitor. 
Similarly, since the relative Maddala pseudo-R2 can be written as 
(5.36)    ] ) / ln( ) / 2 exp[( 1
1 1
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j p q y N R , 
and (5.24) can be rewritten as 
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substituting this into (5.36) gives 
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So the Maddala pseudo-R2 is, ceteris paribus, increasing in average edge and 
increasing in average over-round. Rearranging (5.40) gives 
(5.41)   
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i.e., the bettor’s edge is positively related to the relative Maddala pseudo-R2 but 
independent  of  the  odds-implied  probability  of  the  winner.  Clearly,  relative 
pseudo-R2s are useful in competitive event prediction. However, we have also 
shown in equations (5.35) and (5.41) that direct relationships can be derived 
between  predicted  model  probabilities,  ‘public’  model  probabilities,  and 
relative pseudo-R2 measures. These relationships are important because they 
show  us  first  that  the  economic  value  of  estimated  model  probabilities  is 
increasing  in  pseudo-R2s,  and  also  the  functional  form  of  this  relationship. 
These formulae are useful for understanding the context in which pseudo-R2s 
should be reported, and could be employed in wider contexts, e.g., when there is   154 
a prior probability of an alternative being chosen that is more appropriate than 
a null probability.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
  In  this  paper,  we  have  set  out  to  describe  and  evaluate  properties  of 
pseudo-R2s as a measure of forecast accuracy in discrete choice models, a class 
of models that have a wide range of applications, from predicting consumer 
demand to epidemiology and operations research. While R2 in ordinary least 
squares linear regression is a widely-used and well-justified measure, the same 
is  typically  not  true  of  pseudo-R2s.  For  instance,  we  have  shown  both 
theoretically and empirically that at least one of the definitions of pseudo-R2 
(McFadden’s definition) is not robust to variations in the number of alternatives 
in each choice problem. We have therefore suggested an adjustment to correct 
for this bias. This has important implications for the comparability of pseudo-R2 
measures across models, particularly non-nested models or models fitted on 
different datasets, which is a key desirable property of any forecast evaluator. 
Further work could investigate the comparability of other definitions of pseudo-
R2 in discrete choice models or other models that involve the logistic function, 
such as generalized additive models. 
We  have  also  described  two  methods  for  estimating  the  variance  of 
pseudo-R2s so that their values can be statistically compared: the bootstrap and 
asymptotic  methods.  A  comparison  of  the  two  methods  on  actual  data 
demonstrates that they are reasonably close in the estimates that they produce, 
so we would recommend that either method is useful in obtaining standard 
errors for pseudo-R2s. Our findings here contribute to an understanding of the 
use  of  pseudo-R2s  in  general,  which  are  often  simply  reported  without  a 
justification or without standard errors when comparing them across models. 
Moreover, these methods are particularly useful when the pseudo-R2 itself is 
the  value  of  interest  in  hypothesis  testing;  for  instance,  in  comparing  the 
predictive  power  of  discrete  choice  models,  or  evaluating  the  efficiency  of 
speculative  financial  markets.  Finally,  we  have  derived  simple  relationships 
between relative pseudo-R2 measures and the expected profit to a bettor from   155 
betting  on  competitive  events,  which  is  an  important  relationship  because 
choice modelling is often employed in the context of competitive events in order 
to assess market efficiency, and efficient markets are a desirable goal in the 
regulation of financial markets to minimize risks of financial shocks. As a result 
of all of the above, we have arrived at a much more rigorous understanding of 
the value of pseudo-R2s in evaluating the predictions of discrete choice models.   157 
Conclusion 
 
  This  section  briefly  summarizes  the  main  findings  of  each  of  the  five 
papers  in  this  thesis,  states  the  contributions  of  each,  discusses  the 
contributions  of  the  thesis  as  a  whole  to  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
biased decision making, and finally discusses the implications of the research 
for policy-making and future research. 
  The  theme  of  Chapter  1  was  that  there  are  a  variety  of  reasons  why 
evidence  of  biased  decision  making  from  laboratory-based  studies  need  not 
necessarily translate to the population as a whole, particularly to individuals 
who have expertise in the task they are carrying out, are offered meaningful 
incentives,  and  dedicate  enough  time  to  the  task  so  as  to  receive  regular, 
unambiguous  feedback  on  the  outcomes  of  their  decisions.  In  discussing 
evidence  (or  lack  of  evidence)  of  biased  decision  making  by  participants  in 
betting markets, this paper shows numerous examples that bettors are rational 
and well-calibrated decision makers, who generally aren’t subject to heuristics 
and  biases  that  are  well-documented  from  laboratory-based  research  (the 
favourite-longshot bias is an important exception). The main conclusion was 
that future research into biased decision making should always account for the 
observed differences in behaviour between laboratory and naturalistic settings. 
While there are advantages and disadvantages of naturalistic and laboratory 
studies, a tandem approach, with each informing the other, seems to be the way 
forward in order to assess the true nature of biased decision making. 
  Chapter 2 was the first study to investigate noise trading and herding in a 
betting  exchange  market.  The  main  conclusions  were  as  follows:  first,  noise 
trading is associated with increased market efficiency, a result that is attributed 
to  the  improved  liquidity  attracting  an  increased  level  of  participation  by 
informed traders. Second, herding is prevalent, particularly so in the later, more 
active stages of the market and in different levels depending on whether price 
changes  follow  a  ‘buy’  or  a  ‘sell’  signal.  The  findings  contribute  to  the 
understanding  of  the  role  of  noise  in  the  efficiency  of  financial  markets  in 
general, as this paper is able to overcome a significant methodological problem 
with  using  regular  financial  market  data,  in  that  regular  financial  markets   158 
always represent current expectation of future prices, and so are inherently 
uncertain. In contrast, betting market prices reach a defined termination point 
at which all uncertainty is resolved. The main finding of this paper, that noise 
trading, volatility, and efficiency of final market prices all move in tandem, has 
important policy implications for all financial markets. For example, the results 
support  arguments  that  regulatory  measures  to  protect  investors  from  the 
destabilizing  effects  of  noise  are  self-defeating, and  suggest  that  focusing  on 
innovative means of reducing the risks to arbitrageurs, rather than discouraging 
speculators, may be the best approach to achieving efficient markets. It is also 
demonstrated  that  the  inefficiency  resulting  from  herding  is  of  such  a 
magnitude that it is possible to make positive returns from strategies in counter 
to  those  of  herding  traders.  The  contribution  of  these  findings  is  that 
regulations in financial markets should be devised to minimize the impact of 
herding while avoiding restrictions to noise traders: particular attention should 
be given to situations where uninformed traders may incorrectly believe that 
there are traders with privileged information operating. Furthermore, markets 
that involve contingent returns at a fixed point in time (such as the markets 
examined  here)  should  always  be  allowed  sufficient  time  to  reach  efficient 
levels. 
  Chapters  3  and  4  investigated  the  favourite-longshot  bias  (FLB)  using 
recent data from all three major types of betting market in the UK and Ireland: 
bookmakers, exchanges, and pari-mutuel pools. Previous research has shown 
that the FLB has existed or is absent in a variety of jurisdictions over many 
decades. These papers provide new reasons for the presence or absence of the 
bias in each type of market. In the case of bookmakers and exchanges, Chapter 3 
makes a number of important contributions. First, it contains evidence of (i) 
FLB in bookmaker markets, and (ii) no FLB in exchange markets. Second, it 
confirms that predictive accuracy of exchange prices is largely superior to that 
of bookmaker prices. However, in the case of exchange markets, it also uncovers 
significant relationships between the FLB and betting volume, and between the 
FLB  and  over-round.  It  also  shows  that  there  are  no  such  relationships  in 
bookmaker markets. Most significantly, a model is developed that suggests that 
the optimal pricing policy for a bookmaker, who competes with other operators   159 
for betting on favourites, is to set prices which include the FLB. The empirical 
results are largely supportive of the predictions of this model. 
  In pari-mutuel markets, Chapter 4 has developed a model that shows that, 
in  order  to  explain  the  FLB  without  reference  to  market  makers,  one  must 
account for a ‘strong favourite’ effect, whereby bettors who generally underbet 
favourites give undue preference to favourites in races where the variance of 
the odds of their rivals is low. This effect is predicted by a representative agent 
model employing prospect theory as the driving force behind bettors’ decisions, 
but  is  not  predicted  by  a  model  employing  expected  utility  theory.  Most 
importantly,  these  predictions  do  not  depend  on  parametric  assumptions  or 
assumptions about the bettor’s choice set as in previous research. Hence, the 
results provide definitive evidence that cognitive errors of traders, rather than 
their risk preferences, explain the FLB. Together, these two papers contribute 
more robust evidence, using new and innovative methodologies, that explain 
the FLB in each type of market. 
  The final chapter explores and solves a number of methodological issues 
relating to pseudo-R2s as a measure of evaluating forecast accuracy of discrete 
choice models, particularly the conditional logit (CL) model. Having employed 
the CL model throughout this thesis, we were able to use results derived in this 
chapter in order to test some of the hypotheses in earlier chapters. Moreover, 
this  paper  shows  how  these  concerns  relate  to  wider  issues  in  the  field  of 
discrete choice modelling as a whole. Future work could explore a much more 
general understanding of the  role that pseudo-R2s have to play in statistical 
modelling. 
  Overall,  this  thesis  makes  a  significant  contribution  towards 
understanding the extent and nature of biased decision making in naturalistic 
environments. As it was argued in Chapter 1, there are many reasons to doubt 
the generalizability of laboratory research, so demonstrating such biases in the 
real  world  is  crucial  to  establishing  solid  foundations  to  the  knowledge  and 
understanding of the manner in which individuals make decisions. Indeed, in 
surveying  previous  literature  in  Chapter  1,  the  conclusion  that  was  arrived 
upon is that decision makers operating in their natural environment generally 
do  not  make  biased  decisions,  or  at  least,  the  extent  and  generality  of  such   160 
biases is significantly lower. This puts the main findings in Chapters 2 and 3 in 
context: each of these papers demonstrated evidence of biased decision making 
in the naturalistic environment of betting on horseracing (herding and the FLB, 
respectively),  and  thus  make  a  significant  contribution  to  the  literature. 
Moreover, in Chapter 2, by categorizing market activity by the time until the end 
of  the  market  and  whether  it  results  in  large  ‘buy’  or  ‘sell’  movements,  this 
paper was able to identify and discuss reasons why herding might occur. This is 
in  itself  is  a  major  contribution  over  previous  studies  of  herding  in  betting 
markets (discussed in Chapter 1) and in regular financial markets (discussed 
briefly in Chapter 2). Similarly, in Chapter 3, it was shown that the extent of the 
FLB  is  dependent  on  a  range  of  factors,  particularly  the  type  of  market 
(exchange  or  bookmaker),  since  transaction  costs  and  the  manner  in  which 
prices are set is different in each type of market. The different costs ensure that 
the type of decision maker, in terms of the information they hold, operating in 
each market is distinct: traders in exchange markets are more informed, and so 
the extent of systematic bias is reduced, and conversely, systematic bias is not 
eliminated in bookmaker markets because costs are restrictive. Furthermore, 
the  bookmaker’s  effective  monopoly  in  setting  prices  as  well  as  the  general 
demand  preferences  of  bettors  participating  in  these  markets  ensures  that 
bookmaker markets display significant bias throughout their duration. All of the 
above  considerations  contribute  to  the  developing  understanding  of  how 
systematic decision making biases can be allowed to persist (monopoly pricing 
and high costs), but also how they can be eliminated (competitive pricing and 
low  costs).  Chapter  4  advanced  a  new  method  (free  of  certain  restrictive 
assumptions) that allows researchers to distinguish between different models 
of decision making that can account for biases such as the FLB. Hence, it makes 
a significant contribution in guiding future research to assessing the relative 
merits of alternative models of decision making. Similarly, Chapter 5 discussed 
a range of limitations in the current methodology for evaluating discrete choice 
models. In a sense, this paper makes a contribution to what is hoped can be an 
informative and highly useful avenue of future research. 
  Research into decision making biases in general, this thesis included, has 
major policy implications in a number of fields. First, a detailed understanding   161 
of heuristics and biases in a management context is key to guiding operational 
decision making and avoiding costly errors at an organizational level. Hence, a 
greater understanding of biases such as herd behaviour and overweighting of 
small  probabilities  can  guide  policy-makers  in  organizations  at  a  high  level. 
Second, the efficient operation of financial markets depends on the appropriate 
regulation of such markets. A greater understanding of the extent and causes of 
herding, the effects of noise trading, and other factors, therefore contributes to 
better deployment of regulations. Finally, a large part of psychological research 
into behaviour is driven by real-world events, and so naturalistic research aids 
the future direction and topicality of laboratory research. 
  Finally, it should be offered that the main strength of this thesis is also its 
greatest limitation: in studying decision making in the naturalistic environment 
of  betting  markets  for  horseracing,  the  scope  of  the  empirical  research  is 
necessarily  narrow.  Future  work  in  the  area  of  naturalistic  biased  decision 
making could further investigate the consistency of empirical evidence of other 
large populations of decision makers with the predictions of theoretical models. 
The FLB is a decision making bias that has received a great deal of attention in 
the literature not only because of its prevalence but because of what it tells us 
about  the  manner  in  which  people  make  decisions  in  a  general  sense.  This 
thesis has described new and more satisfactory explanations for the FLB in the 
three major types of betting market in the UK (and indeed, globally), and in 
doing  so  has  devised  new  and  innovative  theoretical  models  and  empirical 
methodologies and resolved unanswered questions related to the topic. It has 
also shown and explained the prevalence of herd behaviour in these markets 
and the effect that noise trading has on market volatility and efficiency, and 
outlined a range of implications of these findings for policy-making in wider 
financial markets, an important subject because regular financial market data 
are unsuited to robust tests of market efficiency. As a result of the above, this 
thesis has made significant contributions to the existing literature on biased 
decision making in speculative financial markets.   162 
Appendix 1. The Shin model 
 
  In a series of three papers, Shin (1991, 1992, and 1993) demonstrated 
that, in a bookmaker market, the FLB can be explained by supply-side factors: 
specifically,  price-setting  by  the  bookmakers  themselves.  Shin  modelled 
bookmaker markets as a game between a profit-maximizing bookmaker and a 
randomly chosen bettor. The model assumes that the bettor is likely to be a 
noise trader, but could be a perfectly informed insider, who knows precisely the 
identity of the winning horse. The model predicts that, since the bookmaker is 
not perfectly informed, they will depress odds on longshots (the horses with the 
least chances of winning the race) relative to those on favourites in order to 
protect themselves from the possibility of large losses to the insider, who is in 
possession of superior information. 
  Formally,  the  model  is  of  an  n-horse  race  that  involves  a  monopoly 
bookmaker,  a  perfectly  informed  insider  trader,  and  a  set  of  uninformed 
outsiders.  The  bookmaker  sets  prices  ri  (corresponding  to  decimal  odds  of 
i i r R / 1 = ) on all horses, subject to 0 < ri < 1 for all i, and  B r
n
i i + ≤ ∑ = 1
1 , where B > 
0  is  as  small  as  is  required  for  the  bookmaker  to  obtain  monopoly  rights 
through  competition  with  other  potential  market  makers.  The  bookmaker 
knows the true winning probabilities pi, but only the insider knows the identity 
of  the  winning  horse  in  advance.  A  bettor  is  randomly  selected  to  face  the 
bookmaker; the bettor is the insider with probability z (0 ≤ z < 1), or an outsider 
who  attaches  probability  1  to  the  i-th  horse  with  probability  i p z) 1 ( − .  The 
bettor is then permitted to bet £1 with the bookmaker on their preferred horse, 
which is the winning horse if the bettor is the insider, or the i-th horse if the 
bettor  is  the  i-th  outsider.  Hence,  the  problem  for  the  expected  profit-
maximizing bookmaker is to set the ri to maximize 
(A1.1)    ∑ =
− +
−
n
i
i
i i
r
p z zp
1
2 ) 1 (
1  
subject to  B r
n
i i + ≤ ∑ = 1
1  and 0 < ri < 1 for all i. The solution of this problem is 
given by   163 
(A1.2)   
2
1 1 ] ) ( [ 1 ∑ ∑ = = = = +
n
s s
n
s s p F r B , 
  ∑ = =
n
s s i i p F p F r
1 ) ( ) ( , 
where 
(A1.3)   
2 / 1 2] ) 1 ( [ ) ( i i i p z zp p F − + = , 
which gives rise to a FLB, i.e.,  j i j i j i p p p p r r > ⇔ < / / . 
  The value of z in Shin’s (1993) model gives rise to a direct means (known 
as  Shin  z)  of  measuring  the  proportion  of  market  participation  that  can  be 
attributed to traders with privileged information. Although in Shin’s original 
model, informed traders are perfectly informed, Fingleton and Waldron (1999) 
relaxed  this  assumption,  showing  that  it  is  equivalent  to  suppose  that  the 
precision of the informed trader’s information can vary, and that the Shin z 
value is equal to the level of informed trading times the degree of precision. 
Hence, it is reasonable to assume a more general situation in which a range of 
different types of informed traders operate, but that the level of influence they 
have in the market is likely to vary in tandem. The Shin z value itself is directly 
derived from final bookmaker prices and has been used extensively in betting 
market studies in order to investigate claims relating to the level of informed 
trading (e.g., Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997; Smith et al., 2006). 
  There are several accepted methods for estimating the Shin z value for a 
given  event. Shin’s  (1993)  own  method  was  based  around  the  Taylor  series 
expansion  of  ) ( i p F  around  1/n.  Jullien  and  Salanié  (1994)  noticed  that  the 
equations in (A1.2) can be rearranged to give 
(A1.4)    ) 1 /( ) (
2 2 B r p F i i + = , 
which in turn can be solved for pi to yield 
(A1.5)   
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Thus, the condition  1
1 = ∑ =
n
i i p  can be used to estimate the value of z for a given 
event. In Chapter 2 we adopt the iterative method of Law and Peel (2002), in 
which we square and sum (A1.5) before rearranging the resulting expression to 
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(A1.6)   
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The iterative procedure is then to start with an initial estimate of z, calculate the 
pi using (A1.5), calculate a new value of z using (A1.6), and repeat these two 
steps until convergence. 
  Shin’s model can explain the FLB in bookmaker markets and gives a useful 
measure of insider (or just informed) trading in these markets. However, one 
must  accept  the  assumptions  of  Shin’s  model.  The  key  assumption  is  that 
knowledgeable  insiders  are  more  likely  to  bet  on  longshots  than  favourites, 
which is a reasonable assumption to make given anecdotal evidence. However, 
it has been pointed out (e.g., Schnytzer and Shilony, 2005) that some of the 
assumptions in Shin’s model are unrealistic. However, similar conclusions can 
be reached with these assumptions relaxed. For example, Schnytzer and Shilony 
(2005)  found  that  bookmakers  should  raise  prices  on  longshots  more  than 
favourites in order to defend themselves against insider knowledge, without 
assuming that insiders know which horse will win the race, or that insiders are 
more  likely  to  bet  on  longshots.  Peirson  and  Smith  (2010)  extend  the  Shin 
model while relaxing the assumptions that insiders know which horse will win 
the race, and that the amount bet by insiders is fixed and not related to the odds 
on offer. Their model demonstrates that bookmakers should increase prices on 
those horses where there is a higher probability of inside information being 
employed.   165 
Appendix 2. A model of competing markets 
 
  Here we prove the main propositions from the model in section 3.3. We 
consider two markets, a bookmaker and an exchange, which offer prices qi and 
ri,  respectively,  on  a  single  race  with  n  runners,  with  over-rounds  given  by 
1
1 − =∑ =
n
i i b q B  and  1
1 − =∑ =
n
i i e r B ,  respectively,  with  e b B B > .  We  assume  that 
the bookmaker’s best estimates for true probabilities are the exchange odds-
implied probabilities, i.e., pi = ri/(1+Be). We also make the approximation that 
the qi are continuous on the interval (0, 1). Considering a small time interval, 
over which Be, Bb, and the ri are constant the bookmaker’s goal is to maximize 
their expected returns  ) ,..., ( 1 n q q G  over this time interval. Denote the demand 
curve for horse i, which is the amount bet on horse i when the bookmaker and 
exchange  prices  are  qi and ri,  respectively,  by  ) , ( i i r q f ,  normalized  so  that  it 
satisfies f(r, r) = r/(1+Be). Therefore,  ) ,..., ( 1 n q q G  is given by 
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subject to the over-round condition  b
n
i i B q + = ∑ = 1
1 . 
  For  fixed  ri,  Bb  and  Be,  this  is  a  constrained  optimization  problem  to 
maximize 
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1 1 1 b
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where λ is a constant. The solutions are given by the system of equations 
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We do not seek to solve this system of equations, but note a sufficient condition 
for the FLB in the bookmaker prices: for two horses j (a longshot) and k (a 
favourite: rj < rk), with odds-implied probabilities equal across the exchange and 
bookmaker  markets  ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e j b j B r B q + + = , ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e k b k B r B q + + = ),  the 
marginal increase in expected returns for an increase in price is greater for the 
longshot  ( k j q H q H ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ / / ).  Furthermore,  the  greater  the  difference,  the   166 
greater  the  level  of  FLB.  So,  denoting  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ˆ e i b i B r B q + + =  and  with  some 
manipulation, this condition becomes 
(A2.4)    0 )] , ˆ ( ' ) , ˆ ( ' [
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We have now the following as a sufficient condition for the FLB: 
(A2.5)    ) , ( ' ) , ( ' k k j j r xr f r xr f > , 
for  all  x  such  that  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 e b B B x + + ≤ ≤ .  That  (A2.4)  follows  from  (A2.5)  is 
proved in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. If condition (A2.5) is satisfied, then so is (A2.4). 
Proof.  If  rj  <  rk,  and  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 e b B B x + + ≤ ≤ ,  then  by  (A2.5), 
) , ( ' ) , ( ' k k j j r xr f r xr f > . So, by an integration inequality, 
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Hence, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, 
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Furthermore, 1/rj > 1/rk, so 
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Now,  ) 1 /( ) , ( e B r r r f + = , so 
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i.e., 
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So inequality (A2.4) holds. 
 
  Moreover,  the  difference  k j q H q H ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ / /  is  increasing  in  both  Bb 
(holding  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e b B B + +  fixed) and  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( e b B B + + , i.e., the level of FLB should 
increase both with bookmaker over-round and the level of competition between 
the bookmaker and the exchange.   167 
Proposition  2.  If  there  is  no  competition  (Bb  =  Be),  then  there  is  still  FLB 
(provided (A2.5) holds). 
Proof. If Bb = Be, then  i i r q = ˆ , so equation (A2.4) becomes 
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Now,  ) 1 /( ) , ( e B r r r f + = , so the first two terms in (A2.11) cancel, leaving the 
condition 
(A2.12)    0 ) , ( ' ) , ( ' > − k k j j r r f r r f . 
This is satisfied by (A2.5) when x = 1, so (A2.4) is a sufficient condition for the 
FLB even when Bb = Be. 
 
Proposition 3. Furthermore, if there is no over-round (Bb = 0) then there is no 
FLB. 
Proof. We show that  0 / = ∂ ∂ i q H  is satisfied by qi = ri. If Bb = Be = 0, then (A2.3) 
simplifies to 
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(A2.14)      λ − = ∂ ∂ 1 / i q H . 
This is true for all i so we can choose λ = 1, i.e., 0 / = ∂ ∂ i q H .   168 
Appendix 3. Proof from Chapter 4 
 
  We show here that, for  ) (t v  an increasing function that is concave for t > 0, 
(A3.1)    ∑ = − −
=
n
k
k x v xR v
X
2 ) ( ) (
1
 
is decreasing in the variance of the Rk. To see this, first suppose there are just 3 
horses in the race. Denote the odds on the non-favourites by R2 and R3, with 
respective ‘prices’ given by r = 1/R2 and  3 / 1 R r K = − . Since  ) ( x v −  is constant 
for  all  k,  we  set  0 ) ( = −x v .  Representing  the  value  function  for  gains  by  a 
concave power function 
α t t v = ) ( , 0 < α < 1, we have that 
(A3.2)    ] ) ( [
α α α r K r x X − + =
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Hence 
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1 1 − − − − − =
α α α α r K r x
dr
dX
, 
which is negative if and only if r > K/2, i.e., increasing the variance of the prices 
(and hence odds) for non-favourites has the effect of decreasing X. The converse 
result holds for the expected utility model if the utility of wealth function is 
convex.   169 
Appendix 4. Proofs from Chapter 5 
 
Proposition 1. If the model probabilities are  j j ij n n f p / ) ( = , then the McFadden 
and Maddala pseudo-R2s are given by 
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means of the number of competitors and of  ) ( j n f , respectively. Here, N is the 
number of events. 
Proof. First, recall that the definitions of the McFadden and Maddala pseudo-
R2s are given by 
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For the Maddala pseudo-R2, 
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  The following lemmas are adapted from Hu, Shao, and Palta (2006) for the 
conditional logit model (their proofs are for the multinomial logit model). 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose the independent variables xij, j = 1, 2, … , N, i = 1, 2, … , nj, are 
independent  and  identically  distributed  random  m-vectors  with  finite  second 
moment  (i.e.,  ) (
2
ij x E  finite).  Then  0 )] ( ln ) ˆ ( )[ln / 1 ( p L L N → − β β  as  ∞ → N , 
where  p →  denotes convergence in probability. 
Proof. We first prove that 
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which is finite by assumption of finite second moment. Hence, each element of 
the  second  order  derivative  matrix  is  ) (N Op .  The  remainder  of  the  proof  is 
from  Hu,  Shao,  and  Palta  (2006).  Let  β β β ∂ ∂ = / ) ( ln ) ( L SN  and 
)) ( ( ) ( β β N N J E I =  be the score function and information matrix, respectively, 
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where β* is a vector between β ˆ  and β. The asymptotic normality results of the 
maximum likelihood estimator gives  ) 1 , 0 ( ) ˆ ( ) (
2 / 1 N IN → − β β β . The lemma then 
follows from  ) 1 ( ) (
2 / 1
p N O N I =
− β  and  ) 1 ( / *) ( p N O N J = β .   172 
Lemma 2. Assume that the independent variables xij, j = 1, 2, … , N, i = 1, 2, … , nj, 
are independent and identically distributed random m-vectors with finite second 
moment (i.e.,  ) (
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Similarly, 
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By the Law of Large Numbers, as  ∞ → N , 
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Moreover, from Lemma 1, as  ∞ → N , 
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Proposition 2. Assume that the independent variables xij, j = 1, 2, … , N, i = 1, 2, … , 
nj,  are  independent  and  identically  distributed  random  m-vectors  with  finite 
second moment (i.e.,  ) (
2
ij x E  finite). Let H1, H2 be given by (A4.16) and let 
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By the Central Limit Theorem (in two dimensions), 
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this leads to the asymptotic normality results in (A4.23).   175 
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